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LC. No. 2010-000114 
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR STAY 
OF 05.17.2011 ORDER TO PAY 
COMPENSATION BENEFITS 
(A) PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On May 3, 2010, the Claimant filed his Request For Calendaring and listed the following 
disputed issues to be heard and decided by the Industrial Commission: 
(1) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 bending over to tie his work I snow boots accident arise out 
of and in the course of his employment with UPS? 
(2) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident either cause a new injury or aggravate, 
accelerate, light-up, combine with or contribute to a pre-existing back condition and 
result in the need for medical treatment? 
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(3) Are the Defendants liable for medical benefits as required by the Claimant's attending 
physician or needed immediately after the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury 
and a reasonable time thereafter pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-432? 
(4) Are the Defendants liable for the payment of total temporary disability (TTD) and I or 
temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits to the Claimant during his period of recovery? 
(5) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident cause the Claimant to suffer any 
permanent physical impairment (PPI) and, if so, to what extent? 
(6) Did the Claimant suffer any disability in excess of his physical impairment (PPD >PPI) 
as the result of his 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury, including whether the Claimant is 
totally and permanently disabled under the 100% method or the odd-lot doctrine? 
(7) Are the Defendants liable for the payment of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-
804? (Judicial Notice of Industrial Commission's adjudicative file). 
On May 12, 2010, the Defendants filed a Motion To Bifurcate the issues and listed the 
following issues to be heard and decided at the 09.28.2010 Hearing: 
1. Whether Claimant's injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment; 
2. Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing injury or disease 
or cause not work-related; 
3. Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as provided for by 
Idaho Code§ 72-432, and the extent thereof; 
4. Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability 
(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof; and 
5. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's unreasonable 
denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804 
(Judicial Notice of Industrial Commission's adjudicative file). 
On July 20, 2010, the Industrial Commission entered a NOTICE OF HEARING which 
bifurcated the issues and listed the following disputed issues to be heard and decided at the 
09.28.2010 Hearing: 
1. Whether Claimant suffered a personal injury ansmg out of and in the course of 
employment; 
2. Whether Claimant's injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment; 
3. Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as provided for by 
Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof; 
4. Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and I or temporary total disability 
(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof; 
5. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer I Surety's unreasonable 
denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code§ 72-804? 
(Judicial Notice of Industrial Commission's adjudicative file). 
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The bifurcated hearing was held on 09.28.2010. After the Hearing, the Industrial 
Commission entered its 05.17.2011 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order which awarded 
the Claimant TTD benefits from 12.28.2009 - 12.06.2010 and past denied medical benefits in the 
amount of $149,033.68 (Judicial Notice of Industrial Commission's adjudicative file). 
The Defendants did not file a Motion For Permissive Appeal with the Industrial 
Commission within fourteen (14) days of the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 Order as 
required by Idaho Appellate Rule (IAR) 12(b) (Judicial Notice of Industrial Commission's 
adjudicative file). The Defendants did not file a Motion For Reconsideration or Rehearing of the 
Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 Order within twenty (20) days as required by Idaho Code 
§72-718 (Judicial Notice of Industrial Commission's adjudicative file). 
On June 20, 2011, the Defendants filed their NOTICE OF APPEAL with the Industrial 
Commission (Judicial Notice of Industrial Commission's adjudicative file). On June 27, 2011, 
the Claimant filed his Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal and Brief in Support with the 
Idaho Supreme Court (See Exhibit 7 to Affidavit of Susan R. Veltman in Support of Defendants' 
Memorandum Regarding Payment Obligations filed by the Defendants with the Industrial 
Commission on September 16, 2011). 
On July 27, 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court granted the Claimant's Motion For 
Involuntary Dismissal and dismissed the Defendants' Appeal (See Exhibit 2 to Affidavit of 
Susan R. Veltman in Support of Defendants' Memorandum Regarding Payment Obligations filed 
by the Defendants with the Industrial Commission on September 16, 2011). On August 15, 
2011, the Idaho Supreme Court denied the Defendants' Motion For Clarification (See Exhibit 4 
to Affidavit of Susan R. Veltman in Support of Defendants' Memorandum Regarding Payment 
Obligations filed by the Defendants with the Industrial Commission on September 16, 2011 ). 
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As of this date on September 27, 2011, the Defendants have not paid the Claimant the 
past denied TTD benefits and past denied medical benefits that they were Ordered to pay by the 
Industrial Commission in its May 17, 2011 Order. 
(B) ISSUE PRESENTED 
DO THE DEFENDANTS HAVE A LEGAL OBLIGATION TO RESPECT THE AUTHORITY 
AND JURISDICTION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND COMPLY WITH ITS 
05.17.2011 ORDER TO PAY COMPENSATION BENEFITS TO CLAIMANT 
(C) ARGUMENT 
(1) THE DEFENDANTS HAVE WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE FINAL 
AND BINDING EFFECT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S MAY 17, 2011 
ORDER BECAUSE THEY DID NOT FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
AND I OR REHEARING WITHIN 20 DAYS AS REQUIRED BY IDAHO CODE 72-718 
The Industrial Commission has consistently held that its decisions are final and conclusive 
with respect to all matters adjudicated unless a party files a Motion For Reconsideration within 20 
days pursuant to LC.§ 72-718: 
A decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and 
conclusive as to all matters adjudicated, provided that within twenty days 
from the date of filing the decision, any party may move for 
reconsideration. Idaho Code § 72-718. (See ORDER DENYING 
RECONSIDERTION in McCrorey v. Boise Paving & Asphalt Co., and 
Explorer Insurance Co., LC. 2000-025583 (Filed: 06.23.2011). 
Since the Defendants did not file a Motion For Reconsideration and I or a Motion For 
Rehearing within 20 days of the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 decision, the Commission's 
05.17.2011 decision became final and conclusive with respect to the Defendants' legal obligation to 
pay Claimant past denied TTD benefits and past denied medical benefits. The Industrial 
Commission should enter an Order finding that the Defendants have waived their right to challenge 
the Commission's 05.17.11 Order and must comply with said Order by immediately paying to the 
Vawter I Claimant's 09.27.2011 Response to Defendants' Motion for Stay of05.l 7.201 l Order To Pay Compensation Page 4 
{7 
Claimant retroactive TTD benefits and past denied medical benefits in accordance with the 
Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 Order. 
(2) THE DEFENDANTS HAVE WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE 
BINDING EFFECT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S MAY 17, 2011 ORDER 
BECAUSE THEY DID NOT FILE A MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL WITH 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WITHIN 14 DAYS AFTER THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION ENTERED ITS MAY 17, 2011 ORDER AS REQUIRED BY IAR 12(b) 
The Defendants either knew (or should have known) that the Industrial Commission's 
05.17.2011 Order was not an Order that could be appealed as a matter of right under IAR 11 
because that Order did not fully and finally dispose of all of the disputed issues in this case. When 
the Idaho Supreme Court denied the Defendants' Motion For Clarification on August 15, 2011, the 
Idaho Supreme Court specifically referred the Defendants to the case of Jensen v. Pillsbury Co, 121 
Idaho 127, 828 P.2d 161 (1992) in an effort to help the Defendants understand the difference 
between a final Order which may appealed as a matter of right versus an Interlocutory Order that 
may only be appealed by permission of the Supreme Court in cases where the requirements of IAR 
12 have been met. 
Rule 12. Appeal by perm1ss10n. (b) Motion to District Court or 
Administrative Agency--Order. A motion for permission to appeal from an 
interlocutory order or judgment, upon the grounds set forth in subdivision 
(a) of this rule, shall be filed with the district court or administrative 
agency within fourteen (14) days from date of entry of the order or 
judgment. The motion shall be filed, served, noticed for hearing and 
processed in the same manner as any other motion, and hearing of the 
motion shall be expedited. 
Because the Defendants did not file a Motion For Permissive Appeal of the Industrial 
Commission's 05.17.2011 Order with the Industrial Commission within 14 days of the 
Commission's 05.17.2011 Order as required by IAR 12(b), the Defendants waived their right to 
challenge the finality and binding effect of the Order and Commission's 05.17.2011 decision 
became final and conclusive with respect to the Defendants' legal obligation to pay Claimant past 
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denied TTD benefits and past denied medical benefits. 
The Industrial Commission should enter an Order finding that the Defendants have waived 
their right to challenge the Commission's 05 .17 .11 Order and must comply with said Order 
immediately by paying to the Claimant retroactive TTD benefits and past denied medical benefits in 
accordance with the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 Order. 
(3) THE DEFENDANTS HA VE WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE 
BINDING EFFECT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S MAY 17, 2011 ORDER 
BECAUSE THE LAW IN IDAHO HAS LONG BEEN THAT A PARTY MAY NOT 
SUCCESSFULLY COMPLAIN OF ERRORS THAT SHE HAS INVITED 
On pages 6-7 of their Memorandum requesting a Stay, the Defendants attempt to blame the 
Claimant for the predicament that they are now facing because they made the decision to file their 
Motion To Bifurcate on May 12, 2010. The Defendants' arguments are not supported by the 
pleadings on file with the Industrial Commission. 
On May 3, 2010, the Claimant filed a Request For Calendaring which asked the Industrial 
Commission to resolve all disputed issues in this case at a final Hearing. On May 12, 2010, the 
Defendants responded to the Claimant's Request For Calendaring and filed their Motion To 
Bifurcate the issues and asked the Commission to resolve less than all of the disputed issues in this 
case. The Industrial Commission granted the Defendants' Motion To Bifurcate and issued its July 
20, 2010 NOTICE OF HEARING which listed less than all of the disputed issues in this case to 
be heard and decided at the September 28, 2010 Hearing. 
By requesting bifurcation of the issues and then making the decision to not file a Motion 
For Reconsideration and the decision to not file a Motion For Permissive Appeal, the Defendants 
now find themselves in the position of their own making and must accept their obligation to 
comply with the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 Order and pay the Claimant the past denied 
TTD benefits and past denied medical benefits which are long overdue: 
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It has long been the law in Idaho that one may not successfully complain 
of errors one has acquiesced in or invited. Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale 
Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 433, 95 P.3d 34, 52 (2004) (citing State v Owsley, 
105 Idaho 836, 838, 673 P.2d 436, 438 (1983)). 
The predicament that the Defendants find themselves m now is analogous to the 
predicament that the Defendants found themselves in Godfrey v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter 
Day Saints, IC 2005-012945; 2009-028453; 2007-020643 and 2008-012881(0rder Denying 
Motion To Reconsider filed 07.27.2011). 
In Godfrey, the Defendants conceded in their Responsive Brief that in order to resolve the 
"arising out of employment" issue, the Commission had to address the medical causation issue. 
However, when the Commission did exactly what the Defendants asked them to do and decided 
the causation issue, the Defendants complained and filed a Motion For Reconsideration arguing 
that is was improper for the Commission to address causation. 
On Reconsideration, the Commission rejected the Defendants' complaints about the 
Commission having decided an issue that the Defendants invited the Commission to decide 1: 
Having invited the Commission to consider the issue, and having adduced 
proof on the issue, the Defendant may not be heard to argue surprise when 
faced with an outcome that is contrary to its expectations. Godfrey, supra, 
at p. 5. 
Just like the Defendants in Godfrey, by filing their 05.12.2010 Motion To Bifurcate the 
Defendants in this case invited the Commission to enter its 05.17.2011 Order which did not fully 
and finally decide all of the disputed issues in this case. It would be contrary to the law of Idaho 
to allow the Defendants to avoid their legal obligation to make the prompt payment of 
compensation to the Claimant based on an Order that the Defendants invited the Commission to 
enter. 
1 The same law finn that represented the Defendants in Godfrey is representing the Defendants in this case. 
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The Industrial Commission should enter an Order finding that the Defendants have waived 
their right to challenge the Commission's 05.17.11 Order and must comply with said Order by 
immediately paying the Claimant retroactive TTD benefits and past denied medical benefits in 
accordance with the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 Order. 
(4) THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE IDAHO WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT 
ENTITLES THE INJURED WORKER TO SURE AND CERTAIN RELIEF IN THE 
FORM OF THE PROMPT PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION BENEFITS WHEN DUE 
The fundamental public policy of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act is to provide sure 
and certain relief to the injured worker and his family. 
"We must liberally construe the provisions of the workers' compensation 
law in favor of the employee, in order to serve the humane purpose for 
which the law was promulgated." Murray-Donahue v. Nat'l Car Rental 
Licensee Ass'n, 127 Idaho 337, 340, 900 P.2d 1348, 1351 (1995) (citing 
Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 333, 337, 870 P.2d 1292, 
1296 (1994)). 
*** 
Idaho's workers' compensation law is remedial legislation. It is a well-
known canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation is to be 
liberally construed to give effect to the intent of the legislature. State By 
and Through Alan G. Lance v. Hobby Horse Ranch Tractor and Equip. 
Co., 129 Idaho 565, 567, 929 P.2d 741, 743 (1996) (citing NORMAN J. 
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.01 at 
147 (5th ed. 1992)). The intent of the Idaho Legislature in enacting the 
workers' compensation law was to provide "sure and certain relief for 
injured workmen ... regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion 
of every other remedy." Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 346, 
109 P.3d 1084, 1089 (2005). 
(A) Sure and Certain Relief in the Form of Time Loss Benefits During Period of Recovery 
The Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011 Order required the Defendants to pay the 
Claimant TTD benefits from 12.28.2009 - 12.06.2010. (See Conclusions of Law and Order No. 2 
on pg. 21 of the 05.17.2011 decision). The total amount of TTD benefits past due (excluding 
interest) is $28,352. 70, calculated as follows: 
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2009 TTD Benefits Due 
During the 09.07.2011 telephone conference with the Commission, the Defendants conceded that 
the Claimant's high date of injury wage would subject him to the 90% AWSW cap based on 
application of the limits set forth in Idaho Code §72-408 and §72-409. In 2009, 90% of the 
AWSW was $572.40 and the daily rate was $81.77. Based on the 05.17.2011 Order, the 
Defendants owe the Claimant 4 days of benefits in 2009 at $81.77 per day or $327.09 (i.e., 
12.28.09-12.31.09 = 4 days). 
Total 2009 TTD benefits due= $327.09 
2010 TTD Benefits Due 
In 2010, 90% of the A WSW was $578.70 and the daily rate was $82.67. The Defendants owe 
the Claimant 48 weeks+ 3 days from 01.01.2010- 12.06.2010: 
48 weeks X $578. 70 
3 days X $82.67 




Combined Total TTD Benefits Due: $327.09 + $28,025.61 = $28,352.70 (excluding interest). 
(B) Sure and Certain Relief in the Form of Past Denied Medical Benefits 
The Industrial Commission Ordered the Defendants to provide the Claimant with sure 
and certain relief in the form of $149,033.68 in past denied medical benefits (excluding interest) 
(See Order No. 3 on pg. 21 of its 5 .17 .11 decision). The combined principal amount of the 
benefits that the Industrial Commission Ordered the Defendants to pay to Claimant in its 
05.17.2011 decision is $177,386.38 calculated as follows: 
Past denied TTD benefits of $28,025.61 +past denied medical benefits of 
$149,033.68 =total benefits that are past due and owing= $177,386.38. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code §72-734, interest became due and payable on the entire amount as 
of the date of the 05.17.2011 decision based on the statutory rate of interest set forth in Idaho 
Code §28-22-104(2). In the past 133 days since the Industrial Commission entered its 
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05.17.2011 Order, $3,414.39 in interest charges have accrued which must be added to the 
principal sum in order to calculate the total amount now due as of 09 .27.2011. 
The legal rate of interest from 5.17.11 to 6.30.11 was 5.375%. Effective 7.1.11, the legal 
rate of interest changed to 5.25% (Source: Idaho State Treasurer's Web-Site 
http://sto.idaho.gov/Reports/LegalRateOflnterest.aspx). The total amount of accrued interest as of 
09.27.2011 can be calculated as follows: 
Interest Due from 5.17.11 -6.30.11Using5.35% Interest Rate 
Total amount of $177,386.38 X 5.35% = $9,490.17 per annum+ 365 = $26.00 per day 
May = 14 days X $26.00 = 




Interest Due from 7 .1.11 - 9 .27 .11 Using 5 .25% Interest Rate 
Total amount of $177,386.38 X 5.25% = $9,312.78 per annum+ 365 = $25.51 per day. 
July= 31 days X $25.51 = 
August = 31 days X $25 .51 = 





Total Interest Accumulated Since 05.17.2011: 
$2,270.39 
$3,414.39 
The Industrial Commission should enter a supplemental Order which immediately 
requires the Defendants to pay to the Claimant $180,800.77; i.e., principal of $177,386.38 + 
interest of $3,414.39 = $180,800.77). 
The Idaho legislature has declared it the express public policy of this state to require 
employers I sureties to make the prompt payment of compensation th to the injured worker and 
his family in order to protect their welfare: 
CHAPTER3 
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SECURITY FOR COMPENSATION 
72-304. Prompt compensation payments required Rules and 
regulations. The commission is authorized to make and change from time 
to time such rules and regulations as it shall deem necessary to secure the 
prompt payment of compensation, and after affording the surety 
opportunity to be heard, may withdraw its approval of any employer or 
surety who unnecessarily delays payment of compensation, and the 
commissioner [director] of [the department of] insurance upon notification 
accordingly shall withdraw his authorization of a surety to insure or 
guarantee the payment of workmen's compensation liability of employers 
in this state (emphasis supplied). 
IDAPA §17.02.11 also places a mandatory duty on employers I sureties to comply with 
the Idaho Workers' Compensation statutes and rules so that the "payment of compensation [to 
injured workers} shall be sure and certain and not unnecessarily delayed": 
17.02.11.000.LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
These rules are adopted and promulgated by the Industrial Commission 
pursuant to the provisions of Sections 72- 508, 72-301 and 72-304, Idaho 
Code. 
17.02.11.014.06. Comply with Law and Rules. Comply with the statutes 
of the state of Idaho and the rules of the Industrial Commission to the end 
that payment of compensation shall be sure and certain and not 
unnecessarily delayed. The Commission may withdraw its approval of any 
employer to operate as a self-insurer if it shall appear to the Commission 
that workers secured by said self-insured employer are not adequately 
protected and served, or the employer is failing to comply with the 
provisions of these rules or the Workers' Compensation Law. 
17.02.11.051.09. Prompt Claim Servicing. Prompt claim servicing 
includes, but is not limited to: 
11. Non-Compliance. Non-compliance with the above requirements may 
result in the revocation of the authority of a self-insured employer to self-
insure its workers' compensation obligations in the state of Idaho, or such 
lesser sanctions as the Industrial Commission may impose. 
By refusing to comply with the Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011 Order and pay the 
Claimant the $180,800. 77 in past due TTD and medical benefits, the Defendants have clearly 
breached their statutory duty to make the prompt payment of compensation to the Claimant. 
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However, the Defendants ask the Industrial Commission to overlook their flagrant violation of 
their statutory obligations and the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 Order based on the 
supposition that the Claimants' past denied medical bills have already been paid by the Oregon 
Teamster Employers Trust and his temporary disability benefits have already been paid by his 
short-term/ long-term disability carrier (Seep. 5 of Defendants' Memorandum, LI. 13-19). 
The argument that UPS should be relieved of its legal obligation to make the prompt 
payment of compensation benefits due to the Claimant because its denial of this claim shifted the 
financial burden of the Claimant's disability to other health insurance companies and I or short-
term/ long-term disability insurance companies is bad public policy and was recently rejected by 
the Industrial Commission in June of 2011: 
Defendants' argument is contrary to statute. Section 72-432 requires 
Defendants, and only Defendants - not a private health insurance 
provider- to pay for medical care relating to Claimant's industrial injury. 
The fact that Claimant's medical bills may have been paid by private 
insurance is immaterial; if they have been paid, they have been paid by the 
wrong entity. Defendants, not private insurance, are liable to pay for this 
claim, and Defendants are not allowed to substitute private insurance for 
workers' compensation. Such is contrary to Idaho law. See Idaho Code § 
72-201 (establishing workers' compensation as exclusive compensation 
for injured workers) and § 72-318 (devices that are designed to relieve 
employers of their liability under the workers' compensation statutes are 
invalid). (See Ferrin v. Bechtel Bettis, Inc., and Intermountain Claims, LC. 
No. 2006-001471, Order Regarding Reconsideration, filed 06.06.2011) 
(emphasis supplied). 
The Defendants next argue that the Industrial Commission should overlook their refusal 
to comply with the Commission's 05.17.2011 Order because the Claimant will have to 
eventually relinquish any payment that the Defendants make to the Claimant to his health and 
disability carriers in order to satisfy their subrogation interests (See p. 5 of Defendants' 
Memorandum, LL 20-21 - p. 6, LL 1-2). 
Vawter I Claimant's 09.27.2011 Response to Defendants' Motion for Stay of05.17.2011 Order To Pay Compensation Page 12 
!'t> ( 
Whether the Claimant has a duty to reimburse his health carrier and I or his disability 
carrier from any payments that he receives from the Defendants is immaterial - the Defendants 
are liable to pay this claim under the Act and their original liability is not a function of whether 
the Claimant has a secondary obligation to reimburse his Subrogees based on contractual 
relationships entered into outside of the workers' compensation system as the result of the 
Defendants' denial: 
We note that, under the Edmonson rule, Defendants must pay the medical 
care award directly to Claimant. It is for Claimant and his counsel, not 
Defendants, to pay the providers and/or the insurers with whom Claimant 
contracted outside the workers' compensation system for the provision of 
medical services. Neel v. Western Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 
852 (2009), Ferrin supra at p. 4 (emphasis supplied). 
The Industrial Commission's decision in Ferrin is consistent with a long line oflndustrial 
Commission decisions where the Commission has held that the Defendants in denied claims do 
not have the right to control the manner, method or timing of the Claimant's reimbursement of 
his Subrogees outside the workers' compensation system: 
The worker is the entity who has a legal obligation to reimburse the 
medical providers. Thus, the Defendant's argument that it had a right to 
audit for "usual" and "customary" charges is misguided .... In the present 
case, Defendants speculate as to who will receive the "excess" monies if 
Claimant's counsel negotiates reductions with the providers. Whether 
negotiations occur with the providers is of no concern to Defendants. 
Claimant is in a contractual relationship with his providers - Defendants 
are not. Defendants do not have a right to unilaterally reduce the billing of 
a medical provider with whom they have no relationship or contractual 
agreement. Such would constitute a windfall for Defendants that, in 
denying the claim, they did not earn .... 
Ample documentation exists regarding the Commission's pos1t10n on 
payment of medical bills following a denied claim. Defendants' efforts to 
distinguish prior decisions is without merit. The weight of case law in 
opposition to Defendants' position makes their denial of full 
reimbursement for Claimant's medial invoices unreasonable. Pursuant to 
Idaho Code §72-804, Claimant is entitled to attorney's fees of 25% of the 
amount of Claimant's medical bills that remain outstanding and unpaid by 
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Defendants. (See Industrial Commission's 12.11.2007 Order Regarding 
Payment of Medical Benefits in Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., and 
Advantage Workers Compensation Insurance Company, LC. No. 2005-
011115) (emphasis supplied). 
******** 
"Defendants' request that the Commission control how part of this award 
is distributed is not persuasive. In a denied claim situation, providers are 
not entitled to direct payment from the employer I surety under the 
workers' compensation system. . .. How and in what manner those 
obligations are satisfied is for Claimant and her attorney to resolve" (See 
10.2.2008 Order Regarding Attorney's Fees in Farrar v. Adecco and 
American Home Assurance Company, LC. No. 2006-013181) (emphasis 
supplied). 
Even though the Industrial Commission recently held in Ferrin that the Defendants have 
no right to control the manner, method or timing by which the Claimant satisfies his obligations 
to his Subrogees outside of the worker's compensation system, the Defendants request that the 
Industrial Commission enter a supplemental Order which requires the Claimant to place any 
payments received from the Defendants pursuant to the Commission's 05.17.2011 Order in a 
trust account where the funds must sit idle for several years until the Idaho Supreme Court issues 
its final opinion on the "arising out of employment" issue (See Defendants' Memorandum, p. 7, 
LL 21-22 -page 8, L. 4). 
The Industrial Commission should reject the Defendants' attempt to control the manner, 
method or timing by which the Claimant reimburses his Subrogees by requiring the Claimant to 
hold any payments received from the Defendants in trust for several years while this case grinds 
through the administrative and appellate legal process. If the Industrial Commission allows the 
Defendants in denied claims to place these types of constraints on the Claimant's benefits and 
the rights of his Subrogees, that would constitute bad public policy that will have a chilling 
effect on the injured workers' ability to receive medical care and disability payments outside the 
workers compensation system because health insurance and I or disability carriers will no longer 
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step up to the plate and accept the financial burden of the Defendants' denial if they know that 
the Defendants have the power to prevent them from getting reimbursed for several years: 
Moreover, as the Commission pointed out in its written decision, if an 
insurer is aware that, even if the Commission awards workers' 
compensation benefits to an injured worker, the worker has no obligation 
to reimburse the insurance company for payment of the same expenses, the 
insurer will likely hesitate to provide compensation to injured workers 
who could potentially recover workers' compensation benefits. Therefore, 
interpreting the statute in the way that Williams proposes could actually 
have a negative effect on injured workers by discouraging insurance 
companies from paying medical expenses while the worker is seeking 
workers' compensation benefits-a potentially lengthy process. Williams 
v. Blue Cross of Idaho, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 37623, filed 
09.21.2011, at p. 11, LL 21-29) (emphasis supplied). 
Since the Industrial Commission entered its 05.17.2011 Order, the Defendants have 
already unreasonably delayed the payment of compensation to the Claimant by 133 days and 
should not be allowed persist in their unreasonable failure and I or refusal to pay the Claimant 
the benefits that he is entitled to receive under the Act. 
(5) THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE IDAHO WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT 
REQUIRES ALL PARTIES TO A WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIM TO 
RESPECT THE LEGAL AUTHORITY AND WRlSDICTION OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION AND COMPLY WITH THE COMMISSION'S ORDERS TO MAKE 
THE PROMPT PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION WHEN DUE 
The Defendants have taken the position that they can breach their statutory obligation to 
provide the Claimant with medical and income benefits that are required to be paid by the Workers' 
Compensation Act and then refuse to comply with the Industrial Commission's Order to make 
prompt payment with absolute impunity. The Defendants appear to be operating on the mistaken 
assumption that the Industrial Commission does not have any legal authority to enforce its own 
Orders: 
In effect, the Industrial Commission has no statutory authority to enforce its own 
awards (See Defendants' Memorandum, p. 4, LL 12-13). 
The Workers' Compensation Act gives the Industrial Commission the ultimate authority to 
Vawter I Claimant's 09.27.2011 Response to Defendants' Motion for Stay of 05.17.2011 Order To Pay Compensation Page 15 
enforce its own awards: 
72-304. Prompt compensation payments required Rules and 
regulations. The commission is authorized to make and change from time to time 
such rules and regulations as it shall deem necessary to secure the prompt 
payment of compensation, and after affording the surety opportunity to be heard, 
may withdraw its approval of any employer or surety who unnecessarily delays 
payment of compensation, and the commissioner [director] of [the department of] 
insurance upon notification accordingly shall withdraw his authorization of a 
surety to insure or guarantee the payment of workmen's compensation liability of 
employers in this state (emphasis supplied). 
When an employer unnecessarily delays in the payment of compensation benefits when 
due to the injured worker, the Industrial Commission can withdraw its approval to self-insure 
against the employer's liability under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. When a surety 
unnecessarily delays in the payment of compensation benefits when due to the injured worker, 
the Industrial Commission can put the Commissioner of the Idaho Department of Insurance on 
notice who must then withdraw his authorization of the surety to sell workers' compensation 
insurance policies in the state of Idaho. 
UPS I Liberty would appear to be suffering from extreme myopia by challenging the 
Industrial Commission's legal authority and jurisdiction to enforce its own awards. If UPS is 
self-insured for any portion of this claim, then UPS would be required by Idaho Code 72-301 (2) 
to post a surety bond or guaranty contract with the Industrial Commission as satisfactory security 
for the payment of its liability under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. The Industrial 
Commission holds UPS' s surety bond or guaranty contract in exclusive trust for the benefit of 
UPS employees who are owed workers' compensation benefits under the Act. 
If Liberty Insurance Corp. insures UPS under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act, 
then Liberty would be required by Idaho Code §72-301(2) to place sufficient money or bonds 
with the Idaho State Treasurer "[t]o the end that the workmen secured under this act shall be 
adequately protected" in an amount equal to the total amounts of all outstanding and unpaid 
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compensation awards against such surety. (See Idaho Code §72-301(2)). The State Treasurer 
holds any monies or bonds placed by a surety to ensure the liability of the employer as an 
"exclusive trust for the benefit of the employees ... to remain with the treasurer in trust to answer 
any default of any employer, self-insured employer or surety" (See Idaho Code §72-302) 
(emphasis supplied). 
When the Industrial Commission enters its supplemental Order ruling on the Defendants' 
Motion For a Stay of Payment Obligations, the Claimant respectfully requests that the Industrial 
Commission explicitly state that the Defendants are in serious default of their 05.17.2011 
payment obligations to the Claimant so that the Claimant can execute on the self-insured bond I 
guaranty contract on deposit with the Industrial Commission and I or the monies and I or surety 
bond that Liberty has placed on deposit with the Idaho State Treasurer's office and collect 
benefits that the Commission Ordered the Defendants to pay in its 05 .17.2011 Order. 
(6) THE CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER 
IDAHO CODE §72-804 BASED ON THE DEFENDANTS UNREASONABLE 
REFUSAL AND I OR DELAY TO PAY BENEFITS 
Since the Claimant's original 12.18.2009 industrial accident, 648 days have elapsed 
during which the Defendants have not fulfilled their statutory obligations to provide the Claimant 
with medical benefits and income benefits as required by the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
Since the Industrial Commission entered its 05.17.2011 Order finding this denied claim 
compensable and Ordering the Defendants to pay the Claimant past denied TTD benefits and 
past denied medical benefits, 133 have elapsed. Because the Defendants have unreasonably 
refused to pay the Claimant the benefits that the Commission Ordered them to pay on 05.17.2011 
and I or unreasonably delayed in making said payment, the Claimant is entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804: 
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72-804. Attorney's fees -- Punitive costs in certain cases. If the commission or any 
court before whom any proceedings are brought under this law determines that the 
employer or his surety contested a claim for compensation made by an injured 
employee or dependent of a deceased employee without reasonable ground, or 
that an employer or his surety neglected or refused within a reasonable time after 
receipt of a written claim for compensation to pay to the injured employee or his 
dependents the compensation provided by law, or without reasonable grounds 
discontinued payment of compensation as provided by law justly due and owing 
to the employee or his dependents, the employer shall pay reasonable attorney 
fees in addition to the compensation provided by this law. In all such cases the 
fees of attorneys employed by injured employees or the commission shall fix their 
dependents. 
CONCLUSION 
The Claimant respectfully requests that the Industrial Commission Order the Defendants 
to pay the principal sum of $177,368.38, interest of $3,414.39 and all reasonable attorney's fees 
that have been incurred by Claimant since the date of the Commission's 05.17.2011 Order. 
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C. 
By~~-'"=-'::...>.c---::r--'-~~ 
Rick ~Kallas - of the ---
Attorneys for Claimant -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of September, 2011, I served the Claimant's 9.27.11 
Response to Defendants' Motion for Stay of 5.17.11 Order To Pay Compensation by the method 
indicated be low and addressed to the following: 
Susan R. Veltman, Esq. 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 West Washington 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
Vawter I Claimant's 09.27.2011 Response to Defendants' Motion for Stay of 05.17.2011 Order To Pay Compensation Page 18 
C.L. "BllTCll" OTTER 
Governor 
TERESA LllN .-\ 
Director 
JAMES F. KILE 
Manager. IS If 
Stat of Idaho 
Department of Administration 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
650 West State Street, Room 120 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise. ID 83720-790 I 
Telephone (208 ) 332- 1837 or r AX (208 ) 332-1898 
http ';www.atlm.ida ho.gn\ 
September 26, 2011 
• 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF NOTICE OF CLAIM 
RE: Vawter VS. United Parcel Service, Gallagher Bassett Services-Branch #193, ISIF 
SOC SEC NO: 
ISIF CLAIM NO: 2011-2065 
IC NO/S: 10-000114 
The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIP) acknowledges receipt on August 18, 2011, of a 
claim submitted by Surety, in the above-referenced matter. 
The ISIF will respond to the claim within 60 days of such receipt, as provided in the statute 
below. 
72-334 FILING NOTICE OF CLAIM WITH THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND Any claimant, employer or surety making a 
claim for benefits ... shall file a notice with the manager not less than sixty (60) days prior to 1he date of filing of a complaint against the ... fund 
.... Such notice shall include, ... a detailed statement describing the disability claim and supporting documentation including relevant medical and 
vocational rehabilitation records .... The manager shall evaluate lhe notice of claim and shall approve or deny the claim or make an offer of 
settlement within the sixty (60) day period. If, in the discretion of the manager, the notice of claim is ... incomplete, tl1e manager may, upon 
written notice to the party seeking to join the ... fund, extend the time period for evaluation of the claim for a maximum of thirty (30) days in 
order to request 1he necessary documents and records. The manager shall approve or deny the claim or rrnke an offer of settlement within the 
extended period 
By v~~ 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
.l 
2 
Original: State Industrial Commission 
CC: Susan Veltman co 
Gallagher Bassett Services-Branch #193 
C.I.. "Bl'TC ll" OTTER 
rnKE GWARTN EY 
Director 
.JAMES F. KILE 
!\1ana~~r. Indust ria l Special 
I ndcmnity Fund 
October 6, 2011 
Susan Veltman 
PO Box 2528 
Boise, ID 83701 
Stat of Idaho 
Department of Administration 
Division of Insurance and Internal Support 
Industria l Special Indemnity Fund 
650 West State Street. Room 120 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-7901 
Tele phone {208) 332- I 83 5 or FAX (208 ) 33 2-1 89X 
hnp': www.a<lm . idaho. gen 
RE: Vawter VS. United Parcel Service, Gallagher Bassett Services-Branch #193, ISIF 
SOC SEC NO: 
ISIF CLAIM NO: 2011-2065 
IC NO/S: 10-000114 
Dear Ms. Veltman: 
The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund has completed a review of the documentation sent to our 
office in the above referenced claim. The material you provided on Mr. Vawter ' s claim does not 
conclusively confirm that he is either, totally or permanently disabled or that the ISIF is liable for 
his claim. Therefore, we are denying his claim. 
Sincerely, 
Verlene Wise 
Insurance Claims Technical Advisor 
CC: Rick D. Kallas 
State Industrial Commission 
Gallagher Bassett Services-Branch #193 
ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRL4.L COJVIMISSION, JUDICIAL DIHSION, P.O. BOX 83720, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
COMPLAINT AGAINST THE 
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (ISIF) 
() 
LJ 
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Michael Vawter, P.O. Box 168, Donnelly, ID 83615 Rick Kallas, 1031 E. Park Ave., Boise, ID 83712 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS EMPLOYER'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
United Parcel Service, 270 S. 7th, Payette, ID 83661 Susan Veltman, P.O. Box 2528, Boise, ID 83701 
l.C. NUMBER OF CURRENT CLAIM WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S 
2010-000114 (NOT ADJUSTERS) NAME AN'D ADDRESS 
Print Form 
DATE OF INJURY Liberty Insurance Corp. c/o Gallagher Bassett, 720 Park Blvd. 
12/18/09 Ste. 125, Boise, ID 83712 
-NATURE AND CAUSE OF PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT PRE-EXISTING CURRENT INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE: 
See attached. 
STA TE WHY YOU BELIEVE THAT THE CLAIMANT IS TOTALLY AND PERMANENTLY DISABLED: 
Defendants do not concede Claimant is totally and permanently disabled. Claimant alleges total permanent disability. Both 
parties are awaiting expert vocational opinions. 
SIGNATURE OF PARTY OR ATTOR..,EY: 1'<l Sh" \k.Lf !Y\Pi.-.._ 
Susan R. Veltman 
PRINTORTYPENA~IE: ------------------~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. 19th October 11 
I hereby certify that on the __ day of---------' 20 __ , I caused to be served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Complaint upon: 
Manager, ISIF PO Box 83720 
Dept of Administration Boise, Idaho 83720-7901 
Claimant's Name 
Michael Vawter c/o Rick Kallas 
1031 E. Park Blvd., Boise, ID 83712 
Address 
Employer's Name 
United Parcel Service c/o Susan Veltman 
P.O. Box 2528, Boise, ID 83701 
Address 
Surety's Name Liberty Insurance Corp. c/o Susan Veltman 
P.O. Box 2528, Boise, ID 83701 
Address 
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personal service of process 
regular U.S. Mail 
NOTICE: Pursuant to the provisions ofldaho Code§ 72-334, a notice of claim must first be filed with the 
Manager of ISIF not less than 60 days prior to the filing of a complaint against ISIF. 
You must attach a copy of Form IC 1001 Workers' Compensation Complaint, to this document. 
An Answer must be filed on Form IC 1003 within 21 days of service in order to avoid default. 
IC1002 (REV. 3/01/2008) COMPLAINT AGAINST ISIF 
Appendix 2 
Claimant has 9% PPI for a 1998 right thumb injury, 7% PPI for a 1990 left shoulder injury; 7% PPI for a 
1990 back injury (forensically apportioned), and 10% PPI for a 2004 right shoulder injury. He has other 
pre-existing conditions that have not been rated which include knee issues, osteoarthritis, hypertension 
and diabetes. Received 19% PPI for current injury which includes 7% apportioned to pre-existing disc 
herniation. 
l tt l 
· " SENb ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, 700 S. CLEAR~~.~~ 
IDAHO 83712, P.O. Box 83720, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041 ~ v;;JJ Li :it:li 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION COMPLAINT 
l.C. No. 2010-000114 
CLAIMANT 'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Michael P. Vawter -Donnelly, Idaho 83615 
EMPLOYER 's NAME AND ADDRESS 
United Parcel Service, Inc. 
270 S. 7th 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
CLAIMANT 'S SOCIAL SECURITY NO. - CLAIMANT 's BIRTHDATE -
STATE AND COUNTY IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRED 
Valley County, Idaho 
CLAIMANT 's ATIORNEY 's NAME AND ADDRESS 
Rick D. Kallas 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS, TALBOY & 
DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S 
(NOT ADJUSTER) NAME AND ADDRESS 
Liberty Ins. Corp. 
Clo T.P.A. Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. 
720 E. Park Blvd., Ste. 125 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
DATE OF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
12/18/2009 
WHEN INJURED, CLAIMANT WAS EARNING AN AVERAGE WEEKLY 
WAGE OF: 
$1.728.70, PURSUA1'ff TO §72-419, IDAHOCODE 
DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (WHATHAPPENED): 
On the date of his 12.18.09 low back injury, the Claimant started his UPS truck on his employer's facto premises located 
at the Cascade, Idaho airport and then went inside the offices of Arnold Aviation to pick up his UPS electronic clipboard 
(DAID). Before exiting the building, the Claimant sat down to tie his work snow boots and felt a pop in his low back which 
was followed by shooting pain down both lower extremities. 
NATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDEITT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE: 
Low Back Injury. 
WHAT WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMfNG AT THIS TIME: 
All workers' compensation benefits available under Idaho law including, but not limited to the following: 
( 1) Medical Benefits; 
(2) Time Loss Benefits (TTD/TPD); 
(3) Permanent Physical Impairment (PPI) Benefits; 
(4) Disability in excess of impairment (PPD > PPI) benefits; and, 
( 5) Attorney Fees. 
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DATE ON WHICH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO EMPLOYER 
December 24, 2009 
December 28, 2009 
HOW NOTICE WAS GNEN: 
ISSUE OR ISSUES lNVOL VED : 
[X] ORAL 
TO WHOM YOU GAVE NOTICE 
Jim Lovett 
Jim Lovett, Dax ? and 800# 
[] WRITTEN [ J OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY 
(1) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 bending over to tie his work I snow boots accident arise out of and in the course of 
his employment with UPS? 
(2) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident cause a new injury to his low back? 
(3) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident aggravate, accelerate, light-up, combine with or contribute to a 
pre-existing back condition and result in the need for medical treatment? 
( 4) Are the Defendants liable for medical benefits as required by the Claimant's attending physician or needed 
immediately after the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury and a reasonable time thereafter pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 72-432? 
{5) Are the Defendants Hable for the payment of total temporary disability (TTD) and I or temporary partial disability 
(TPD) benefits to the Claimant during his period of recovery? 
(6) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident cause the Claimant to suffer any permanent physical impairment 
{PPI) and, if so, to what extent? 
(7) Did Claimant suffer any disability in excess of his physical impairment (PPD >PPI) as the result of his 12.18.09 
industrial accident I injury, including whether the Claimant is totally and permanently disabled under the 100% 
method or the odd-lot doctrine? 
(8) · Are the Defendants liable for the payment of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804? 
DO YOU BELIEVE THlS CL<\IM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTlON OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? [ j YES [ X] NO IF SO, PLEASE STATE 
WHY: 
NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND MUSTBE FILED ON FORM l.C. 1002 
PHYSICIANS WHO TREATED CLAIMANT (NAME AND ADDRESS) 
Scott 8. Harris, M.D. 
Payette Lakes Medical CHnic 
211 Forest St. 
P.O. Box 1047 
McCall, Idaho 83638 
St. Luke's RMC 
1 90 E. Bannock St. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
R. Tyler Frizzell, M.D., Ph.D. 
222 N, 2nd St., Ste. 307 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU INCURRED TO DATE? 
UNDETERMINED AT THIS TIME. 
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS. HAS YOUR EMPLOYER PAlD' IF ANY? Unknown WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU PAID' lF ANY? 
UNDETERMINED AT THIS TIME. 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. [ X] YES [ ] NO 
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DAIE' SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT OR ATTORNEY 
PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW 
ONLY IF CLAIMS IS MADE FOR DEATH BENEFITS 
NAME OF DECEASED DATE OF DEATH RELATION OF DECEASED TO CLAIMANT 
WAS CLAIMANT DEPENDENT ON DECEASED? DID CLAIMANT LIVE WITH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT? 
[]YES (]NO {)YES []NO 
CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE. SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Complaint upon: 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
United Parcel Service, Inc. 
270 s. 7lh 








SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Liberty Ins. Corp. 
Clo T.P.A. Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. 
720 E. Park Blvd., Ste. 125 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
['-[). U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
NOTICE! An Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer on Form l.C. 1003 
with the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of mailing, to 
avoid default. If no answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered! 
Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, 317 Main Street, Boise, 
Idaho 83720-6000 (208) 334-6000 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720~0041 
AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEAL TH INFORMATION 
I hereby authorize ________________ to disclose health information as specified: 
Provider Name - must be specific for each provider 
To: ------------------- ---------------------- -Insurance Company/Third Party Administrator/Self Insured Employer/IS IF, their attorneys or patient's attorney 
Street Address 
City State Zip Code 
Purpose or need for date: Worker's Compensation Claim 
· (e.g. Worker's Compensation Claim) 
Information to be disclosed: Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care: ---------
0 Discharge Summary 
0 History & Physical Exam 
0 Consultation Reports 
0 Operative Reports 
0 Lab 
b Pathology 
0 Radiology Reports 
0 Entire Record 
0 Other: Specify 
I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable): 
o A IDS or HIV 
o Psychiatric or Mental Health Information 
o Drug/Alcohol Abuse Information · 
I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law (45 CFR Part 164) and that the 
information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I understand that this 
authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking the authorization won't apply to 
information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider will not condition treatment, payment, 
enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise revoked, this authorization will expire upon 
resolution of worker's compensation claim. Provider, its employees, officers, copy service contractor, and physicians are hereby 
released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above information to the extent indicated and authorized by me on 
this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature below authorizes release of all information specified in this 
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·aotliorization. Any questions that I have regarding disclosure may be directed to the privacy officer of the Provider specified above. 
S 1gnature of Patient Date 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Send Original To: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division. 700 S. Clearwater Lane, Boise, Idaho 83712 IC1003 (Rev 11/9' 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
l.C. NO ._._.;2;;;...;.0...;...;10-""·0..;;...;00'-'-11..:.....;4 __ INJURY DA TE _ _..;.;;;12;;;;...;/1;...;;..;8/..;......20 __ 0..._9 _ 
_ The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by 
stating: 
X The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating: 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Michael Vawter Rick Kallas 
P.O. Box 168 Ellsworth, Kallas & DeFranco, PLLC 
Donnelly, ID 83615 1013 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
EMPLOYER' S NAME AND ADDRESS WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME 
United Parcel Service AND ADDRESS 
270 s. ih Liberty Insurance Corp. 
Payette, ID 83661 720 Park Blvd., Suite 125 
Boise, ID 83712 -::.r: 
~ 
ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL ~CIAL lig::MNITY FUND (NAME AND 
AND ADDRESS) 
Susan Veltman 
Gardner & Breen Law Offices 
P.O. Box 2528 
Boise, ID 83701 











Paul J. Augustine 
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 

















1. That the accident alleged in the Complaint actually occurred on or about the time claimed. 
2. That the employer/employee relationship existed. 
3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused entirely by an accident arising 
out of and in the course of Claimant' s employment. 
5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to 
the nature of the employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are 
characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment. 
6. That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was 
given to the employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 
days of the manifestation of such occupational disease. 
7. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage 
pursuant to Idaho Code,§ 72-419: $under investigation. 
8. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
12. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant? None. 
Answer Page I of2 
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11. State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affirmative defenses. 
1. The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund recently received the Complaint Against the ISIF and contemplates the initiation of formal discovery. 
The Fund has limited records available and is unable at this time to accurately either admit or deny portions of the Complaint and reserves 
the right to amend this Answer as necessary and warranted by subsequent discovery. 
2. Claimant is not totally and permanently disabled. 
3. Claimant did not suffer from a known manifest, pre-existing, permanent physical impairment within the meaning of Idaho Code §72-332(2). 
4. If claimant is totally disabled, it is not due to the aggravation and acceleration of a pre-existing condition or due to the combined effects of 
pre and post injury conditions. 
5. Claimant's pre-existing impairment did not constitute a hindrance or obstacle to his employment. 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. YES NO - -_x_ UNDER INVESTIGATION 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE. 
NO. 
Amount of Compensation Paid to Date Dated Signature of Defendant or Attorney 
PPD I TTD I Medical November~ , 2011 (1J 
00.00 I oo.oo I oo.oo I 
PLEASE COMPLETE \~. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6~y of November, 2011 I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER upon: 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Michael Vawter 
c/o Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas & DeFranco, 
PLLC 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
Via: _ personal service of process 
regular U.S. Mail 
Answer-Page 2 of2 
EMPLOYER AND SURETY'S 
NAME AND ADDRESS 
Liberty Insurance Corp. 
720 Park Blvd, Suite 125 
Boise, ID 83712 
Via: _ personal service of process 
~ol>eUS1~ 
\ 
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND 
(if applicable) 
Via: personal service of process 
regular U.S. Mail 
Rick D. Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
Idaho State Bar No. 3872 
Attorney for Claimant 
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STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL ) 
INDEMNITY FUND, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
COMES NOW Claimant, Michael P. Vawter, and, pursuant to J.R.P. 8 (C), hereby requests that 
the Industrial Commission calendar this claim Hearing on the following grounds: 
The requesting party hereby states: 
1) Readiness For Hearing 
The Claimant is ready for Hearing. 
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2) Disputed Issues To Be Heard and Decided 
The following issues are before the Commission to be heard and decided: 
(a) What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent physical impairment (PPI) caused by the 
subject 12.18.09 industrial accident/injury? 
(b) What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent disability in excess of his physical 
impairment (PPD >PPI) caused by the subject 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury, 
including whether the Claimant is totally and permanently disabled under the 100% 
method and I or the odd-lot doctrine? 
( c) Whether any liability for the Claimant's total and permanent disability should be 
apportioned to the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) under LC. §72-332? 
(d) Whether apportionment under LC. §72-406 is appropriate? 
3) Location of Hearing 
The desired location of the Hearing is Boise, Idaho. 
4) Claimant's Counsel's Unavailable Dates 
At the present time, the Claimant's attorney is not available for Hearing on the following dates: 
12.01.2011 - 02.29.2012; 03.26.2012 - 03.30.2012; 06.16.2012 - 06.20.2012; 07.4.2012 -
7.09.2012. 
5) Length of Hearing 
The estimated length of time to present the Claimant's case in chief is one Yz day. 
6) Full Commission Participation 
This case does not present any unique, unusual or bizarre factual, legal or medical issues that 
need to be heard by the full Commission. 
7) Translation Services 
The Claimant does not require translation services. 
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DATED this 29th day ofNovember, 2011. 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC 
By ,~cD,~ 
RICKnAiJL 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29th day of November, 2011, I served the Claimant's 
11.29.2011 Request For Calendaring on the Defendants by the method indicated below and addressed to 
the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC 
l 004 W. Fort St. 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Susan Veltman 
Gardner & Breen 
1410 W. Washington 
Boise, ID 83702 
Vawter I Claimant's 11.29.2011 Request for Calendaring 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
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Rick D. Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
Idaho State Bar No. 3872 
Attorney for Claimant 
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STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL ) 
INDEMNITY FUND, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
I.C. No. 2010-000114 
CLAIMANT'S REQUEST FOR STATUS 
CONFERENCE 
COMES NOW Claimant, Michael Vawter, by and through his attorney of record, Rick D. Kallas, of 
the law firm of Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C. and pursuant to JRP 8 hereby requests a telephonic 
Status Conference as soon as practicable after the Defendants have filed their respective responses to the 
Claimant's 11.29.2011 Request For Calendaring in accordance with JRP 8 (C)(2) to discuss the following 
issues: 
(1) The scheduling of a final hearing to decide the disputed issues set forth in the Claimant's 11.29.2011 
Request For Calendaring and the Defendants' Responses thereto; and, 
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(2) Entry of an Order ruling on Defendant UPS's Motion To Stay the payment obligations set forth in the 
Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 Order. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of November 2011. 
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C. 
Certificate of Service 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29th day of November 2011, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of Claimant's Request For Status Conference by the method indicated below upon the following persons: 
Susan Veltman 
Gardner & Breen 
1410 W. Washington 
Boise, ID 83702 
Paul J. Augustine 
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC 
1004 W. Fort St. 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Vawter I Claimant's I 1.29.201 I Request For Status Conference 
[X ] U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
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ORDER DENYING STAY 
FI LE 
DEC - 8 2011 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The issue before the Commission is whether an award of workers' compensation benefits 
in the above-captioned case should be stayed pending final resolution of the case. Defendants 
argue that the Idaho Supreme Court's refusal to accept an appeal of the Commission's May 17, 
2011 decision indicates that the decision is not final, and therefore should not be enforced. 
Claimant replies that the decision is final and that Defendants must comply with it. 
I. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
At the request of Defendants, this case was bifurcated. On May 17, 2011, the 
Commission issued a decision finding that Claimant suffered a compensable work-related 
accident. The decision awarded medical care benefits and total temporary disability (TTD) 
benefits to Claimant. Additional issues remained to be determined. 
On May 19, 2011, Claimant filed a request for calendaring, and a hearing on the 
remaining issues was scheduled for October 25, 2011. Defendants notified Claimant and the 
Commission that Defendants intended to appeal the May 17 decision to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. A notice of appeal was timely filed, but the Court dismissed the appeal without comment. 
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Defendants requested that the Court clarify the reason why the appeal was dismissed, as a party 
may appeal by a matter of right a final decision of the Commission pursuant to I.A.R. 11 ( d). The 
Court denied the motion for clarification but directed counsel to review the Court's opinion in 
Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 121 Idaho 127, 823 P.2d 161 (1992). In that case, the Court held that a 
"decision of the Commission which does not finally dispose of all the claimant's claims would 
not be a final decision subject to appeal pursuant to I.A.R. l l(d)." 
Following dismissal of the appeal, Defendants filed a request for additional issues at 
hearing, asking the Commission to consider the following: 1) Whether the Commission's May 
17, 2011 order triggered Defendants' obligation to pay benefits to Claimant despite the Court's 
implied ruling that the decision was not final; 2) If so, whether Defendants are entitled to 
reimbursement from Claimant and/or his attorney if the May 17, 2011 decision is reversed on 
appeal by the Court; 3) Whether the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) is liable under 
Idaho Code § 72-332; and 4) Apportionment under the Carey formula. Claimant objected to the 
first two issues, arguing, first, that the decision is final and the award should be paid; second, that 
the reimbursement issue is not ripe for determination; and third, that Claimant's attorney is not 
the recipient of benefits and therefore should not be held personally liable to reimburse the 
benefits should the Commission's award be reversed. 
On September 7, 2011, the Commission held a telephone status conference with the 
parties. The October 25 hearing was vacated to allow time for Defendants to join ISIF as a party. 
The Commission asked the parties to brief the issue of whether the award granted by the May 1 7 
decision should be stayed. 
II. 
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
Defendants ask that the award be stayed. They argue that the Court's refusal to accept the 
appeal demonstrates the decision is not final. Because the decision is not final, payment of the 
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award should be deferred pending a final decision. Under Idaho Code § 72-735, it is the district 
court, not the Commission, that enforces Commission awards, and the district court can only 
enforce Commission awards from which no appeal has been taken. Thus, the award in this case 
is not enforceable until after the time for appeal has passed. Furthermore, to hold that a decision 
can be final for purposes of enforcement, but not for purposes of appeal, would be a manifest 
injustice and violate Defendants' due process rights. Defendants request that the decision be 
modified to reflect that it is not final. In the alternative, Defendants ask that the award be put into 
a trust account pending final resolution of the case. 
Claimant argues that Defendants should pay the award immediately. The policy of the 
workers' compensation statutes is to provide injured workers with "sure and certain relief' in the 
form of prompt payment of benefits. Claimant demands attorney fees for Defendants' 
unreasonable delay in paying the award. Claimant also argues that, because Defendants did not 
file a motion for reconsideration following the decision, and because Defendants did not file a 
valid appeal, the decision is now final as to all issues adjudicated, and the Commission should 
enter an order finding that "Defendants have waived their right to challenge" the decision. 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
A. The award will not be stayed. 
A decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive as to 
all matters adjudicated, provided that within twenty days from the date of filing the decision, any 
party may move for reconsideration. Idaho Code § 72-718. Final decisions may be appealed to 
the Supreme Court. Id. An appeal may be made to the Court from the Commission's decisions 
and orders within such times and in such manner as prescribed by mle of the Court. Idaho Code 
§ 72-724. An appeal to the Court shall automatically operate as a stay of the award, order or 
decision being disputed on the appeal, unless the Commission shall otherwise order. Idaho Code 
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§ 72-731. Whenever a decision shall have been entered by the Commission awarding 
compensation of any kind, such award shall accrue, and the employer shall become liable for, 
and shall pay, interest thereon from the date of the decision, regardless of whether an appeal shall 
be taken. Idaho Code § 72-734. In the event of default of compensation due under an award, any 
party may file in the district court for the county in which the claimant's injury occurred, a 
certified copy of the decision of the Commission awarding compensation from which no appeal 
has been taken within the time allowed, and thereupon the court shall render a decree or 
judgment in accordance therewith. Idaho Code § 72-735. The Commission may withdraw its 
approval of any surety who unnecessarily delays payment of compensation. Idaho Code § 72-
304. 
An appeal as a matter of right can be taken from any final decision or order of the 
Commission. I.A.R. 11 ( d). In appeals from the Commission, the order or award shall be stayed 
during the pendency of the appeal, unless otherwise ordered by the Commission or Court. I.AR. 
13(d). 
The question before the Commission is whether a decision that is not final for purposes 
of appeal is nevertheless final for purposes of enforcement. Claimant and Defendants present 
compelling reasons in support of their positions. Claimant cites the underlying purpose of the 
workers' compensation laws: to provide sure and certain relief to injured workers. See Idaho 
Code § 72-201. Such relief, argues Claimant, should be prompt; it should not be delayed for 
what could be several years pending the ultimate conclusion of the case. Defendants argue that 
they could be forced to pay a substantial award to which Claimant may not be entitled, 
depending on the outcome of a future appeal. As observed by the Commission in the decision, 
this was a close case on the issue of compensability. The decision could be overturned. Implicit 
in Defendants' argument is apprehension of the possibility that Defendants, having paid a 
substantial award, will not be able to regain their money from Claimant should the Court reverse 
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the Commission's decision. 
The fact that awards are automatically stayed on appeal reflects our system's aversion to 
forcing parties to pay awards that might ultimately be overturned. We are mindful of the policy 
reasons supporting Defendants' arguments. Yet we are also mindful of the need for claimants to 
receive prompt compensation. This conflict would not have arisen had the Court accepted 
Defendants' appeal. The award would have automatically been stayed, and the parties would 
have received a final, conclusive ruling from the Court on the issue of compensability well 
before they can now expect to receive it. 
We are cognizant of the rule set forth in Jensen. However, according to Idaho Code§ 72-
718, a Commission decision, in the absence of fraud, is final and conclusive as to all matters 
adjudicated on the date the decision is filed, provided that no party moves for reconsideration. 
Here, no party has moved for reconsideration, and no party has alleged fraud. Therefore, under 
the plain language of the statute, the May 17, 2011 decision is final as to the matters of whether 
Claimant suffered an injury arising out of employment, whether Claimant is entitled to TTD 
benefits, whether Claimant is entitled to medical benefits, and whether Claimant is entitled to 
attorney fees. These issues will not be revisited by the Commission in future decisions, absent 
instruction by the Court following an appeal. Though the Commission has continuing 
jurisdiction over the remaining issues in the case, the May 1 7 decision was not intended to be, 
nor should it be read as, preliminary. It is final. 
Idaho Code § 72-718 further provides that "final decisions may be appealed to the 
Supreme Court." Here, Defendants have appealed, but the Court has dismissed the appeal, 
implying that Defendants have not complied with I.A.R. 11 ( d) as interpreted by the Court in 
Jensen. While we understand and appreciate the Court's preference for judicial economy, we 
believe the Court's construction of I.A.R. 1 l(d), as discussed in Jensen, conflicts with the 
provisions of Idaho Code § 72-718. These provisions exist for good reason. Workers' 
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compensation cases are not of a type in which all the issues can be easily and conveniently 
deferred for one appeal. Injured workers should not be in the position of having to wait for 
compensation pending resolution of all the issues before both the Commission and the Court, a 
process that can take several years. At the same time, sureties should not have to pay awards that 
could ultimately be overturned on appeal. It is not reasonable to expect that sureties will be able 
to be reimbursed for these awards should they be reversed. Many workers' compensation 
claimants, injured and unable to work, or with reduced capacity to work, face uncertain 
economic circumstances. They are unlikely to have the means to reimburse sureties for 
substantial awards, especially if the award has already been distributed to medical providers or 
otherwise spent. 
Nevertheless, the Court dismissed Defendants' appeal, citing Jensen. Jensen does not 
discuss Idaho Code§ 72-718. In the absence of further guidance from the Court, we are left with 
the plain language of the statute, which provides that our decision is final as to the matters 
adjudicated. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-734, the award accrued on May 17, 2011, the date the 
decision was filed. "Accrue" means to become due and payable, to mature, to vest. Black's Law 
Dictionary 20-21 (6th ed., West 1990). The Legislature would not have used the word "accrue," 
nor would it have provided that interest will accrue on the award from the date the decision is 
filed, regardless of whether an appeal shall be taken, if the Legislature had not intended for the 
award to become immediately due and payable upon filing of the decision. 
Defendants argue that, regardless of when an award accrues, it does not become 
enforceable by the district court until after the time for appeal has passed, pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 72-735. We agree that this does seem to be the unambiguous direction of the statute. 
However, we expect Surety to comply with the orders of the Commission until an appeal is 
perfected. In this regard, we note that Idaho Code § 72-304 grants to the Commission the 
authority to withdraw its approval of any surety who unnecessarily delays payment of 
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compensation. 
Defendants argue that forcing them to pay the award would amount to a manifest 
injustice and a due process violation in that it would unfairly deprive Defendants of property. 
While we are sympathetic to Defendants' situation, we are not convinced by this argument. This 
case was bifurcated at Defendants' request. See Response to Request for Hearing/Motion to 
Bifurcate, filed May 12, 2010. Claimant preferred to address all the issues in one hearing, though 
Claimant ultimately agreed to bifurcation. See Claimant's Response to Defendants' Motion to 
Bifurcate, filed May 13, 2010. We agree with Defendants that bifurcation is often desirable and 
beneficial to the parties. It promotes efficiency, in that a negative decision on the issue of 
compensability spares the parties from having to unnecessarily litigate the other issues. 
Bifurcation also allows the issue of a claimant's entitlement to medical care to be addressed 
while a claimant is still in the period of recovery and other issues, such as permanent impairment 
and permanent disability, are not yet ripe. Forcing the parties to wait until all issues are ripe 
before hearing the case would essentially force claimants to pay for their own medical care. 
Many claimants are not in financial position to do this, and their conditions could deteriorate as 
they go untreated. Thus, as Defendants argue, there is a rationale to support the decision to 
bifurcate. However, and as this case aptly demonstrates, there is a potential downside to the 
decision to bifurcate as well. Should Defendants lose on a threshold compensability issue, they 
will be obliged to pay benefits, and must even bring the case to its full conclusion, before they 
can appeal the Commission's determination on the threshold issue. With any decision to request 
bifurcation comes a need to recognize this potential outcome, and parties ignore this potentiality 
at their peril. 
Indeed, if parties were not expected to abide by a Commission order on a bifurcated case, 
there would be no reason to bifurcate. Why would the parties ask for such an order, and why 
would the Commission issue one, if the order is to have no effect? It would be more economical 
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to try the case on all the issues at once. When parties request bifurcation, they are requesting an 
expedited determination of certain issues, and they should expect to be held accountable for their 
responsibilities under such a determination once it is made. 
The policy of the workers' compensation law is to provide injured workers with sure and 
certain relief. Claimant is correct that an important aspect of sure and certain relief is prompt 
payment of benefits. Claimant's compensation payments should not be delayed for months or 
years because of a voluntary request for bifurcation made by Defendants. There is no manifest 
injustice or due process violation in ordering Defendants to pay an award granted by the 
bifurcated decision that they themselves requested. Defendants could have waited to try the 
entire case at once. Additionally, at hearing, Defendants had the same opportunity to present 
evidence and arguments that Claimant had, and Defendants availed themselves of the 
opportunity. They have not been deprived of due process. Ultimately, their arguments at hearing 
proved unsuccessful. This might not have been the result Defendants desired, but they should 
have considered the possibility of this result before making their request to bifurcate. 
Defendants are hereby ordered to pay the award granted by the Commission's May 17, 
2011 decision. 1 
B. 
Defendants have not waived their right to appeal. 
Claimant asks the Commission to enter an order that Defendants have waived their right 
to appeal the decision, because Defendants did not file a motion for reconsideration, and because 
Defendants did not file a valid appeal. We decline to issue such an order. Defendants may appeal 
a decision of the Commission as a matter of right, and, indeed, attempted to file an appeal after 
the decision was issued. Claimant then filed a motion for involuntary dismissal with the Court, 
1 
In lieu of a stay, Defendants ask that the award be placed in a trust account. Defendants cite no authority that 
would permit the Commission to issue such an order. 
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arguing that the Commission's May 17 decision was not final. See Claimant/Respondent's Brief 
in Support of Motion for Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal, dated June 27, 2011. Claimant cannot 
have it both ways. He cannot argue to the Court that the decision is not final and Defendants 
cannot appeal, only to argue to the Commission that the decision is final and Defendants have 
waived their right to appeal. So long as the Court continues to adhere to the holding in Jensen, 
the time to file an appeal as a matter of right under I.A.R. 11 ( d) does not begin to run until after 
all the issues before the Commission have been adjudicated. Here, several issues remain for the 
Commission to consider. Therefore, Defendants have not waived their right to appeal. 
Furthermore, we find that Claimant is not entitled to attorney fees. Defendants have not 
unreasonably delayed payment of benefits. After the decision was issued, Defendants filed a 
notice of appeal and expected the award to be stayed. Once the appeal was dismissed, 
Defendants asked the Commission to consider the question of whether the award should be 
stayed. This request was not unreasonable. There were compelling arguments in Defendants' 
favor. Ultimately, in light of the policy of the workers' compensation law, and in light of 
Defendants' own request to bifurcate the case, we find these arguments unpersuasive; that does 
not mean they were frivolous or made in bad faith for the purpose of unreasonable delay. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing analysis, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That: 
1. The Commission's May 17, 2011 decision is final and conclusive as to all matters 
adjudicated, pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718. 
2. Defendants shall pay, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order, the award 
granted by the decision, with appropriate interest pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-734. 
3. The parties' right to appeal this case to the Idaho Supreme Court under I.A.R. 11 ( d) 
does not vest, and the time to file an appeal does not start to run, until all the issues 
pending before the Commission have been adjudicated. 
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4. Claimant is not entitled to attorney fees for unreasonable delay. 
v~. 
DATED this -0 'v' day of December, 2011. 
INDUSTRlAL COMMISSION 
Assistant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of December 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DENYING STAY was served by regular United States Mail upon each of 
the following: 
RlCKD KALLAS 
1031 E PARK BLVD 
BOISE ID 83712 
SUSAL"J R VELTMAN 
PO BOX2528 
BOISE ID 83701 
eb 
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/)7 ~/ 
f.J~.//,~ // lj / f I , 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850) 
GARDNER BREEN & VELTMAN 
1410 W. Washington - 83702 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
Attorney for Defendants 
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UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 
Employer, 
and 



















LC. Case No. 2010-000114 
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO 
APPEAL ORDER DENYING STAY 
AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED 
HEARING 
Come now Defendants, United Parcel Service, Inc., and Liberty Insurance Corporation, and 
file.this Motion for Permission to Appeal Order Denying Stay, respectfully showing as follows: 
On December 8, 2011, the Industrial Commission filed an Order Denying Stay in which it 
determined that: 
1. The Commission's May 17, 2011 decision is final and conclusive as to all matters 
adjudicated, pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718. 
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2. Defendants shall pay, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order, the award 
granted by the decision, with appropriate interest pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-734. 
3. The parties' right to appeal this case to the Idaho Supreme Court under I.A.R. 1 l(d) 
does not vest, and the time to file an appeal does not start to run, until all the issues 
pending before the Commission have been adjudicated. 
4. Claimant is not entitled to attorney fees for unreasonable delay. 
Defendants seek permission to appeal this interlocutory order to the Idaho Supreme Court 
pursuant to IAR 12(a) because this order involves a controlling question oflaw as to which there is 
substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal from the order may 
materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation. Specifically, whether a decision of the 
Industrial Commission that is not final for purpose of appeal is nevertheless final for purposes of 
enforcement. Defendants' position with regard to this issue is articulated in its memorandum filed 
with the Industrial Commission on September 16, 2011. 
Defendants request an expedited hearing on the matter pursuant to IAR 12(b). 
DA TED this 12th day of December, 2011. 
Susan R. Veltman - of the firm 
GARDNER BREEN & VELTMAN 
Attorney for Defendants 
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HEARING, P. 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 12th day of December, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83 712 
Paul Augustine 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN 
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HEARING, P. 3 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850) 
GARDNER BREEN & VELTMAN 
1410 W. Washington - 83702 
Post Office Box 2528 lOll OEC 12 P tr t+l 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
RECEIVED 
lHOUSTRlA.l COMMISSION 
Attorney for Defendants 




UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 
Employer, 
and 



















LC. Case No. 2010-000114 
MOTION REQUESTING EXPEDITED 
RULING FOR STAY UPON 
PERMISSIVE APPEAL 
Come now Defendants, United Parcel Service, Inc., and Liberty Insurance Corporation, and 
file this Motion Requesting Expedited Ruling for Stay Upon Permissive Appeal, respectfully 
showing as follows: 
Prior to or simultaneous with the filing of this motion, Defendants filed a Motion for 
Permission to Appeal Order Denying Stay. The purpose of the permissive appeal is to obtain a 
ruling from the Idaho Supreme Court as to whether a decision of the Industrial Commission that is 
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not final for the purpose of appeal is nevertheless final for purposes of enforcement. The issue will 
be moot if Defendants are required to comply with the Industrial Commission's order to pay benefits 
pursuant to its Order Denying Stay filed December 8, 2011. 
Therefore, Defendants request the Industrial Commission stay its Order Denying Stay during 
the processing of the motion for permission to appeal. This request is made pursuant to IAR 
12(f)(l). Defendants request a ruling on this motion prior to December 22, 2011, since that is 
the date by which payment has otherwise been ordered. 
DATED this 12th day of December, 2011. 
Susan R. Veltman - of the firm 
GARDNER BREEN & VELTMAN 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the lih day of December, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
Paul Augustine 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN 
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STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL ) 




ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME 
FI E 
DEC 1 3 
In response to the Commission's Order Denying Stay (Order), filed December 8, 2011, 
Defendants United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) and Liberty Insurance Corporation (Liberty) have 
filed a motion for permission to appeal the Order, as well as a motion requesting expedited ruling 
for stay upon permissive appeal. Pursuant to J.R.P. 3(e)(2), Claimant and Defendant Industrial 
Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) have fourteen days from the filing of these motions to respond to 
them. However, the same rule grants the Commission authoricy to act on a motion sooner, 
provided the Commission gives notice to all parties. Because the Order gave UPS and Liberty 
only two weeks to comply with its terms, the Commission deems it necessary to shorten time and 
act on the pending motions by 5:00 p.m. MST on Monday, December 19, 2011. If Claimant and 
ISIF wish to respond, they should do so no later than 5:00 p.m. MST on Friday, December 16, 
2011. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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3:rv\· DATED this-' __ day of December, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / 3'~ay of December 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME was served by facsimile upon each of the following: 
RICK D KALLAS 
(208) 345-8945 
SUSAN R VELTMAN 
(208) 387-3501 
PAUL J AUGUSTINE 
(208) 947-0014 
eb 
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Rick D. Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
Idaho State Bar No. 3872 
Attorney for Claimant 
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STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL ) 
INDEMNITY FUND, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
I.C. No. 2010-000114 
CLAIMANT'S REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING 
OF HEARING DA TE BASED ON CLAIMANT'S 
11.29.11 REQUEST FOR CALENDARING 
COMES NOW Claimant, Michael P. Vawter, and, pursuant to JRP 8 (C), hereby requests that 
the Industrial Commission calendar this claim for Hearing on the following grounds: 
l) The Claimant filed a Request for Calendaring on 11.29.11 in order to have the following issues 
heard and decided by the Industrial Commission: 
(a) What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent physical impairment (PPI) caused by the 
Vawter I Claimant's Request for Scheduling of Hearing Date Based on 11.29.2011 Request for Calendaring Page 1 
subject 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury? 
(b) What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent disability in excess of his physical 
impairment (PPD >PPI) caused by the subject 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury, 
including whether the Claimant is totally and permanently disabled under the 100% 
method and I or the odd-lot doctrine? 
(c) Whether any liability for the Claimant's total and permanent disability should be 
apportioned to the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) under LC. §72-332? 
(d) Whether apportionment under LC. §72-406 is appropriate? 
2) Pursuant to JRP 8(C)(2), the Defendants, United Parcel Service and Liberty Insurance Corp., and 
Defendant, ISIF, had 14 days within which to file a Response to Claimant's Request for 
Calendaring; i.e., on or before Tuesday, December 13, 2011. 
3) As of this date, the Defendants, United Parcel Service and Liberty Insurance Corp., and 
Defendant, ISIF, have not filed a Response to Claimant's 11.29.11 Request for Calendaring. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Claimant respectfully requests that the Industrial Commission 
issue a Notice of Hearing setting this case for Hearing based solely on the Claimant's 11.29.11 Request 
for Calendaring. 
DATED this 15111 day of December, 2011. 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC 
ByfL~KraJ 
RIC . KJttLAS 
Attorney for Claimant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of December, 2011, I served the Claimant's Request 
for Scheduling of Hearing Date Based on 11.29 .11 Request For Calendaring by the method indicated 
below and addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC 
1004 W. Fort St. 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Susan Veltman 
Gardner & Breen 
1410 W. Washington 
Boise, ID 83702 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
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12/15/2011 10:22 
PAUL J. AurnJsT1.NE ISB 4608 
AUGUS'rrNE LA w OFFICES, PLLC 
1004 W. Fort Street 
Post Office Box 1521 
Boise, JD 83701 
Telephone: (208)367-9400 
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014 
Attomeys for Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
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BEFORE THE lNDUSTRTAL COMMISSION OF THE ST A TE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL VAWTER, 
Cla.imant, 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 
Employer, 
and 
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP., 
Surety, and 
STA TE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
IC No. 2010-000114 
DEFENDANT INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND'S 
RESPONSE TO MOTIONS FILED 
BY LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP. 
AND lTNITED PARCEL SERVICE 
COMES NOW Defe.ndant, State ofJdaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIP"), by and 
through its counsel of record, Paul J. Augustine, and hereby responds to the Motions filed by 
Defendants Surety and Employer for pem1ission to appeal order. Although ISIF was not a party to 
this case at the time the original order determining that the Claimant's claim was compensable was 
entered by the Commission in May 2009, ISIP believes that it is critical to have the threshold issue of 
compensability determined by Ida110 Supreme Court before continuing with the current case. It 
DEFENDANT ISTF'S RESPONSE TO MOTIONS PILED BY LIBERTY TNSURANCE CORP. AND UNJTED 
PARCEL SERVICE - l 
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would serve the interest of judicial economy to have this threshold issue of compensability decided 
prior to engaging in the cost and expense of litigation over the Claimant's entitlement to total 
disability benefits from the Defendants Employer/Surety and ISIP. The ISIF prefers that the Idaho 
Supreme Court decide the issue of compensability made by Employer/Surety before the ISIP has 
expended money for costs and attomeys' fees associated with defending the claim made against it by 
the Employer/Surety. Therefore, Defendant ISlF respectfully requests that the Commission allow 
Defendants United Parcel Service and Liberty Insurance Corp. to appeal the interlocutory order of 
the Commission to the Idaho Supreme Court as it relates to the compensability of the Claimant's 
claim. 
I ·r-
DATED this~ day of December~ 201 I. 
AUGUSTIN'E LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By~..__~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
Paul J. Aug tine - Of the Firm 
Attorneys fi Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ) )11~ day of December, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT ISIF'S RESPONSE TO MOTIONS FILED BY LIBERTY 
INSURANCE CORP. AND 1JNITED PARCEL SERVTCE, by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the followi11g: 
Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, KaJlas & Defranco, PLLC 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise1 ID 83712 
Attorney.for Claimant 
Susan Veltman 
Gardner & Breen Law Offices 
P.O. Box 2528 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorneysfor .Employer/Surety 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
_Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
~Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_&_Telecopy 
DEFENDANT ISTP'S RESPONSE TO MOTIONS FILED BY LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP. AND UNITED 
PARCEL SERVICE· 3 
12/15/2011 THU 10 47 [TX/R)< ~lO 5732] 11'tJ 
Rick D. Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
Idaho State Bar No. 3872 
Attorney for Claimant 
zon OEC I b p 2: I 2 
RECEIVED , 
a:ni I~ !RlAL COMMISSION 
;f'lU~·' 
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ST A TE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL ) 
INDEMNITY FUND, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
LC. No. 2010-000114 
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT UPS'S MOTION FOR 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL SUPPLEMENTAL 
ORDER 
COMES NOW Claimant, Michael P. Vawter, and pursuant to the Industrial Commission's 
12.13.2011 ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME hereby files Claimant's Response in Opposition to Defendant 
UPS's Motion for Permission to Appeal Order Denying Stay. The Claimant respectfully requests that the 
Industrial Commission DENY UPS's Motion For Permissive Appeal on the following grounds: 
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1. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 12.08.2011 ORDER DENYING STAY DOES NOT 
INVOLVE A CONTROLLING QUESTION OF LAW SUBJECT TO A PERMISSIVE APPEAL 
The Industrial Commission should deny UPS's Motion For Permissive Appeal because UPS 
cannot satisfy the permissive appeal standards set forth in I.A.R. 12(a): 
Permission may be granted by the Supreme Court to appeal from an interlocutory 
order or judgment of a district court in a civil or criminal action, or from an 
interlocutory order of an administrative agency, which is not otherwise 
appealable under these rules, but which involves a controlling question of law as 
to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an 
immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly 
resolution of the litigation. 
I.A.R. 12(a) only permits the permissive appeal of an interlocutory order of an administrative 
agency which involves a controlling question of law. The controlling question of law in this case is 
whether the Claimant's 12.18.2009 low back injury arose out of his employment with UPS. The 
Industrial Commission decided that controlling question of law in a manner adverse to UPS in its 
05.17.2011 decision. 
The Industrial Commission's 12.08.2011 supplemental ORDER DENYING STAY does not 
involve a controlling question of law. That supplemental Order merely imposes a time deadline for UPS 
to comply with the payment obligations previously set forth in the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 
controlling decision. Since the Commission's 12.08.2011 supplemental Order does nothing more than 
establish a timeline for complying with the Industrial Commission's original 05.17.2011 Order, it does 
not involve a controlling question of law in this case and is not the proper subject of a permissive appeal 
pursuant to I.A.R. 12( a). 
2. UPS HAS ALREADY WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO FILE A PERMISSIVE APPEAL 
I.A.R. l 2(b) required UPS to file a motion for permissive appeal with the Industrial Commission 
within fourteen (14) days after the Industrial Commission entered its 05.17.2011 Order that decided the 
controlling question of law in this case. Since UPS failed to file a motion for permissive appeal with the 
Industrial Commission within fourteen (14) days of the 05.17.2011 Order, UPS has already waived its 
right to file a motion for permissive appeal. 
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By filing its 12.12.2011 Motion For Permission To Appeal Order Denying Stay, UPS is simply 
trying to come in through the back door of a supplemental Order in an effort to revive its right to file a 
permissive appeal of the controlling question of law when it has already waived its right to file a 
permissive appeal. The Commission should not allow UPS to accomplish indirectly through a 
supplemental Order what it could not accomplish directly through the original order because it failed to 
file a Motion For Permissive Appeal from the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 decision. 
3. A PERMISSIVE APPEAL WILL NOT MATERIALLY ADVANCE THE ORDERLY 
RESOLUTION OF LITIGATION AS REQUIRED BY I.A.R. l 2(a) 
The Industrial Commission should deny UPS's Motion For Permissive Appeal because granting a 
permissive appeal at this stage of the proceedings will not materially advance the orderly resolution of the 
litigation as required by I.A.R. 12(a). In fact, a review of the procedural history of this claim confirms 
that UPS has done everything in its power to thwart the orderly resolution of this litigation. After filing 
its May 12, 2010 Motion To Bifurcate asking for the bifurcated resolution of the issues in this case, UPS 
willfully refused to comply with the Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011 Order that it had requested. 
When UPS realized that it had waived its right to take a permissive appeal of the Industrial 
Commission's 05.17.2011 Order because it failed to file a Motion For Permissive Appeal with the 
Industrial Commission within 14 days as required by I.A.R. 12(b ), UPS attempted to take an appeal as a 
matter of right pursuant to I.A.R. l l(d). The Idaho Supreme Court granted the Claimant's Motion For 
Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal on July 27, 2011 and cited the case of Jensen v. Pillsbury Co, 121 Idaho 
127, 823 P. 2d 161 (1992) for the proposition that the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 decision is not 
a final and appealable Order from which an appeal may be taken as a matter of right pursuant to I.A.R. 
11 ( d). 
Since the Supreme Court ruled that UPS is not entitled to take an appeal as a matter of right 
pursuant to I.A.R. 1 l(d), that only leaves a permissive appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 12. However, UPS has 
already waived its right to file a permissive appeal of the controlling question of law set forth in the 
Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 decision because it did not file a Motion For Permissive Appeal with 
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the Industrial Commission within 14 days after the Commission filed its 05.17.2011 decision as required 
by I.A.R. l 2(b ). 
Rather than accept responsibility for the position that it placed itself in and satisfy its legal 
obligations to the Claimant, UPS has now taken the disingenuous position that the Industrial 
Commission's 12.08.2011 supplemental Order involves a controlling question of law when UPS must 
realize that its argument is fallacious. 
The controlling question of law in this case is not the definition of the date when UPS must 
satisfy the obligations placed on it by the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 decision. The controlling 
question of law is whether Claimant's injury arose out of his employment with UPS. That question was 
answered by the Commission's 05.17.2011 decision. The Commission's 12.08.2011 supplemental Order 
merely imposed a deadline for UPS to satisfy its obligations to Claimant. 
Even if the Industrial Commission agreed with UPS's argument and concluded that the payment 
deadline set forth in the Commission's 12.08.2011 supplemental Order involved a controlling question of 
law, the Idaho Supreme Court could not decide that derivative question of law without first deciding the 
merits of the underlying question of whether the Claimant's 12.18.2009 industrial injury arose out of his 
employment with UPS. 
The Supreme Court is not going to grant a permissive appeal of the controlling question of 
whether Claimant's 12.18.2009 injury arose out of his employment with UPS because UPS failed to file a 
Motion For Permissive Appeal with the Industrial Commission as required by I.A.R. 12(b) within 14 days 
of the Commission's 05.17.2011 original Order. That fateful blunder by UPS not only prevents a 
permissive appeal from the Commission's 05.17.2011 original decision, it also prevents a permissive 
appeal from the Commission's 12.08.2011 supplemental Order which is merely derivative of and 
supplemental to the original decision. 
Given the extremely high probability that the Idaho Supreme Court will recognize that UPS is 
trying to perfect a permissive appeal indirectly through a supplemental Order when it is impossible for it 
to perfect a permissive appeal directly through the original Order that decided the real controlling 
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question of law, it would not materially advance the orderly resolution of this case for the Commission to 
grant UPS's Motion For Permissive Appeal. 
After the Idaho Supreme Court grants the Claimant's Second Motion For Involuntary Dismissal 
of Appeal, the parties will have accomplished nothing but to find themselves back before the Industrial 
Commission in exactly the same position with UPS still refusing to comply with the payment obligations 
set forth in the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 decision. The Claimant should not be deprived of the 
sure and certain relief promised to him by Idaho Code §72-201 while UPS wastes scarce administrative 
and adjudicative resources by taking multiple appeals which are either premature or lack merit. 
4. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 05.17.2011 DECISION IS FINAL BASED ON THE 
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF IDAHO CODE §72-718 
Idaho Code §72-718 plainly states that the decisions of the Industrial Commission become final 
and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated on the date the decision is filed provided that no party moves 
for reconsideration. Pursuant to Idaho Code §72-718 and JRP 3(F), UPS had twenty (20) days from the 
date of the Commission's 05.17.2011 Order to file a Motion For Reconsideration but failed to do so. By 
failing to file a Motion To Reconsider, UPS has already conceded that the Commission's 05.17.2011 
decision is final with respect to all issues adjudicated in the 05.17.2011 decision and should satisfy its 
obligations under that Order. 
5. UPS REQUESTED BIFURCATION AND SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH 
THE ORDER THAT IT REQUESTED 
When UPS filed its 05.12.2010 Motion To Bifurcate, UPS either knew, or should have known, 
that the Industrial Commission could enter an Order that would obligate UPS to pay medical and income 
benefits to the Claimant and UPS should be held liable for its obligations under the bifurcated Order that 
it requested: 
Thus, as Defendants argue, there is a rationale to support the decision to 
bifurcate. However, and as this case amply demonstrates, there is a potential 
downside to the decision to bifurcate as well. Should Defendants lose on a 
threshold compensability issue, they will be obliged to pay benefits, and must 
even bring the case to its full conclusion, before they can appeal the 
Commission's determination on the threshold issue. With any decision to request 
bifurcation comes a need to recognize this potential outcome, and parties ignore 
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this potentiality at their peril. (See Industrial Commission's 12.08.2011 ORDER 
DENYING STAY, p. 7, LL 16-22). 
When parties request bifurcation, they are requesting an expedited determination 
of certain issues, and they should expect to be held accountable for their 
responsibilities under such a determination once it is made (See Industrial 
Commission's 12.08.2011 ORDER DENYING ST A Y, p. 8, LI. 1-3). 
6. THE CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO SURE AND CERTAIN RELIEF IN THE FORM OF 
PROMPT PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
The Claimant's right to receive sure and certain relief in the form of the prompt payment of 
worker's compensation benefits is not the only thing at stake in this case. If UPS and Liberty Insurance 
Corp. are allowed to willfully disobey a bifurcated Order from the Commission that they requested and a 
supplemental Order which merely imposes a payment deadline, then all Orders entered by the Industrial 
Commission in all cases will have no impact or meaning whatsoever until after the Idaho Supreme Court 
renders a final decision on appeal that affirms the Commission's authority. 
The Industrial Commission should enter an Order which rebukes UPS and Liberty Insurance 
Carp's for their attempts to deprive the Claimant of sure and certain relief and wreak havoc on the orderly 
administration of justice: 
Injured workers should not be in the position of having to wait for compensation 
pending resolution of all the issues before both the Commission and the Court, a 
process that can take several years (See Industrial Commission's 12.08.2011 
ORDER DENYING ST A Y, p. 6, LI. 2-4). 
The policy of the workers' compensation law is to provide injured workers with 
sure and certain relief. Claimant is correct that an important aspect of sure and 
certain relief is prompt payment of benefits. Claimant's compensation payments 
should not be delayed for months or years because of a voluntary request for 
bifurcation made by Defendants. There is no manifest injustice or due process 
violation in ordering Defendants to pay an award granted by the bifurcated 
decision that they themselves requested. (See Industrial Commission's 
12.08.2011 ORDER DENYING ST A Y, p. 8, LI. 4-9) 
This might not have been the result Defendants desired, but they should have 
considered the possibility of this result before making their request to bifurcate 
(See Industrial Commission's 12.08.2011 ORDER DENYING STAY, p. 8, LI. 
13-14). 
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7. UPS HAS NOT PRESENTED ANY NEW AND COMPELLING ARGUMENTS TO SUPPORT 
ITS MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL 
UPS has not presented any new and compelling legal arguments to support its Motion For 
Permissive Appeal but merely incorporated by reference and reiterated all of the arguments that were 
previously considered and rejected by the Industrial Commission in UPS's 09.16.2011 Memorandum 
Regarding the Issue of Payment Obligations. 
The Claimant can understand why UPS and Liberty would want to keep the worker's 
compensation benefits that the Industrial Commission awarded to the Claimant in its 05.17.2011 decision, 
but that motivation does not justify launching a direct challenge to the Industrial Commission's legal 
authority and refusing to comply with its Orders: 
However, we expect Surety to comply with the orders of the Commission until an 
appeal is perfected. In this regard, we note that Idaho Code §72-304 grants to the 
Commission the authority to withdraw its approval of any surety who 
unnecessarily delays payment of compensation (See Industrial Commission's 
12.08.2011 ORDER DENYING ST A Y, p. 6, L. 23- p. 7, L. 1 ). 
If the parties to workers' compensation claims are allowed to willfully disobey Orders from the 
administrative agency that has been granted exclusive jurisdiction to administer the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act, the orderly administration of justice in all workers' compensation claims will be 
threatened. What are the practical consequences of the brash stand that UPS and Liberty Insurance Corp. 
are taking in this case? 
Will Liberty lose Industrial Commission and Department of Insurance approval to write and sell 
worker's compensation policies in the state of Idaho? Will thousands of Liberty employer I policy-
holders be forced to go without workers' compensation insurance coverage because UPS and I or Liberty 
willfully refused to comply with the Industrial Commission's Orders? Will Liberty have to bring a 
lawsuit against UPS to recover all of the lost profits suffered by Liberty as the result of losing its ability 
provide employers in the state of Idaho with worker's compensation insurance? What does this open 
defiance of the Industrial Commission's authority do to the integrity of the workers' compensation system 
in the long-run? 
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The Claimant respectfully requests that the Industrial Commission enter an Order denying UPS' s 
Motion For Permissive Appeal and take all legal action that is necessary to compel UPS and Liberty 
Insurance Corp. to comply with the payment obligations set forth in the Commission's original 
05.17.2011 decision and its 12.08.2011 supplemental Order. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of December, 2011. 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th day of December, 2011, I served the Claimant's Response 
in Opposition to Defendant UPS's Motion For Permissive Appeal by the method indicated below and 
addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC 
1004 W. Fort St. 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Susan Veltman 
Gardner & Breen 
1410 W. Washington 
Boise, ID 83702 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
Vawter I Claimant's Response in Opposition to Defendant UPS's Motion For Permissive Appeal Page 8 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 


















STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL ) 





PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
FI E 
DEC 1 9 lU11 
On December 12, 2011, Defendants United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) and Liberty 
Insurance Corporation (Liberty) filed a motion requesting permission to appeal the 
Commission's Order Denying Stay (Order), filed December 8, 2011. UPS and Liberty argue that 
the Order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for 
difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal from the Order may materially advance 
the orderly resolution of the litigation. Defendant State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity 
Fund (ISIP) agrees and asks that the Commission grant the motion. Claimant objects to the 
motion, arguing that the Order does not involve a controlling question of law. 1 
For reasons addressed in the Order, we disagree. There appears to be a conflict between 
Idaho Code § 72-718 and I.AR. 11 ( d) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Jensen v. Pillsbury 
Co., 121 Idaho 127, 823 P.2d 161 (1992). We believe that the parties and the Commission would 
1 
UPS and Liberty filed a request for hearing on their motion; however, the parties, in the interest of time, have 
agreed to rest on the pleadings without hearing. 
ORDER GRANTING PERMISSION TO APPEAL - 1 
benefit from the Court's examination of the relationship between I.A.R. 11 ( d) and Section 72-
718. Reconciliation of these provisions could have a substantial impact not only on this case, but 
on many cases before the Commission and, indeed, on Commission procedure itself. If 
bifurcated orders are not final orders for purposes of enforcement and appeal, the Commission 
would need to consider whether it should continue to allow the practice of bifurcation. 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That: 
1. The motion for permission to appeal is GRANTED; 
2. The Order Denying Stay is STAYED pursuant to I.A.R. 13(f)(l) until such time as 
the appeal is perfected or permission to appeal is denied by the Supreme Court. 
DATED this { ~tv\_ day of December, 2011. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Thomas P. Bas m, omm1ss10ner 
ORDER GRANTING PERMISSION TO APPEAL - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the l qckt day of December 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING PERMISSION TO APPEAL was served by facsimile upon 
each of the following: 
RICK D KALLAS 
(208) 345-8945 
SUSAN R VELTMAN 
(208) 387-3501 
PAUL J AUGUSTINE 
(208) 947-0014 
eb 
ORDER GRANTING PERMISSION TO APPEAL - 3 
39 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850) 
GARDNER BREEN & VELTMAN 
1410 W. Washington- 83702 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
Attorney for Defendants 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL P. VA WIER, 
Claimant, 
V. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 
Employer, 
and 



















LC. Case No. 2010-000114 
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S 
REQUEST FOR CALENDARING AND 
REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING 
1. Defendants, UPS and Liberty Insurance Corp., assert that calendaring of additional issues 
may be premature. The parties are currently awaiting orders from the Industrial Commission 
regarding a permissive appeal of an interlocutory order. Thus, Defendants do not yet know whether 
some or all proceedings in this matter will be stayed by either the Industrial Commission or the Idaho 
Supreme Court. ISIF was recently joined and discovery is pending. Both Claimant and Defendant 
have retained vocational experts but are waiting on their reports. 
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT 1 S REQUEST FOR CALENDARING AND REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING, P. 1 
2. Defendants agree that the issues identified by Claimant remain unresolved and will likely 
require a hearing. 
3. This case is appropriately set in Boise for one day. 
4. It is unlikely the parties will be able to reach a settlement. 
5. This case is appropriately heard by the Commissioners smce the underlying 
compensability decision was issued by them. 
6. Unavailable dates of counsel for Defendants are: 
2012- March 8-9, 14-16 
April 16-20 
May 2, 9 
DATED this 19th day of December, 2011. 
Susan R. Veltman - of the firm 
GARDNER BREEN & VELTMAN 
Attorney for Defendants 
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S REQUEST FOR CALENDARING AND REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING, P. 2 
141 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of December, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
Paul Augustine 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN 
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S REQUEST FOR CALENDARING AND REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING, P. 3 
PAUL J. AUGUSTINE ISB 4608 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1004 W. Fort Street 
Post Office Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 367-9400 
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014 
Attorneys for Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL VAWTER, 
Claimant, 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 
Employer, 
and 
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP., 
Surety, and 
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
IC No. 2010-000114 
DEFENDANT INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND'S 
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
COMES NOW Defendant, State ofldaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF), by and 
through its counsel of record, Paul J. Augustine, and hereby responds to Claimant's Request for 
Calendaring pursuant to Rule 8 of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure, as follows. 
Defendant, ISIF anticipates that this case will be ready for hearing after May 1, 2012. 
1. Statement. Defendant ISIF will be prepared to proceed to hearing after May 1, 2012. 
2. Issue or Issues to be Heard. 
• Defendant ISIF agrees with issues identified in Claimant's Request for Hearing. 
DEFENDANT ISIF'S RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S REQUEST FOR HEARING - I 
3. Desired Location of Hearing. Boise, Idaho. 
4. Length of Hearing. One day 
5. Unavailable Dates. 
January 10, 13; 
February 2, 22; 
March 7, 15, 19; 
April 3, 5, 6, 11, 16; and 
June 8, 2012. 
7 yf~ 
DATED this~\.; day of December, 2011. 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
L 
'\ /-' 
11 ( \ 
x I 
By \ l\;°':Jj . 
Paul J. Augu$tI\le - Of the Fmn 
Attorneys ftjdustrial Special Indemnity Fund 
DEFENDANT ISIF'S RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S REQUEST FOR HEARING - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ll~ day of December, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT ISIF'S RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S REQUEST FOR 
HEARING, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas & DeFranco, PLLC 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
Attorney for Claimant 
Susan Veltman 
Gardner & Breen Law Offices 
P.O. Box 2528 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorneys for Employer/Surety 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_Telecopy 
/ 
lv U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
DEFENDANT ISIF'S RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S REQUEST FOR HEARING - 3 
Clerk of the Courts 
(208) 334-2210 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION SECRETARY 
STATEHOUSE MAIL 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83 720-0041 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 
NOTICE OF PETITION FILING 





A DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL AND TO 
STAY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECEMBER 8, 2011 ORDER was filed in this 
office DECEMBER 30, 2011. 
This document will be reviewed by the Idaho Supreme Court using the Docket Number 
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Supreme Court Docket No. 39512-2012 
Industrial Commission No. 2010-114 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC., 




1. DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL AND TO 
STAY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECEMBER 8, 2011 ORDER with 
attachments, an AFFIDA VII OF SUSAN R. VELTMAN IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL AND TO 
STAY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECEMBER 8, 2011, ORDER and 
DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND TO STAY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 
DECEMBER 8, 2011, ORDER were filed by counsel for Appellants on December 30, 
2011, requesting permission to appeal regarding the Industrial Commission's December 
8, 2011, interlocutory order denying stay, and to stay such order during pendency of 
appeal. 
2. CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS/ 
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL AND TO STAY THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 12.08.2011 INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, 
CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO MODIFY INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION'S 12.19.2011 STAY, CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO MODIFY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 12.19.2011 
STAY, an AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO MODIFY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 12.19.2011 STAY with attachment and 
an AFFIDA VII OF RICK D. KALLAS IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT/ 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO MODIFY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 
12.19.2011 STAY with attachments were filed by counsel for Respondent on January 13, 
2012. 
The Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing, 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL-Docket No. 39512-2012 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR 
PERMISSIVE APPEAL AND TO STAY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECEMBER 8, 
2011 ORDER be, and hereby is, DENIED. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the remaining issues shall be litigated without further 
delay. 
·t 
DATED this_---'--_ day of January, 2012. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyorl, Clerk 
cc: Counsel of Record 
Industrial Commission Secretary 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL- Docket No. 39512-2012 
Rick D. Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
Idaho State Bar No. 3872 
Attorney for Claimant 
ZBIZ JAN 3C P lf: UO 
RECEIVED 
lt-IDUSTRl.t.L COMM1S$10N 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO 


















ST A TE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL ) 
INDEMNITY FUND, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
LC. No. 2010-000114 
CLAIMANT'S 2nct REQUEST FOR 
SCHEDULING OF FINAL HEARING DATE 
BASED ON CLAIMANT'S 11.29.11 REQUEST 
FOR CALENDARING 
COMES NOW Claimant, Michael P. Vawter, and, pursuant to JRP 8 (C), hereby requests that 
the Industrial Commission calendar this claim for Hearing on the following grounds: 
1) The Claimant filed a Request for Calendaring on 11.29.11 in order to have the following issues 
heard and decided by the Industrial Commission: 
(a) What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent physical impairment (PPI) caused by the 
Vawter I Claimant's 2"J Request for Scheduling of Hearing Date Based on l l.29.2011 Request for Calendaring Page I 
subject 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury? 
(b) What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent disability in excess of his physical 
impairment (PPD >PPI) caused by the subject 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury, 
including whether the Claimant is totally and permanently disabled under the 100% 
method and I or the odd-lot doctrine? 
(c) Whether any liability for the Claimant's total and permanent disability should be 
apportioned to the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIP) under LC. §72-332? 
(d) Whether apportionment under LC. §72-406 is appropriate? 
2) On 12.15.2011, the Claimant filed his First Request For Scheduling of Hearing date based on 
Claimant's 11.29.2011 Request For Calendaring; 
3) On 1.30.2012, the Idaho Supreme Court entered its ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
PERMISSIVE APPEAL which contained the following Orders: 
(a) An Order which denied UPS's Motion For Permissive Appeal; 
(b) An Order which denied UPS's Motion To Stay the Industrial Commission's 12.08.2011 
Order; and, 
( c) An Order which required the remaining issues in this case to be litigated without further 
delay (See attached copy of Supreme Court's 01.30.2012 ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL). 
For the reasons set forth above, the Claimant respectfully requests that the Industrial Commission 
issue a Notice of Hearing setting this case for Hearing as soon as practicable. 
Vawter I Claimant's 2"<l Request for Scheduling of Hearing Date Based on 11.29.2011 Request for Calendaring Page 2 
fl5D 
DATED this 30th day of January, 2012. 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC 
R -o s> 11 rK>~ 
By: J~~r 'fL~ Y 
RICK D. KALLAS ~ 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 301h day of January, 2012, I served the Claimant's 2nct Request 
for Scheduling of Hearing Date Based on 11.29.11 Request For Calendaring by the method indicated 
below and addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC 
1004 W. Fort St. 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Susan Veltman 
Gardner & Breen 
1410 W. Washington 
Boise, ID 83702 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
































In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 









Supreme Court Docket No. 39512-2012 
Industrial Commission No. 2010-114 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC., 












Ref. No. 12-19 
Respondents-Appellants. 
1. DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL AND TO 
STAY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECEMBER 8, 2011 ORDER with 
attachments, an AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN R. VELTMAN IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL AND TO 
STAY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECEMBER 8, 2011, ORDER and 
DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND TO STAY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 
DECEMBER 8, 2011, ORDER were filed by counsel for Appellants on December 30, 
2011, requesting permission to appeal regarding the Industrial Commission's December 
8, 2011, interlocutory order denying stay, and to stay such order during pendency of 
appeal. 
2. CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS/ 
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL AND TO STAY THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 12.08.2011 INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, 
CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO MODIFY INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION'S 12.19.2011 STAY, CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO MODIFY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 12.19.2011 
STAY, an AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO MODIFY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 12.19.2011 STAY with attachment and 
an AFFIDAVIT OF RICK D. KALLAS IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT/ 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO MODIFY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 
12.19.2011 STAY with attachments were filed by counsel for Respondent on January 13, 
2012. 
The Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing, 



































IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR 
PERMISSIVE APPEAL AND TO STAY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECEMBER 8, 
2011 ORDER be, and hereby is, DENIED. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the remaining issues shall be litigated without further 
delay. 
DATED this 3o·t day of January, 2012. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
cc: Counsel of Record 
Industrial Commission Secretary 








Rick D. Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
Idaho State Bar No. 3872 
Attorney for Claimant 
10\Z L \ J A g: u l 
l" ~
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 


















ST A TE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL ) 
fNDEMNITY FUND, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
(A) RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
I.C. No. 2010-000114 
CLAIMANT'S REQUEST TO INCLUDE 
SUPPLEMENT AL ISSUE FOR RESOLUTION 
AT 05.17.2012 HEARING 
The Claimant filed a Request For Calendaring with the Industrial Commission on 11.29.2011 and 
listed the following 4 issues to be heard and decided at Hearing before the Industrial Commission: 
1. What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent physical impairment (PPI) caused by the subject 
12.18.09 industrial accident I injury? 
Vawter I Claimant's 2.13.12 Request To Include Supplemental Issue For Resolution at 05.17.2012 Hearing Page I 
2. What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent disability in excess of his physical impairment 
(PPD >PPI) caused by the subject 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury, including whether the 
Claimant is totally and permanently disabled under the 100% method and I or the odd-lot 
doctrine? 
3. Whether any liability for the Claimant's total and permanent disability should be apportioned to 
the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) under LC. §72-332? 
4. Whether apportionment under I.C. §72-406 is appropriate? 
Defendant UPS filed its Response To Claimant's 11.29.2011 Request for Calendaring on 
12 .19.2011 and did not dispute the recitation of the disputed issues to be heard and decided at hearing that 
were listed in the Claimant's 11.29.2011 Request For Calendaring. 
Defendant ISIF filed its Response To Claimant's 11.29.2011 Request for Calendaring on 
12.20.2011 and agreed with the recitation of the disputed issues to be heard and decided at hearing that 
were listed in the Claimant's 11.29.2011 Request For Calendaring. 
The Industrial Commission held a Telephone Status Conference with counsel for Claimant, 
Counsel for Defendant UPS and Counsel for Defendant ISIF on Friday, February 10, 2012. During that 
Telephone Conference, Counsel for UPS reiterated her 08.19.2011 Request For Additional Issues At 
Hearing that the Industrial Commission add the reimbursement issue to the list of issues to be heard and 
decided at the 05 .17.2012 Hearing: 
5. Whether Defendant UPS is entitled to reimbursement from Claimant if the Supreme Court 
reverses the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 compensability decision? 
The Claimant objected to inclusion of the reimbursement issue because that issue does not yet 
present a justiciable controversy that is ripe for adjudication before the Industrial Commission and if the 
Supreme Court ultimately reverses the Industrial Commission's 05 .17.2011 decidision finding this claim 
compensable, the Industrial Commission will lack jurisdiction to enforce any prophylactic Order of 
reimbursement that it might enter on the reimbursement issue. 
The Industrial Commission heard the Claimant's objections but overruled them and indicated that 
the reimbursement issue would be added to the list of disputed issues for Hearing and the Claimant could 
address the inclusion of the reimbursement issue in his Briefing. 
Vawter I Claimant's 2.13.12 Request To Include Supplemental Issue For Resolution at 05.17.2012 Hearing Page 2 
Defendant UPS then asked the Industrial Commission to include the following issue to be heard 
and decided at the 05.17.2012 final Hearing: 
6. Whether the doctrines of Res Judicata and I or Collateral Estoppel prevent the Claimant from 
requesting that Defendant UPS pay additional past denied benefits which have not yet been paid 
by Defendant UPS to the Claimant? 
The Industrial Commission indicated that it would add the issues of Res Judicata and I or 
Collateral Estoppel to the list of issues to be heard and decided at the 05.17.2012 Hearing. 
The Claimant then requested the Industrial Commission to add the following issues for resolution 
at the 05.17.2012 Hearing: 
7. Whether Defendant UPS is liable for 100% of the invoiced amount of all past denied medical 
benefits incurred by Claimant in connection with his 12.18 .2009 industrial accident I injury that 
have not yet been paid by Defendants and were not adjudicated at the 09.28.2010 Hearing? 
8. Whether Defendant UPS is liable for mileage reimbursement, per diem and lodging expenses 
incurred by Claimant in connection with the medical treatment that he had to receive as the result 
of his 12.18.09 industrial accident? and, 
9. Whether Defendant UPS is liable for the payment of attorney's fees for their unreasonable delay 
and I or denial in the payment of additional worker's compensation benefits due to Claimant? 
Defendant UPS and Defendant ISIF did not object to the inclusion of these issues and the 
Industrial Commission indicated that it would add these issues for resolution at the 05.17.2012 Hearing. 
(B) CLAIMANT'S REQEUST FOR SUPPLEMENT AL ISSUE TO BE ADDED FOR 
RESOLUTION AT FINAL HEARING 
After Defendant UPS raised the issues of Res Judicata and I or Collateral Estoppel during the 
02.10.2012 Telephone Status Conference, the Claimant realized that another issue would need to be heard 
and decided at the 05 .17.2011 Hearing in order to prevent the manifest injustice that will occur if 
Defendant UPS receives unearned credit for the payment of medical benefits which it never paid in direct 
violation of the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., 147 Idaho 146, 206 
P.3d 852 (2009). 
Based on Defendant UPS's raising the issues of Res Judicata and I or Collateral Estoppel, the 
Claimant requests that the Industrial Commission add the following supplemental issue to the list of 
issues to be set forth in the Notice of Hearing that the Industrial Commission will issue for the 05 .17.2012 
Hearing: 
Vawter I Claimant's 2. 13.12 Request To Include Supplemental Issue For Resolution at 05.17.2012 Hearing Page 3 
10. Whether the Industrial Commission should exercise its authority under Idaho Code §72-719 to 
amend the language of its 05.17.2011 decision to specifically state that Defendant UPS is liable 
for I 00% of the invoiced amount of all past denied medical benefits that were incurred by 
Claimant in connection with his 12.18.2009 industrial accident including, but not limited to, those 
medical benefit claims that were adjudicated at the 09.28.2010 Hearing, in accordance with the 
Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 
852 (2009) in order to prevent the manifest injustice that will occur if UPS is able to avoid its 
liability for the payment of medical benefits under Idaho Code §72-432 and the Court's holding 
in Neel? 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of February, 2012. 
::LSW~:t~,PLLC 
RICK D. KALLAS 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13th day of February, 2012, I served the Claimant's Request To 
Include Supplemental Issue For Resolution at 05.17.2012 Hearing on the Defendants by the method 
indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC 
I 004 W. Fort St. 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Susan Veltman 
Gardner & Breen 
1410 W. Washington 
Boise, ID 83702 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL P. VAWTER, 
Claimant, 
v. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, 
Surety, 
and 




NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter on 
May 17, 2012 at 9:00 am, for one (1) day, in the Industrial Commission hearing room, 700 
South Clearwater Lane, City of Boise, County of Ada, State of Idaho, on the following issues: 
l. Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to the following benefits: 
a. Permanent partial impairment (PPI); 
b. Permanent partial disability (PPD); 
c. Mileage, per diem and lodging expenses incurred in connection with medical 
treatment related to Claimant's industrial injury; 
2., Whether Claimant is totally and permanently disabled, either under the 100% method 
or according to the odd-lot doctrine; 
J. Whether apportionment pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406 is appropriate; 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
4. Whether ISIF is liable under Idaho Code § 72-332, and, if so, apportionment under 
the Carey formula; 
5. Whether Employer and Surety are entitled to reimbursement for benefits paid 
pursuant to the Commission's May 17, 2011 decision, should that decision be 
reversed on appeal; 
6. Whether Claimant is entitled to past-denied medical care benefits, or whether the 
issue of Claimant's entitlement to such benefits is precluded under the doctrine of res 
judicata; 
7. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 72-804, or whether 
the issue of Claimant's entitlement to attorney fees is precluded under the doctrine of 
res judicata; 
8. Whether Employer and Surety are liable for 100% of the invoiced amount of all past-
denied medical care expenses incurred by Claimant in connection with his industrial 
llljury; 
9. Whether the Commission, in order to prevent a manifest injustice, should amend its 
May 17, 2011 decision to reflect that Employer and Surety are liable for 100% of the 
invoiced amount of all past-denied medical care expenses incurred by Claimant in 
connection with his industrial iajury. 
DATED this~ day of March, 2012. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1fl day of March, 2012 a true and correct copy of the 
NOTICE OF HEARING was served by United States Certified Mail upon each of the 
following: 
RICK D KALLAS 
1031 EPARKBLVD 
BOISE ID 83712 
SUSAN R VELTMAN 
PO BOX2528 
BOISE ID 83701 
PAUL J AUGUSTINE 
PO BOX 1521 
BOISE ID 83701 
and by email to: 
DEAN WILLIS 
mdwillis l@msn.com 
phone (208) 855-9151 
amw 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 3 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850) 
GARDNER BREEN & VELTMAN 
1410 West Washington - 83702 
P.O. Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
Attorneys for Defendants 
ORIGINAL 
Z"I' .1. u /.. .~ 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL P. VAWTER, 
Claimant, 
v. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 
Employer, 
and 
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP., 
Surety, 
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL 























LC. No. 2010-000114 
REQUEST FOR ORDER 
GOVERNING HEARING EXHIBITS 
This case is set for hearing on May 17, 2012, to be heard by the Commissioners. A previous 
hearing was held on September 28, 2010, at which time evidence was taken and a record was made. 
There have been extensive pleadings filed with both the Industrial Commission and the Idaho 
Supreme Court in this matter. 
REQUEST FOR ORDER GOVERNING HEARING EXHIBITS, P. 1 
In an effort to avoid duplicative evidence and to confirm the extent to which the Industrial 
Commission will take official notice of pleadings filed, UPS and Liberty Ins. Corp. (Defendants), 
request confirmation from the Commission as to what evidence, if any, is already considered to be 
admitted and/or subject to official notice. 
Defendants request that all evidence admitted at the previous hearing, the hearing transcript, 
and all pleadings filed with the Industrial Commission in this matter be considered without the need 
for either party to re-admit and that all pleadings, briefs, and attachments filed with the Industrial 
Commission be considered as part of the evidentiary record. The ISIF was not a party to the previous 
hearing and copies of past exhibits would need to be provided by the respective parties. 
DATED this 3rd day of April, 2012. 
Susan R. Veltman 
GARDNER BREEN & VELTMAN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
REQUEST FOR ORDER GOVERNING HEARING EXHIBITS, P. 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of April, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83 712 
Paul Augustine 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN 
REQUEST FOR ORDER GOVERNING HEARING EXHIBITS, P. 3 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL P. VAWTER, 
Claimant, 
v. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, 
Surety, 
and 







On April 3, 2012, Defendants Employer and Surety filed a request for an order governing 
hearing exhibits. In anticipation of the hearing scheduled to be held on May 17, 2012, Employer 
and Surety ask the Commission to confirm whether the exhibits and transcript from the previous 
hearing, which was held on September 28, 2010, are part of the record. Furthermore, Employer 
and Surety request confirmation that the pleadings of the parties made in this case are part of the 
record as well. 
We hereby confirm that the whole of the Commission's legal file, which includes the 
hearing transcript, the previously-admitted exhibits, and all pleadings of the parties, is part of the 
record. Thus, it is not necessary for the parties to move that any evidence or documents that are 
already part of the file be re-admitted. 
Employer and Surety note that Defendant State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity 
Fund (ISIF) was not a party in this case at the time of the first hearing. Therefore, Claimant and 
ORDER REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS - 1 
Defendants Employer and Surety shall provide copies of their previously-admitted exhibits to 
ISIF. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 
l '.7t-0_ 
I""=> day of April, 2012. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \ 6'fk day of April, 2012, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS was served by facsimile upon each 
of the following: 
RICK D KALLAS 
1031 E PARK BLVD 
BOISE ID 83712 
SUSAN R VELTMAN 
PO BOX2528 
BOISE ID 83701 
PAUL J AUGUSTINE 
PO BOX 1521 
BOISE ID 83701 
eb 
ORDER REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS - 2 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB NO. 7850) 
BREEN VELTMAN WILSON, PLLC 
1703 W. Hill Rd. 
Boise, ID 83702 
PH (208) 387-2667 
FAX (208) 387-2677 
veltman@bvwcomplaw.com 
1n11 
Li.i IL , 
Attorney for Defendants United Parcel Service/Liberty Insurance Corp. 




UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 
Employer, 
and 
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP., 
Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
























LC. No. 2010-000114 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF 
COUNSEL 
TO: THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND PARTIES OF RECORD. 
Notice is hereby given that SUSAN R. VELTMAN has changed law firms from GARDNER, 
BREEN & VELTMAN (now GARDNER LAW) to BREEN VELTMAN WILSON, and is being 
substituted as counsel of record in this matter. 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL, Pg. 1 
Contact information for new counsel is: 
Susan R. Veltman 
Breen Veltman Wilson 
1703 W. Hill Rd. 
Boise, ID 83702 
PH (208) 387-2667 
FAX (208) 387-2677 
veltman@bvwcomplaw.com 
All future notices, pleadings, and other correspondence in the above-captioned matter should 
be directed to Ms. Veltman at the above address. 
Dated this ?;J* day of August 2012. 
By: __ ~_\l-Y'_V_~_/Y\A.-_ 
SUSANR. VELTMAN 
BREEN VELTMAN WILSON 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL, Pg. 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
.- \ \y~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~h~' l_'1_~'-.-/ __ day of August, 2012, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
Paul Augustine 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL, Pg. 3 
:JJ./iJ 
/ 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL P. VAWTER, 
Claimant, 
V. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., 
Employer, 
IC 2010-000114 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
and FILED 
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, 
Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
SEP 2 8 2012 
INIUS1'PUAL COMMISSION 
This matter came before the Industrial Commission for hearing on May 17, 2012. 
Appearing for Claimant was Rick Kallas, Esq. Appearing for Defendants United Parcel 
Service/Liberty Insurance Corporation was Susan Veltman, Esq. Appearing for State of 
Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) was Paul Augustine, Esq. Per the Notice of 
Hearing filed March 7, 2012, the following matters are at issue: 
1. Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to the following benefits: 
a. Permanent partial impairment (PPI); 
b. Permanent partial disability (PPD); 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 1 
c. Mileage, per diem and lodging expenses incurred in connection with medical 
treatment related to Claimant's industrial injury; 
2. Whether Claimant is totally and permanently disabled, either under the 100% 
method or according to the odd-lot doctrine; 
3. Whether apportionment pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406 is appropriate; 
4. Whether the ISIF is liable under Idaho Code § 72-332, and, if so, apportionment 
under the Carey formula; 
5. Whether Employer and Surety are entitled to reimbursement for benefits paid 
pursuant to the Commission's May 17, 2011 decision, should that decision be reversed on 
appeal; 
6. Whether Claimant is entitled to past-denied medical care benefits, or whether the 
issue of Claimant's entitlement to such benefits is precluded under the doctrine of res judicata; 
7. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 72-804, or 
whether the issue of Claimant's entitlement to attorney fees is precluded under the doctrine of res 
judicata; 
8. Whether Employer and Surety are liable for 100% of the invoiced amount of all 
past-denied medical care expenses incurred by Claimant in connection with his industrial injury; 
9. Whether the Commission, in order to prevent a manifest injustice, should amend 
its May 17, 2011 decision to reflect that Employer and Surety are liable for 100% of the invoiced 
amount of all past-denied medical care expenses incurred by Claimant in connection with his 
industrial injury. 
At hearing, the testimony of Claimant, Shaun Byrne, Greg Herzog, Barbara Nelson, and 
Nancy Collins was adduced. The testimony of Preston Wilkinson was taken by way of pre-
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 2 
hearing deposition on May 8, 2012. The testimony ofR. Tyler Frizzell, M.D., was taken by way 
of post-hearing deposition on June 4, 2012. 
This matter has been the subject of prior proceedings before the Commission. At the 
request of Defendants, hearing on this case was bifurcated. Following a September 28, 2010 
hearing, the Commission issued its May 17, 2011 decision finding that Claimant suffered a 
compensable work-related accident and was entitled to an award of TTD benefits, as well as 
certain medical benefits in the amount of $149,033.68. Claimant appealed the May 17, 2011 
decision to the Idaho Supreme Court, which subsequently dismissed the appeal. 
Employer/Surety requested that the Commission stay the award pending resolution of the 
remaining issues in the case. By Order filed December 8, 2011, the Commission denied the 
request for stay and ordered the payment of the award made in the Commission's May 17, 2011 
decision. Employer/Surety attempted to perfect a permissive appeal of the May 17, 2011 
decision to the Idaho Supreme Court. That appeal was rejected as premature. 
At the May 1 7, 2012 hearing, the Commission considered all testimony and exhibits 
offered in the connection with the earlier hearing. In addition, the Commission admitted into 
evidence Claimant's additional exhibits 1 - 24, Employer/Surety's additional exhibits 9 22, and 
ISIF's additional exhibits A - K. 
Being fully advised in the law and the premises, the Commission issues this decision on 
the issues remaining in this bifurcated proceeding. 
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
Claimant contends that on or about December 18, 2009, he suffered an accident arising 
out of and in the course of his employment, and as a consequence of which he is totally and 
permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine. Specifically, Claimant contends that his total 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 3 
and permanent disability is solely the result of the compensable accident, and that responsibility 
for his total and permanent disability lies exclusively with Employer/Surety. Although 
Employer/Surety has filed a complaint against the ISIF, seeking to hold the ISIF responsible for 
a portion of Claimant's total and permanent disability, Claimant does not join with 
Employer/Surety in asserting that some portion of Claimant's total and permanent disability is 
the responsibility of the ISIF. Claimant acknowledges that although he has a number of 
preexisting physical impairments, none of these impairments are of the type that implicate ISIF 
liability. Specifically, Claimant denies that any of his preexisting physical impairments 
constituted a subjective hindrance to him on a pre-injury basis. Further, Claimant contends that 
none of these impairments combine with the work accident to cause permanent and total 
disability. Claimant acknowledges that he suffered a work related low back injury in 1990 for 
which he required medical treatment, and which resulted in time loss from work. Claimant 
contends that at the time of his closing evaluation for this injury, he was given neither an 
impairment rating, nor any physician imposed limitations/restrictions. Though Claimant 
acknowledges that he has suffered low back aches and pains over the years since 1990, he denies 
that he suffers from any preexisting low back condition which would have warranted the award 
of an impairment rating prior to the subject accident. Claimant contends that Employer/Surety, 
having benefitted from the finding of their evaluating physician in 1991 that Claimant suffered 
no impairment as a consequence of the 1990 accident, should not now be heard to assert that 
Claimant does have an impairment rating of 7% of the whole person referable to the 1990 
accident. 
Finally, Claimant asserts that the doctrine of res judicata does not operate as a bar to his 
demand for payment of additional medical bills, recently discovered, but incurred prior to the 
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date of the first hearing on this matter. Instead, Claimant contends that he is entitled to an award 
of attorney fees for Employer/Surety's failure to pay medical and other benefits related to 
Claimant's compensable injury. 
Though acknowledging that Claimant is profoundly disabled, Employer/Surety contends 
that Claimant is not totally and permanently disabled under either of the routes to total and 
permanent disability recognized by Idaho law. Employer/Surety contends that in the event 
Claimant is found to be totally and permanently disabled, not all of the responsibility for 
Claimant's total and permanent disability should be borne by Employer/Surety. 
Employer/Surety contends that Claimant has preexisting permanent physical impairments 
involving several body parts, and that his preexisting permanent physical impairment for his low 
back condition meets all of the elements of ISIP liability. According to Employer/Surety, 
Claimant's current low back impairment is 19% of the whole person, with 7% assignable to 
Claimant's preexisting condition and 12% assignable to the subject accident. Employer/Surety 
contends that the doctrine of res judicata bars Claimant from adjudicating entitlement to 
additional medical bills incurred prior to the date of the first hearing, but only recently 
discovered. 
The ISIF acknowledges that Claimant may be totally and permanently disabled, but 
contends that Dr. Frizzell's recent opinion apportioning Claimant's low back impairment 
between the subject accident and Claimant's preexisting condition must be rejected. ISIF argues 
that Claimant's total and permanent disability, if extant, is wholly the product of the subject 
accident, and that none of Claimant's preexisting impairments constituted a subjective hindrance 
to Claimant, nor did they combine with the subject accident to cause total and permanent 
disability. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Claimant was born on , and was 52 years old as of the date of 
hearing. He and his family moved to Donnelly, Idaho when Claimant was 11 years old. With 
the exception of a brief stint in the Marine Corps, Claimant has resided in Donnelly ever since. 
2. Claimant graduated at the bottom of his class from Donnelly High School. He got 
mostly Cs and Ds, with some Fs and Bs, during his tenure as a student. He did poorly at studies 
requiring reading and writing, but excelled at math. 
3. Barbara Nelson confirmed that Claimant's academic performance in high school 
was poor. Ms. Nelson administered various academic tests, including the WRAT 4. This testing 
confirmed Claimant's testimony that he has severe deficiencies in reading, writing, and spelling, 
but tests at a high school graduate level in math. (Tr. 218/21 220/16). Nancy Collins, the 
vocational expert retained by Employer/Surety, expressed no disagreement with Ms. Nelson's 
observations concerning Claimant's academic performance and deficiencies. 
4. Notwithstanding his deficits in reading, writing, and spelling, it is noted that 
Claimant is a cogent and articulate speaker. He had no difficulty understanding or responding to 
the questions that were put to him at hearing. In particular, he seems to be blessed with good 
recall. 
5. Claimant has no other post-high school education, other than the training he 
received in the Marine Corps. He testified that he received training as a mechanic on vehicles 
peculiar to the Marine Corps, and which have no counterpart in the civilian world. 
6. Though Claimant testified that he has taught himself to read, he still has difficulty 
with comprehension. He does not read the daily paper. He has attempted to read novels for 
enjoyment, but is frequently frustrated when encountering words that he does not understand. 
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He is capable of using a web browser to access websites that he likes to follow, mostly those 
providing fishing news or information on BSU football. He denied having any other computer 
skills whatsoever. 
7. From approximately 1983 to 2004 Claimant worked as a volunteer EMT. He 
testified that he completed initial EMT training, then became ambulance certified and later 
obtained an EMT-A rating. When he finally resigned in 2003, he was serving as President of the 
local EMT board. (Tr. 166/21 - 167 /8). Claimant resigned from his position as an EMT because 
of new rules that created potential liability for any EMT who inaccurately recorded medical 
information about a patient. Claimant testified that in view of his difficulties with reading, 
writing, and spelling, he had no desire to subject himself to this type ofliability. 
8. . Claimant was discharged from the Marines in 1980 because of what he described 
as a "defective attitude." Nevertheless, Claimant received an honorable discharge. He returned 
to the Donnelly area, and was first employed by Petrolane. There, he worked as a driver for 
about a year before landing another job at Roland Brothers. He worked there for approximately 
2Y2 years, first as a mechanic's apprentice, and then as a snow plow operator and cement truck 
driver. He left Roland Brothers in order to take a job with UPS in 1983. He was employed as a 
package driver, and worked in this position for the duration of his employment by UPS. 
However, until 1990 he evidently drove a "feeder route" in which position he transported 
packages from Boise to McCall and back. In approximately 1990, he bid on a package driver job 
in Cascade so that he would be able to spend more time following his school age children's 
sporting and school activities. Against the suggestion that the Cascade job was physically less 
demanding than the feeder route job, Claimant testified that it was, in fact, a more demanding 
position. Claimant described his job duties as follows: 
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A. Well, there is - in the big city like Boise they have - they have pre-loaders 
and unloaders and all of that stuff. In a rural area, McCall, they have - I think 
there is four guys that work in the building in McCall that unload the feeder truck 
and load their package cars. It's the drivers that do it. But where I was at down 
in Cascade I was the only one. So, I unloaded the trailer into the truck and loaded 
the truck and placed the boxes - we put anything from a pound to - I think the 
heaviest one I ever carried was 232 pounds. You know, I have had 247 on the 
box. But we weighed it when I got to the mill, but - so, you know, I did all that 
and, then, at the end of the - you go out and make your deliveries and you have a 
predetermined time that you have to do your pickups and you do your pickups 
during the afternoon and, then, finish your deliveries and get done at the end of 
the day, you unload your truck of the packages you didn't get delivered and also 
all your pickup stuff into the trailer and, then, you do your end of day stuff where 
you just - your DIAD, you have already done your signature for your COD count 
and all that stuff and you punch out. 
Tr. 3312-22. 
9. Following the subject accident and related low back surgeries, Claimant was 
declared medically stable by Dr. Frizzell in November 2010. Thereafter, he was given certain 
permanent limitations/restrictions by Dr. Frizzell. He attempted to identify a means by which he 
could return to work for UPS, and continue with his Employer until he could retire. He worked 
closely with UPS to identify a suitable position, and even offered to take a job outside of Valley 
County if the company could identify a position consistent with his limitations/restrictions. UPS 
was unable to identify work for Claimant consistent with his limitations/restrictions, and in the 
end, he resigned so that he could access his 401K to have something to live on. 
10. Claimant applied for Social Security disability benefits, and was eventually found 
eligible for Social Security disability benefits retroactive to December 24, 2009. He did not, 
however, begin receiving Social Security disability until December 2011. As of the date hearing, 
Claimant receives $2,260.00 or $2,290.00 per month in Social Security disability benefits. In 
addition, Claimant receives a monthly payment from the Western Conference Pension Plan in the 
amount of$2,108.00. 
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11. Claimant testified to his understanding that he can earn monthly income of either 
$920.00 or $970.00 per month without endangering his right to monthly Social Security 
disability income. His union pension imposes some restrictions on the type of work he can do 
without jeopardizing those monthly benefits. 
12. In a letter dated June 27, 2011, Dr. Frizzell addressed Claimant's permanent 
limitations/restrictions follmving a functional capacities evaluation administered by Peggy 
Wilson: 
My permanent physical restrictions are in line with the ones that I had made based 
on the recommendations of Ms. Connie Crogh on December 6, 2010. Ms. Wilson 
has come to similar restrictions. Mr. Vawter had a valid Key Functional Capacity 
Assessment on June 20, 2011. He is able to work at a light work level. 
Specifically, he may stand for 2 hours a day, 20 minutes duration. He may walk 4 
hours a day with frequent, moderate distances. He may lift 20 pounds 
occasionally and 10 lbs. frequently. He may carry 20 lbs. occasionally and 10 lbs. 
frequently. He may torque 10 lbs. occasionally and 5 lbs. frequently. He may 
push 20 lbs. occasionally and 10 lbs frequently. He may pull 20 lbs occasionally 
and 10 lbs. frequently. He may sit 2 hours a day; 15 minutes duration. He may 
bend minimally, occasionally. He may stoop minimally and occasionally. He 
may crouch minimally, occasionally. He may kneel occasionally. He may crawl 
occasionally. He may climb stairs frequently. He should not work from 
unprotected heights. He should avoid constant, low frequency vibration. 
C. 5.17.12 Ex. 1, pp. 001108-001109. 
13. In a follow-up letter of March 15, 2012, Dr. Frizzell amended these restrictions 
with the following correction: 
I have the reviewed the corrected copy provided by Ms. Wilson. She notes work 
day of four hours with sitting to standing one to two hours, standing one to two 
hours, and walking one to three hours. 
Ms. Wilson also notes that Mr. Vawters' key functional capacity assessment is 
valid. 
Therefore, I agree with her conclusions ... 
C. 5.17.12 Ex. 1, p. 001122. 
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14. Claimant expressed a good understanding of his physician imposed permanent 
limitations/restrictions. See Tr. 52/23 - 5419. As a lifelong resident of the Donnelly area, and as 
a UPS driver, Claimant testified that he had a peculiar, and possibly unique, understanding of his 
local labor market. His work as a UPS driver took him to almost every area business at one time 
or another, and afforded him a glimpse of how local businesses were fairing in the down 
economy: 
By Mr. Kallas 
Q. And you delivered packages as a package car driver for UPS in Valley county 
for approximately 26 years? 
A. Yeah. Real close to 27 years. Yeah. 
Q. So, how familiar are you with the businesses that exist in Valley county 
right now? 
A. I would say especially on the south and, because that's where I spent my 
last 13 years, 14 years. On the south end I know every person, every dog, every 
car that everybody drives. You could tell - UPS was a great barometer for how a 
business is doing. You know when a business starts getting their stuff COD it's 
not long before the door is going to be closing. So, yeah, I got a real good feeling. 
Like I say, most of them I have known since I was a little kid. I ran around in 
Cascade when I was a kid. 
Tr. 79/8-22. 
15. With assistance :from Shaun Byrne and Greg Herzog of the Industrial Commission 
Rehabilitation Division, Claimant applied for work at a number of Valley County businesses 
including Long Valley Farm Service, V-1, the Trading Post, Donnelly Country Store, Harpo's, 
Howdy's, Cascade Auto, Jug Mountain, WorldMart, Rite-Aid, Quick Lube, and an area fitness 
center. Tr. 70/1-16. Claimant testified that though he applied for these jobs, and in many cases, 
knew the owners of the businesses, he was unsuccessful in obtaining employment, either because 
he was not possessed of the skills to perform the job or the job was beyond the 
limitations/restrictions imposed by Dr. Frizzell. 
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16. As a consequence of the subject accident, Claimant underwent two low back 
surgeries, both performed by Dr. Frizzell. After reaching medical stability in November 2010, 
Dr. Frizzell eventually awarded Claimant a 19% PPI rating, along with the aforementioned 
limitations/restrictions. As developed infra, the parties dispute whether, or to what extent, this 
19% PPI rating, and the attendant limitations/restrictions, should be apportioned between the 
subject accident and a preexisting condition. 
17. Claimant's workers' compensation history is significant for a number of reported 
accidents predating the subject December 18, 2009 accident. All of these accidents occurred 
during Claimant's long employment with UPS. 
18. On or about March 24, 1988, Claimant suffered a right thumb injury for which he 
was eventually given a 9% whole person PPI rating. 
19. On or about October 22, 1990, Claimant suffered an injury to his low back at the 
L4-5 level. Patrick Cindrich, M.D., considered Claimant to be a candidate for a percutaneous 
discectomy at L4-5 to treat the left-sided paracentral disc protrusion demonstrated by the 
radiological studies. However, Claimant did not undergo surgery, and was eventually declared 
medically stable on or about April 2, 1991, following evaluation by Richard Knoebel, M.D., an 
evaluating physician retained by UPS and its then surety, Liberty Northwest Insurance. 
Following his examination of Claimant, Dr. Knoebel opined that Claimant was capable of 
returning to work without restriction, and without any permanent physical impairment. (See D. 
5.17.12 Ex. 10, p. 27). The summary of payments reflects that Claimant missed approximately 
22 weeks of work as a result of the 1990 accident for which he received TTD benefits. 
20. On or about September 16, 1999, Claimant suffered another low back injury when 
he slipped while carrying a package. Claimant complained of low back pain and bilateral lower 
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extremity radicular symptoms following this accident. An MRI scan performed on September 
27, 1999 was read as showing mild canal stenosis at L4-5 due to a broad diffuse disk bulge and 
very mild bilateral facet osteoarthritis. (See D. 5.17.12 Ex. 21, p. 236). Claimant missed four 
weeks from work as a result of this accident, for which he received time loss benefits. Neither 
impairment nor restrictions were awarded to Claimant as a consequence of the 1999 accident. 
21. On or about September 19, 1990, Claimant suffered a left shoulder injury when he 
slipped, catching himself with his left arm. MRI evaluation of Claimant's left shoulder showed a 
severely degenerative AC joint with probable accident caused injury superimposed on chronic 
deterioration of the joint. He underwent arthroscopic decompression of the left shoulder and was 
pronounced stable by Dr. Rudd on or about January 23, 2002. At that time, he was also given an 
impairment rating equal to 7% of the whole person. (See D. 5.17.12 Ex. 12, p. 56). In terms of 
Claimant's return to work, Dr. Rudd stated: "We will release him to do his normal duties for 
UPS, although overhead lifting will be awkward for him." 
22. On or about July 6, 2004, Claimant suffered a right shoulder injury while loading 
packages on to the top shelf of his vehicle. He was evaluated by Robert Walker, M.D., and 
diagnosed as suffering from a partial thickness right rotator cuff tear and a right AC joint injury. 
Claimant underwent arthroscopic subacromial decompression of the right shoulder and excision 
of the right AC joint. On or about December 1, 2004, Claimant was declared medically stable 
and was given a 10% whole person rating by Dr. Walker. On December 1, 2004, Dr. Walker 
offered the following comments concerning Claimant's ability to return to work: 
I would expect that he will continue to strengthen over time but it may take 
several months before he has maximal improvement. At this point, he will 
continue with activities as tolerated and may continue to work, progressing to an 
unrestricted basis. 
D. 5.17.12Ex.19,p.218. 
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23. With respect to the prior claims referenced above, Claimant testified that none of 
the injuries he suffered permanently impacted his ability to engage in gainful activity. Without 
exception, Claimant testified that he recovered from these injuries, and returned to his usual 
occupation as a UPS driver. He required no accommodation, and none was offered to him by 
UPS. He testified that prior to the subject December 18, 2009 accident, he felt that he could 
perform any type of manual labor available in Valley County; he felt himself "invincible." (Tr. 
141/12-25). 
24. The record supports Claimant's assertions in this regard, at least with respect to 
the 1988 thumb injury, 2000 left shoulder injury, and 2004 right shoulder injury. As noted, 
Claimant was released without physician imposed restriction following each of these accidents 
and there is neither medical, nor other evidence, which would suggest that these prognostications 
concerning Claimant's functional ability were inaccurate. Claimant made the same averments 
with respect to his 1990 low back injury, but in this case, the record does contain significant 
evidence contradicting Claimant's testimony. 
25. First, as noted above, Dr. Knoebel did not feel that Claimant was entitled to an 
impairment rating for his low back condition following the 1990 accident. Absent the issuance 
of an impairment rating, the 1990 accident would be insignificant for purposes of Idaho Code § 
72-406 apportionment in a less than total case, and Idaho Code § 72-332 apportionment between 
the employer and the ISIF in a total and permanent disability case. However, Dr. Knoebel's is 
not the only opinion of record concerning whether Claimant is entitled to an impairment rating 
for the 1990 accident. A review of the records and testimony of Dr. Frizzell reveals that after a 
good deal of back and forth between he, Claimant's counsel and counsel for Employer/Surety, 
Dr. Frizzell committed himself to the proposition that Claimant's 19% PPI rating should be 
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apportioned 7% to the 1990 accident, and 12% to the subject December 18, 2009 accident. 
Dr. Frizzell also testified that limitations/restrictions against lifting more than 75 pounds would 
accompany the 7% PPI rating awarded to Claimant for the 1990 accident. 
26. Explaining his original disinclination to assign either impairment or limitations to 
the 1990 accident, Dr. Frizzell stated that because Dr. Knoebel had issued neither impairment 
nor limitations for that accident, Dr. Frizzell had labored under the belief that this somehow 
precluded revisiting the issue. (Frizzell Depo., 39/10-21). When asked to simply ignore the fact 
that Dr. Knoebel had previously opined on these issues, Dr. Frizzell expressed his opinion that 
apportionment of both impairment and restrictions was appropriate. 
27. This did not end Claimant's criticism of Dr. Frizzell's new opinion. In arriving at 
his decision to apportion Claimant's PPI rating between the 1990 accident and the 2009 accident, 
Dr. Frizzell relied upon the A.MA ~"Vfedical Association Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment (5th Edition). He believed that it was appropriate to assign some portion of 
Claimant's impairment to the 1990 accident because the three criteria for apportioning 
impairment identified in the Guides had been met: 
1) There is documentation of a prior factor. 
2) The current permanent impairment is greater as a result of the prior factor 
(ie, prior impairment, prior injury, or illness). 
3) There is evidence that the prior factor caused or contributed to the 
impairment, based on a reasonable probability (>50% likelihood). 
A.MA A1edical Association Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (5th 
Edition), p. 11. 
28. Dr. Frizzell testified that the L4-5 injury documented in connection with the 1990 
accident satisfied all three criteria, thus making apportionment appropriate. (Frizzell Depo., 
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15/4-16/5). However, on cross-examination by Claimant's counsel, Dr. Frizzell offered the 
following cryptic response concerning criteria number 2: 
By Mr. Kallas 
Q. Okay. And on step 2, it asks whether the current permanent impairment is 
greater as a result of the prior factor. And in this case, I assume the prior factor 
that we're talking about is the 7 percent PPI rating that you issued for Mr. 
Vawter's preexisting L4-5 disk protrusion, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you explain to me how this current impairment rating would be 
greater as a result of the prior factor? 
A. No, I can't confirm that. 
Frizzell Depo., 22/18-23/4. 
Even so, at the end of the day, Dr. Frizzell concluded the discussion by expressing his 
view that based on the medical and other records he reviewed in connection with Claimant's 
preexisting condition, it was still appropriate to assign 7% of the 19% PPI rating to the 1990 
accident, and to restrict Claimant from lifting over 75 pounds as a consequence of that accident. 
29. Independent evidence in the record tends to support Dr. Frizzell's ultimate 
conclusion that apportionment of both impairment and limitations is appropriate in this case. 
30. On August 5, 2009, Claimant was seen for a DOT physical by Jim Dardis, M.D., 
of the Payette Lakes Medical Center. In connection with that physical, Dr. Dardis recorded the 
following history and findings: 
REVIEW OF SYMPTOMS: The patient has complaints of right thumb pain from 
where he lost the tip of his thumb in a conveyor belt, severe upper back pain, very 
sore with spasms, chronic low back pain from lifting boxes and carrying which 
he's been doing for almost 28 years with UPS He has complaints in both knees 
with heat and swelling which, by the end of the day, just stepping out of this truck 
gives shooting pains with his left knee and causes a hot, swollen, painful, aching 
like a toothache in his right knee by the end of each day of work. 
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1. Normal DOT physical, cleared for two years. 
2. Diabetes mellitus. 
3. Dyslipidemia. 
4. Bilateral knee pain. 
5. Chronic low back pain. 
6. Current upper back pain. 
D. 9.28.10 Ex. 5, pp. 75-76. 
31. From time to time, Claimant was evaluated by his supervisors, who rode along 
with him on his route to assess his performance and compliance with UPS policy. Among other 
things, UPS required its employees to avoid "excessive backing" when accessing the driveways 
or parking lots of its customers. Evidently, this policy was intended to avoid damage to persons 
or property for which the company might be held liable. On a ride along evaluation of July 29, 
2008, the individual who was evaluating Claimant recorded the following: "Excessive backing 
due to protectiveness of sore back." (See D. 5.17.12 Ex. 15, p. 124). 
32. Claimant attempted to explain these entries and square them with his testimony 
that he was altogether unimpaired prior to the December 18, 2009 accident. The Commission 
finds these explanations unconvincing, and concludes that the record provides substantial and 
competent evidence supporting the conclusion that Claimant suffered from symptomatic low 
back complaints prior to December 18, 2009, complaints which were severe enough to cause 
Claimant to modify the manner in which he performed his work. 
33. As noted above, after being declared medically stable, Claimant unsuccessfully 
looked for work in Valley County. In this he was aided by both Shaun Byrne and Greg Herzog, 
however, per Claimant, only Greg Herzog offered specific leads to Claimant for follow-up. 
None of the jobs suggested by Mr. Herzog proved appropriate for Claimant. In addition to the 
work they did on Claimant's case, both Mr. Byrne and Mr. Herzog also offered their views on 
Claimant's residual employability following the December 18, 2009 accident. Mr. Byrne noted 
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that Claimant's transferable job skills include good customer service skills, but little else. He 
proposed that lacking significant transferable job skills, Claimant's employability could be 
improved vvith retraining. However, Claimant's deficiencies in reading, writing, and spelling 
make successful retraining doubtful. 
34. Mr. Byrne testified that Claimant was diligent and highly motivated to either 
return to UPS or other employment in Valley County. Based on Claimant's relevant nonmedical 
factors and the limitations/restrictions imposed by Dr. Frizzell, Mr. Byrne ultimately concluded 
that Claimant is unemployable in Valley County absent the assistance of a sympathetic 
employer. (Tr. 193/22 194/12; 197/5 - 16). 
35. Concerning the job leads that he provided to Claimant, Mr. Herzog acknowledged 
that although these jobs might be consistent with Claimant's physical limitations, Claimant was 
otherwise unequipped with the skills necessary to perform the work in question. (Tr. 209/8 -
211/3). 
36. Delyn Porter, a private vocation rehabilitation expert was retained by Aetna 
Disability and Benefits Management, Claimant's non-occupational disability insurance provider, 
to perform an assessment of Claimant's employability in Valley County. This assessment was 
requested by Aetna in order to assist it in making its own determination as to whether Claimant 
was entitled to the disability benefits available under that policy and/or whether Claimant was a 
candidate for Social Security disability benefits, a status which would reduce Atena's exposure 
for the payment of private disability benefits. Mr. Porter reached conclusions very similar to 
those reached by Shaun Byrne: 
Given his age a formal training program to prepare to return to work would be an 
option, but he would likely have to travel outside of his labor market area in order 
to participate in a training program. He also struggled with high school and notes 
that he was not a good student. When considering his residual functional capacity 
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and permanent work restrictions with the need to travel to participate and past 
struggles in school this may not be a viable option. Career exploration services 
could assist him in identifying training goals and options that he may choose to 
consider. 
The most likely route for Mr. Vawter to return to work would be to work for a 
friend, relative, or sympathetic employer that is willing to overlook and work 
around the multiple factors indentified in this report. He was born and raised in 
the Donnelly area and is well known and respected in the community. 
C. 5.17.12 Ex. 7, p. 007011. 
37. Claimant retained the services of Barbara Nelson to provide an opm10n on 
Claimant's residual employability following the subject accident. In performing her evaluation, 
Ms. Nelson assumed that the final limitations/restrictions identified by Dr. Frizzell accurately 
identify Claimant's current exertional limitations. Conversely, she chose to reject Dr. Frizzell's 
opinion that Claimant should have observed a 75 pound maximum lifting restricting even before 
the December 18, 2009 accident. Ms. Nelson assumed that all of Claimant's 
limitations/restrictions are referable to the December 18, 2009 accident. These limitations, in 
conjunction with Claimant's lack of transferable job skills and his severe academic limitations, 
led Ms. Nelson to conclude that Claimant has suffered a profound disability and is, in fact, 
unemployable in Valley County. (Tr. 222/8 -224/21). 
38. On examination by the Commission, Ms. Nelson conceded that if Dr. Frizzell is 
correct in his conclusion that Claimant should have observed a 75 pound lifting restriction as a 
consequence of the 1990 low back injury, then he has suffered a 10-15% loss of access to the 
labor market as a consequence of the 1990 accident. 
39. Nancy Collins, Ph.D., was retained by Employer/Surety to perform a forensic 
analysis of Claimant's residual employability and to consider whether the 1990 accident 
contributed to Claimant's current disability. 
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40. Dr. Collins did not denigrate Claimant's diligence in attempting to obtain 
employment following his date of medical stability. However, she noted that at the present time, 
Claimant does not have a great deal of financial incentive to pursue employment consistent with 
his limitations. Claimant is receiving monthly payments from both the Social Security 
Administration and his union pension plan. Additionally, Social Security offset provisions 
would apply were Claimant's monthly income from employment to exceed $890.00. 
41. In her report, Dr. Collins proposed that Claimant's disability from all causes is in 
the range of 70-80%. However, this opinion was reached without the benefit of Dr. Frizzell's 
complete opinion on Claimant's current limitations/restrictions. In view of Dr. Frizzell's belief 
that Claimant should be restricted from working more than four hours per day, Dr. Collins 
opined that Claimant's current disability from all causes is in the range of 80%. Although she 
testified that it is not pointless for Claimant to search for part-time work as a cashier or hotel 
clerk, she concedes that Claimant may be an odd-lot worker, and that Claimant's reading, 
writing, and spelling deficiencies would make it difficult for Claimant to succeed in any job that 
requires reading and writing. 
42. Dr. Collins did not dismiss Dr. Frizzell's op1mons on the apportionment of 
impairment and restrictions to the 1990 low back injury. Per Dr. Collins, the 75 pound 
restriction imposed by Dr. Frizzell for the 1990 injury would result in loss of labor market access 
in the range of 10-15% and wage loss in the range of 50-60%. Considering these factors, she 
proposed that Claimant suffered disability in the range of 3 5% as a consequence of the 1990 
accident. 
43. The Commission finds Claimant to be intelligent, articulate, loquacious, and 
generally credible in his testimony-the only exception being Claimant's unconvincing 
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insistence that prior to December 18, 2009, he had no symptomatic low back complaints, and 
that he did not self-limit his activities in order to protect his back. 
44. At the time of the September 28, 2010 hearing, Claimant put on proof that as of 
the date of that hearing, he was aware of medical bills totaling $149,033.68. In briefing, he 
cautioned that he had presented only those bills of which he was aware, and that further research 
might reveal the existence of additional medical bills for treatment rendered prior to the date of 
the September 2010 hearing. He asked the Commission to order Employer/Surety to pay those 
bills of which he was aware as of the date of hearing. 
45. Since the September 28, 2010 hearing, Claimant has discovered additional 
medical bills for services rendered prior to the date of the Commission's May 1 7, 2011 decision 
on compensability. Those bills total $24,627.80. Employer/Surety does not challenge the 
compensability of that care. Rather, Employer/Surety contends that Claimant's entitlement to 
recover these additional expenses incurred prior to the September 28, 2010 hearing is barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata. 
DICUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
Total and Permanent Disability 
46. Under Idaho Code §§ 72-423, 72-425, and 72-430, permanent disability is a 
measure of claimant's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as that 
ability is affected by the claimant's permanent physical impairment, and the relevant nonmedical 
factors identified at Idaho Code § 72-430. The date upon which this disability evaluation must 
be made is the date of hearing. Brown v. The Home Depot, WL 718795 (March 7, 2012). Here, 
Claimant contends that he is totally and permanently disabled, and the ISIP concedes this point. 
Only Employer/Surety contends that Claimant's disability is less than total. 
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47. A claimant may establish that he or she is totally and permanently disabled by 
using either of the two methodologies available to establish total permanent disability: 
First, a claimant may prove total and permanent disability if his or her medical 
impairment together with the nonmedical factors total 100%. If the Commission 
finds that a claimant has met his or her burden of proving 100% disability via the 
claimant's medical impairment and pertinent nonmedical factors, there is no need 
for the Commission to continue. The total and permanent disability has been 
established at that stage. See, Hegel v. Kuhlman Bros., Inc., 115 Idaho 855, 857, 
771 P.2d 519, 521 (1989) (Bakes, J., specially concurring) ("Once 100% 
disability is found by the Commission on the merits of a claimant's case, claimant 
has proved his entitlement to 100% disability benefits, and there is no need to 
employ the burden-shifting odd-lot doctrine"). 
Boley v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 130 Idaho, at 281, 939 P.2d at 857. 
When a claimant cannot make the showing required for 100% disability, then a second 
methodology is available: the odd-lot category is for those workers who are so injured that they 
can perform no services other than those that are so limited in quality, dependability or quantity 
that a reasonably stable market for them does not exist. Jarvis v. Rexburg Nursing Center, 136 
Idaho 579, 584 38 P.3d 617, 622 (2001), citing Lyons v. Industrial Special Indem. Fund, 98 
Idaho 403, 565 P.2d 1360 (1977). The worker need not be physically unable to perform any 
work; they are simply not regularly employable in any well-known branch of the labor market 
absent a business boom, the sympathy of a particular employer or friends, temporary good luck, 
or a superhuman effort on their part. Id., 136 Idaho at 584, 38 P.3d at 622. 
ways: 
48. An employee may prove total disability under the odd-lot doctrine in one of three 
(1) by showing that [he or she] has attempted other types of employment 
without success; 
(2) by showing that [he or she] or vocational counselors or employment 
agencies on his or her behalf have searched for other work and other work 
is not available; or; 
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(3) by showing that any efforts to find suitable employment would be futile. 
Boley v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, supra. 
49. Here, Claimant's impairments total 45% (9% thumb, 7% left shoulder, 10% right 
shoulder, 19% low back). No vocational expert has proposed that Claimant is totally and 
permanently disabled by virtue of having 100% disability, and on the record before the 
Commission, the Commission is unable to conclude that Claimant was 100% disabled as a 
matter of law as of the date of hearing. There remains for consideration the question of whether 
Claimant is, nevertheless, totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine. 
50. Claimant's permanent limitations/restrictions were established by Dr. Frizzell, 
and are not in dispute. These limitations would profoundly limit anyone's ability to engage in 
gainful activity, but have an even greater impact on a worker whose lack of transferable job 
skills leave him suited to manual labor only. Such is Claimant's situation. His academic 
performance in high school was poor, which may be explained by the existence of a learning 
disability, as suggested by the testing performed at Ms. Nelson's instance. Claimant has a great 
deal of difficulty with reading, writing, and spelling. Although his math skills are good, it is 
difficult to imagine what type of part-time sedentary job exists in Valley County that does not 
require the ability to read, write, or operate a computer. Although Claimant presents as articulate 
and personable, these qualities alone do not significantly expand the labor market of someone 
who is as academically challenged as Claimant. Although it was suggested that Claimant might 
improve his employability with unspecified retraining of some type, it was also pointed out that 
retraining would be problematic in view of Claimant's reading and writing deficiencies. 
Moreover, retraining has not been offered, and Claimant's entitlement to retraining benefits 
under Idaho Code § 72-450 is not among the issues noticed for hearing. 
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51. Valley County has one of the highest unemployment rates in the state, but because 
he has lived in Valley County since 1971, and has a peculiar knowledge of the Valley County 
labor market by virtue of his long employment with UPS, Claimant is particularly well suited to 
ferret out employment opportunities in his labor market. Although it is probably true that 
Claimant is less motivated now to look for suitable employment since qualifying for Social 
Security Disability and his private pension, the record establishes that Claimant was diligent in 
his work search after being declared medically stable by Dr. Frizzell. He was exhaustive in his 
efforts to return to work for his time of injury employer. When that effort failed to produce a job 
opportunity for him with UPS, he made a reasonably diligent effort to identify suitable 
employment in the Valley County labor market. Shaun Byrne of the ICRD confirmed that 
Claimant made a good effort to find work consistent with his limitations. Although Mr. Byrne 
recognized that Claimant had better access to job leads than the ICRD, Greg Herzog actually did 
provide Claimant with two or three job leads. Although Claimant did contact these employers, 
Mr. Herzog acknowledged that the positions required skills which Claimant did not possess. (Tr. 
209/8-210/15). In fact, Mr. Herzog was unable to identify any job openings in the Valley 
County labor market which were consistent with Claimant's physical limitations and skills. (Tr. 
211/4-11). 
52. Similarly, Shaun Byrne was unable to identify suitable employment for Claimant 
in Valley County. Mr. Byrne testified that the only employment that might be reasonable for 
Claimant was part-time employment in some type of service job such as a retail sales 
clerk/cashier. He believed that Claimant could perform this type of work for the "right 
employer." Explaining this comment, Mr. Byrne testified that Claimant is probably only 
employable by a sympathetic employer. Mr. Byrne's gestalt is that an individual with 
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Claimant's limitations and lack of transferrable job skills is essentially unemployable in the 
Valley County labor market. (Tr. 197 /5-16). 
53. As noted above, Barbara Nelson testified that she chose not consider 
Dr. Frizzell's opinion on apportionment of impairment and limitations to Claimant's preexisting 
low back condition because she did not find his assessment to be "credible." (Tr. 222/10-
224/21). Although she could be criticized for accepting only those opinions of Dr. Frizzell 
favorable to Claimant's claim, this potential shortcoming does nothing to denigrate her 
conclusion that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled. Taking into account the permanent 
limitations/restrictions given to Claimant following his November 2010 date of medical stability, 
as well as the Claimant's relevant nonmedical factors, including, most importantly, his reading 
and writing deficiencies, Ms. Nelson has credibly explained that Claimant is essentially 
unemployable in the Valley County labor market. 
54. Nancy Collins, Ph.D., originally concluded that Claimant's disability is in the 
range of 70-80%. However, her opinion in this regard assumed that Claimant is capable of 
working an eight hour day. She candidly agreed that if Claimant is not capable of working more 
than four hours per day, his disability is more likely to be at the high end of that range, i.e. 80%. 
Dr. Collins still felt that Claimant might be able to find employment as a part-time cashier or 
hotel clerk. She did not feel it pointless for Claimant to attempt retraining, because he was 
evidently good enough at classroom work to advance in his EMT training over the years. 
However, she conceded that Claimant's reading, writing, and spelling deficiencies would make it 
difficult for Claimant to succeed in any job requiring reading or writing. Most telling, though 
arguing that Claimant's disability is in the range of 80%, she candidly acknowledged that 
Claimant may, nevertheless, be an odd-lot worker. 
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55. Based on the testimony of Mr. Byrne, Mr. Herzog and Ms. Nelson, the 
Commission believes that Dr. Collins has underestimated the significance of Claimant's 
restriction against working more than four hours per day, but that she has, nevertheless, correctly 
observed that in the Valley County labor market, an individual with Claimant's profound 
limitations and lack of skills is likely to be an odd-lot worker. 
56. Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that Claimant has satisfied his 
burden of proving that he is an odd-lot worker by at least two of the recognized methods of 
proving odd-lot status. We find that Claimant has been diligent in his attempts to obtain 
employment, but that even with his intuitive grasp of the Valley County labor market, he has 
been unsuccessful in finding work. As well, the vocational rehabilitation experts who have 
provided testimony in this case are almost uniform in their agreement that Claimant is 
unemployable in Valley County. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Claimant is totally 
and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine. 
ISIF Liability 
57. Idaho Code § 72-332 provides: 
PAYMENT FOR SECOND INJURIES FROM INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY ACCOUNT. (1) If an employee who has a permanent physical 
impairment from any cause or origin, incurs a subsequent disability by an injury 
or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment, and by 
reason of the combined effects of both the pre-existing impairment and the 
subsequent injury or occupational disease or by reason of the aggravation and 
acceleration of the pre-existing impairment suffers total and permanent disability, 
the employer and surety shall be liable for payment of compensation benefits only 
for the disability caused by the injury or occupational disease, including 
scheduled and unscheduled permanent disabilities, and the injured employee shall 
be compensated for the remainder of his income benefits out of the industrial 
special indemnity account. 
(2) "Permanent physical impairment" is as defined in section 72-422, Idaho 
Code, provided, however, as used in this section such impairment must be a 
permanent condition, whether congenital or due to injury or disease, of such 
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seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment or to 
obtaining re-employment if the claimant should become employed. This shall be 
interpreted subjectively as to the particular employee involved, however, the mere 
fact that a claimant is employed at the time of the subsequent injury shall not 
create a presumption that the pre-existing permanent physical impairment was not 
of such seriousness as to constitute such hindrance or obstacle to obtaining 
employment. 
Accordingly, once an iajured worker has been judged to be permanently and totally 
disabled under either of the methods discussed above, the ISIF may be held responsible for some 
portion of that total and permanent disability if the following elements of ISIF liability are 
satisfied: 
1) It must be demonstrated that claimant suffered from a preexisting physical 
impairment; 
2) It must be shown that the impairment was manifest; 
3) It must be shown that the impairment constituted a subjective hindrance to 
employment; and 
4) It must be shown that the impairment combined with the industrial accident to 
cause total and permanent disability. 
See Dumaw v. JL. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 795 P.2d 312 (1990). 
Preexisting Physical Impairment 
58. With one exception, there is agreement between the parties concerning the nature 
and extent of Claimant's preexisting physical impairments. The parties are in agreement that 
Claimant suffered the following preexisting physical impairments: 
March 24, 1988 right thumb injury 9% of the whole person 
September 19, 1990 left shoulder injury 7% of the whole person 
July 6, 2004 right shoulder injury 10% of the whole person 
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59. The parties do dispute the extent and degree to which Claimant suffered a 
permanent physical impairment as a consequence of the October 22, 1990 low back injury. As 
developed above, Dr. Knoebel saw Claimant at the instance of Employer in April 1991, at which 
time he pronounced Claimant medically stable, but not entitled to an impairment rating. The 
record contains only fragments of Dr. Knoebel's report; the record does not reveal anything 
about the history upon which he relied, or Claimant's physical findings on exam. The 
foundation for Dr. Knoebel's ultimate opinion on the extent and degree of Claimant's entitlement 
to an impairment rating in 1991 is unclear. 
60. However, though it is difficult to test the underpinnings of Dr. Knoebel' s opinion 
at this remove, there are also things in the musings of Dr. Frizzell that are troublesome. 
Dr. Frizzell vacillated a good deal in his opinion on whether Claimant was entitled to an 
impairment rating for the 1990 low back injury before finally settling on a 7% PPI rating for the 
1990 accident. Even though Dr. Frizzell adopted this as his final opinion, it is still somewhat 
problematic that he was unable to explain to Claimant's counsel how the "prior factor," i.e. the 
1990 accident, caused Claimant's current impairment to be greater. However, balancing 
Dr. Frizzell's testimony and reports against the conclusions of Dr. Knoebel, nevertheless, leads 
the Commission to conclude that Dr. Frizzell credibly established that Claimant's 1990 low back 
injury entitled him to a 7% PPI rating. In reaching this conclusion, we are also guided by our 
finding that Claimant did not credibly testify that his low back was symptom free in the years 
prior to the December 18, 2009 accident. The record establishes that Claimant suffered from 
symptomatic low back complaints prior to the subject accident, and that these complaints were of 
such significance to cause him to self-modify the manner in which he performed his work. 
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These findings lend credence to the testimony of Dr. Frizzell that Claimant's preinjury low back 
condition was of such significance as to warrant the award of a permanent physical impairment 
rating. 
l\11anif estation 
61. All of Claimant's preexisting impairments were manifest. "Manifest" means that 
either the employer or the employee is aware of the condition so that the condition can be 
established as existing prior the injury. Royce v. Southwest Pipe of Idaho, 103 Idaho 290, 647 
P.2d 746 (1982). Here, all of the impairments referenced above, including Claimant's 
preexisting low back condition, were knovvn to Claimant prior to the date of the subject accident. 
Subjective Hinderance 
62. The subjective hindrance component of the test is found at Idaho Code § 72-
332(2). That section provides: 
(2) "Permanent physical impairment" is as defined in section 72-422, Idaho 
Code, provided, however, as used in this section such impairment must be a 
permanent condition, whether congenital or due to injury or disease, of such 
seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment or to 
obtaining re-employment if the claimant should become employed. This shall be 
interpreted subjectively as to the particular employee involved, however, the mere 
fact that a claimant is employed at the time of the subsequent injury shall not 
create a presumption that the pre-existing permanent physical impairment was not 
of such seriousness as to constitute such hindrance or obstacle to obtaining 
employment. 
63. Therefore, m order to qualify for ISIF liability, a preexisting permanent 
impairment must be of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining 
employment, or to obtaining reemployment should a claimant become unemployed. Further, this 
assessment must be made subjectively as to the particular employee involved. That an injured 
worker may be employed at the time of a subsequent work injury does not create a presumption 
that a preexisting physical impairment did not constitute an obstacle to obtaining employment. 
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The case of Archer v. Bonners Ferry Datsun, 117 Idaho 166, 786 P.2d 557 (1990) makes it clear 
that an injured worker's attitude toward a preexisting condition is but one factor to be considered 
by the Commission in determining whether the preexisting physical impairment constituted a 
subjective hindrance. After Archer, the Commission is required to weigh a wide variety of 
medical and non-medical factors, and expert and lay testimony in making the determination as to 
whether or not a preexisting condition constituted a hindrance or obstacle to employment for the 
particular claimant. Here, there is neither testimony from Claimant, evaluating physicians, or 
vocational rehabilitation specialists which would support the proposition that the 1988 thumb 
impairment, 1990 left shoulder impairment, or 2004 right shoulder impairment constituted an 
obstacle to Claimant's employment or reemployment. The fact that no physician gave Claimant 
permanent limitations/restrictions for these injuries is a significant factor informing the 
Commission's decision that these preexisting physical impairments did not constitute a 
subjective hindrance to Claimant prior to the subject accident. 
64. With respect to the 1990 low back injury, in addition to determining that Claimant 
is entitled to a 7% PPI rating for that injury, Dr. Frizzell felt it appropriate that following that 
injury Claimant should have observed certain limitations/restrictions in order to protect his back 
from further injury. He proposed that Claimant should avoid maximum lifting of over 75 
pounds. The sensibility of this recommendation is well borne out by Claimant's subsequent 
history. Although Claimant returned to unrestricted work following the 1990 low back injury, he 
did not stay symptom free. Another low back injury in 1999 took him off work for a period of 
weeks. In the years immediately preceding the subject accident, medical and employment 
records reflect that Claimant continued to be troubled with symptomatic low back complaints. 
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65. Finally, Dr. Collins persuasively testified that the pre-mJury 
limitations/restrictions given by Dr. Frizzell would reasonably have limited Claimant's access to 
the labor market in Valley County had he lost his job at UPS. 
66. For these reasons, the Commission concludes that Claimant's 7% preexisting 
physical impairment resulting from his 1990 low back injury reasonably constituted a subjective 
hindrance to Claimant prior to the subject accident. 
Combining With 
67. There remains for consideration the question of whether or not the Claimant's 
preexisting physical impairment for his low back condition combined with the effects of the 
subject accident to cause total and permanent disability. For the reasons set for below, we 
believe that this question must be answered in the affirmative. 
68. Following the 1990 low back injury, Claimant underwent MR1 and CT studies. 
Per Dr. Cindrich, the MRJ was thought to reveal a small focal left paracentral disc herniation at 
L4-5. (See D. 5.17.12 Ex. 10, p. 34). A December 10, 1990 CT scan of the lumbar spine was 
read as follows: "There is a left sided disc herination at L4-5 with effacement of the anterior and 
left side of the thecal sac." (See D. 5.17.12 Ex. 10, p. 36). 
69. Following the 1999 low back injury, Claimant's low back was again studied. A 
September 27, 1999 MRJ was read as follows concerning findings at the L4-5 level: 
At L4-5, there is a diffuse anular (sic) bulge and mild osteophyte formation 
evident. Facets are slightly hypertrophic, but the ligamentum flavum is not 
thickened. There is mild canal stenosis at this level. Neural foramina are 
adequate. Exiting nerve roots are surrounded by adequate perineural fat. 
D. 5.17.12 Ex. 21, p. 236. 
70. Following the subject 2009 accident, Claimant underwent MRJ study on January 
11, 2010. That study was read as follows concerning the L4-5 level: 
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Loss of hydration signal in the disc consistent with degenerative disc disease. 
Moderate-sized posterior focal disk protrusion causing moderate central spinal 
stenosis, severe left lateral recess stenosis and a moderate right lateral recess 
stenosis. No significant forarninal stenosis. 
See D. 5.17.12 Ex. 21, p. 247. 
71. The most significant findings in Claimant's low back since the original injury of 
1990 are at the L4-5 level. However, the findings at that level have progressively worsened with 
the passage of time, and with the occurrence of subsequent industrial accidents. The 
Commission has found that Claimant is entitled to an impairment rating following his original 
industrial accident, and that he should have observed certain limitations on his activities 
following that accident in order to protect his back from further injury. That he continued to 
experience low back discomfort and objective worsening of his condition may be explained by 
the fact that he did not, by his testimony, moderate his activities subsequent to the 1990 injury. 
However, evidence which the Commission has found persuasive establishes that Claimant was 
not symptom free in the years immediately preceding the subject accident. Indeed, he attempted 
to find ways to do his job which would ease the demands placed on his back. Finally, Claimant 
suffered a severe worsening of his condition while engaged in the trivial exercise of bending 
over to tie his shoes, tending to corroborate the radiological studies referenced above, which 
demonstrate that Claimant had significant and progressive problems at L4-5 in the years 
preceding the subject accident. Absent Claimant's significant preexisting condition at L4-5, it 
seems likely that the activities of December 18, 2009 would not have resulted in damage to 
Claimant's lumbar spine. At any rate, the medical evidence establishes that Claimant's 
preexisting condition was significantly worsened as a result of the subject accident, and that it is 
impossible to ignore Claimant's preexisting low back condition at L4-5 in describing Claimant's 
current impairment and limitations. Claimant's preexisting low back condition clearly set the 
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stage for Claimant's accident of December 18, 2009, and in that sense combines with the 
accident of December 18, 2009 to cause Claimant's total and permanent disability. 
Carey Apportionment 
72. Having found that the elements of ISIP liability have been met with respect to 
Claimant's preexisting physical impairment of 7% following the 1990 low back injury, it is next 
necessary to apply the rule of Carey v. Clearwater County Road Dept., 107 Idaho 109, 686 P .2d 
' 
54 (1984) to the facts of this case. For purposes of Carey apportionment, Claimant's 
impairments total 19%, 7% of which is attributable to the preexisting condition and 12% of 
which is attributable to the subject accident. The remaining disability to be apportioned between 
Employer and the ISIP equals 81% (100% - 19%). Employer's liability for Claimant's total and 
permanent disability is calculated as follows: 12119 x 81% = 51.19 + 12 = 63.19%. The ISIF's 
responsibility for Claimant's total and permanent disability is calculated as follows: 7 /19 x 81 % 
= 29.8 + 7 = 36.8%. 
73. A 63% disability equals $110,187.00 at 2009 rates. Ordinarily, this would 
represent the exposure of Employer/Surety after Carey apportionment. A 63% disability equates 
to 315 weeks. Therefore, ISIF liability would commence 315 weeks subsequent to Claimant's 
date of medical stability in November 2010. 
Application of Quasi-Estoppel 
74. In briefing, Claimant argued that Employer/Surety should be estopped to assert an 
impairment rating for the 1990 low back injury different than the 0% impairment originally 
given by Dr. Knoebel in 1991. This argument would only be relevant to Claimant's prosecution 
of his claim were Claimant found to be profoundly, but not totally and permanently, disabled. 
However, since Claimant has been found to be totally and permanently disabled, Claimant will 
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receive total and permanent disability benefits regardless of whether or not Employer/Surety is 
estopped from asserting that Claimant has a 7% PPI rating from the 1990 injury; Claimant will 
receive total and permanent disability benefits from either Employer alone, or from Employer 
and the ISIF. Since the Commission has found Claimant to be totally and permanently disabled, 
whether Employer/Surety should be estopped as requested is no longer relevant to Claimant's 
receipt of benefits. 
75. However, the ISIF, which was brought into this case by Employer/Surety, has 
also alleged that Employer/Surety should not now be heard to assert a position on Claimant's 
1990 low back impairment different than the position it advocated back in 1991. 
76. The doctrine of "quasi-estoppel" has received considerable treatment in Idaho 
case law. In Tommerup v. Albertson's, Inc., 101Idaho1, 607 P.2d 1055 (1980), the doctrine was 
described as follows: 
To constitute quasi estoppel, the person against whom the estoppel is sought must 
have gained some advantage for himself, produced some disadvantage to the 
person seeking the estoppel, or induced such party to change his position; in 
addition it must be unconscionable to allow the person against whom the estoppel 
is sought to maintain a position which is inconsistent with the one in which he 
accepted a benefit. 
See also City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Ind. Hwy Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 879 P.2d 1078 (1994); 
Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 48 P.3d 1241 (2002). Of the doctrine it has 
also been said: 
The doctrine classified as quasi-estoppel has its basis in election, ratification, 
affirmance, acquiescence, or acceptance of benefits; and the principle precludes a 
party from asserting to another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position 
previously taken by him. The doctrine applies where it would be unconscionable 
to allow a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which he 
acquiesced or of which he accepted a benefit. 
KTVB v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279, 486 P.2d 992 (1971). 
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Quasi-estoppel, unlike equitable estoppel does not require misrepresentation by one party or 
actual reliance by the other. It is often described as a broadly remedial doctrine, applied on an ad 
hoc basis to specific fact patterns. 
77. It will be recalled that following the 1990 accident, Claimant was diagnosed as 
suffering an L4-5 disc injury of such significance that one of his physicians considered Claimant 
to be a possible candidate for surgical intervention. In 1991, UPS engaged the services of 
Richard Knoebel, M.D., for the purpose of performing an Idaho Code § 72-433 exam. The 
record does not reflect what instructions UPS gave to Dr. Knoebel, what records it supplied, or 
what questions it asked. However, the record does reflect that after completing his examination 
of Claimant, Dr. Knoebel proposed that Claimant had not suffered any permanent physical 
impairment as a consequence of the 1990 accident, and neither was he entitled to any permanent 
limitations/restrictions. The 1990 claim was not litigated, and there was no finding made by the 
Commission as to whether or not Dr. Knoebel was correct in rendering his judgment on 
Claimant's impairment. However, UPS assuredly benefitted from Dr. Knoebel's opinion and 
acquiesced in the same, since the Commission's records reflect that the claims file was 
eventually retired without the payment of any impairment rating by UPS or its then surety. In 
1991, at the time Dr. Knoebel rendered his rating, it was to the advantage of UPS and its then 
surety to minimize their exposure by obtaining a favorable opinion on Claimant's 
impairment/limitations. This they did. 
78. Now, of course, the occurrence of the subject accident of December 18, 2009 has 
made it advantageous to UPS and its current surety to argue that some portion of Claimant's 
impairment must predate the subject accident. As developed above, the Commission has found 
that 7% of Claimant's 19% impairment rating should be assigned to the 1990 accident, and that 
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because this 7% impairment rating meets the other elements of ISIF liability, a portion of UPS's 
responsibility for total and permanent disability benefits can be shifted to the ISIF. 
79. It seems clear that UPS is now asserting a position inconsistent with one it 
acquiesced in and benefitted from in 1991. Further, we believe that it would be unconscionable 
to allow UPS, after having accepted the benefit of the 0% PPI rating rendered by Dr. Knoebel, to 
now assert a contrary position to the disadvantage of the ISIF. 
80. We conclude that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel is applicable to the facts of this 
case. Therefore, Employer/Surety is estopped from asserting that Claimant has a 7% PPI rating 
referable to the 1990 accident. The Commission is aware of the irony of applying the doctrine to 
these facts; the Commission has concluded that Dr. Frizzell correctly identified a 7% PPI rating 
which should attach to the permanent effects of the 1990 accident, while the application of the 
doctrine of quasi-estoppel binds UPS/Surety to Dr. Knoebel's 0% rating, a rating which we were 
not persuaded to adopt. 
81. Since Employer/Surety is estopped to deny the 0% rating, this leaves no other 
preexisting impairments which satisfy the other requirements of ISIF liability. Therefore, 
Employer/Surety cannot meet its prima facie case against the ISIF and Employer/Surety bears 
responsibility for 100% of Claimant's total and permanent disability commencing with 
Claimant's date of medical stability in November 2010. 
Medical expenses and the Doctrine of Res Judicata 
82. In connection with the initial hearing of September 28, 2010, Claimant put on 
proof of medical bills incurred by him to the date of hearing. These bills totaled $149,033.68. 
Claimant asked the Commission for an award in this amount, though he cautioned that this sum 
might not represent the totality of bills incurred to the date of hearing. The bills at issue at the 
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time of the initial hearing were not contested by Employer/Surety, and the Commission 
eventually entered an order awarding Claimant the sum of $149,033.68, representing 100% of 
the invoiced amount of bills presented at the original hearing. 
83. Since that time, Claimant has identified additional bills incurred between the date 
of injury and May 1 7, 2011, the date of the Commission's decision on the compensability of the 
claim. Some of these bills were incurred prior to the September 28, 2010 hearing, and some 
were incurred between the date of that hearing and the date of the Commission's May 17, 2011 
decision. These additional bills, at 100% of the invoiced amount, total $24,627 .80. Again, 
Employer/Surety does not dispute the compensability of these bills pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-
432. Rather, Employer/Surety alleges that the doctrine of res judicata bars Claimant from 
making a claim for these additional bills. Employer/Surety argues that Claimant asked for a sum 
certain representing medical bills incurred in connection with his treatment, and that the 
Commission's award of that sum certain is res judicata of any claim for additional medical bills 
for services rendered prior to the date of the September 28, 2010 hearing. Employer/Surety does 
not assert that any of the bills contained at Claimant's 5.17.12 Exhibit 14 were among those for 
which claim was made at the time of the original hearing. In other words, the parties seem to be 
in agreement that the additional bills claimed by Claimant are actually bills for different services 
than those covered in the bills which were the subject of the previous award. 
84. Although the doctrine of res judicata applies to decisions of the Industrial 
Commission, it is res judicata of a peculiar sort. In workers' compensation cases res judicata 
only bars re-litigation of claims that were actually adjudicated: 
However, Idaho Code § 72-718 varies the doctrine of res judicata as applied to 
workers' compensation cases. See Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3, 896 P.2d 329 
(1995). Decisions by the Commission are conclusive only to matters actually 
adjudicated, not as to all matters which could have been adjudicated. 
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Wernecke v. St. Marie's Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 
(2009). 
85. Here, every medical bill that was submitted by Claimant to Surety for payment 
represents a distinct claim for a benefit payable under the workers' compensation laws. Every 
bill that was submitted could have been the subject of any number of defenses to payment raised 
by Employer/Surety. Employer/Surety could have argued that one or more of the bills were 
incurred outside the chain of referral. Employer/Surety could have argued that the care was not 
required by Claimant's physician. Employer/Surety could have argued to the Commission that it 
should have found the care represented by a particular bill to be unreasonable. The point is that 
every bill for medical services represents a discrete claim for workers' compensation benefits. 
Accordingly, since it is clear that the bills totaling $24,627.80 are new bills, Claimant's 
entitlement to that which was not adjudicated at the prior hearing, the doctrine of res judicata 
does not bar Claimant's litigation of those bills at this time, notwithstanding that most of those 
bills are for services rendered prior to the date of the September 28, 2010 hearing. Aside from 
the res judicata defense, no other defenses to these bills have been raised by Employer/Surety. 
Accordingly, and per Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), 
Claimant is entitled to 100% of the invoiced amount of the bills set forth at Claimant's 5.17.12 
Exhibit 14. 
86. In addition to the bills referenced above, Claimant has identified additional 
medical bills totaling $674.00, as set forth at Claimant's 5.17.12 Exhibit 15. These bills appear 
to represent charges for for services rendered subsequent to the Commission's May 17, 2011 
order finding the claim compensable. These bills have not been paid, but do not appear to be 
disputed by Employer/Surety. Per Neel, supra, Claimant is entitled to payment of these bills 
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under the applicable Industrial Commission fee schedule, since they were incurred subsequent to 
the finding of compensability. 
87. Finally, Claimant has claimed entitlement to the sum of $1,684.71, representing 
travel expenses incurred in connection with the medical care, $264.75 representing per diem 
expenses associated with medical care, and $200.01 representing lodging expenses incurred in 
connection with medical treatment. (See C. 5.17.12 Ex. 16). Some of these expenses were 
incurred prior to the September 28, 2010 hearing, and some were incurred subsequent thereto. 
Claimant contends, and Employer/Surety does not dispute, that these expenses are otherwise 
compensable as medical and related expenses under Idaho Code § 72-432. However, 
Employer/Surety asserts that those expenses incurred prior to the September 28, 2010 hearing are 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. As with the claim for additional medical bills, the claims 
for travel, lodging, and per diem expenses were not adjudicated at the time of the initial hearing. 
Therefore, these claims are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and since they are not 
otherwise contested by Employer/Surety, Claimant is entitled to be reimbursed for these 
expenses as well. 
Is Claimant Entitled to Ruling on Reimbursement in Advance of Supreme Court Review of 
this Decision? 
88. Employer/Surety has signaled that the Commission's original decision on the 
compensability of the subject accident will be appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court once the 
Commission has decided all of the issues in the case. Indeed, Employer/Surety attempted an 
appeal of the threshold compensability issue after that decision was issued by the Commission on 
May 17, 2011. Against the chance that the Court's review might result in a reversal of the 
Commission's threshold finding of compensability, Employer/Surety urges the Commission to 
enter an order advising Claimant that if the Supreme Court does reverse the threshold 
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compensability finding, the Commission will order Claimant to reimburse all monies paid to 
Claimant subsequent to the May 1 7, 2011 decision on compensability. The Commission 
appreciates this dilemma, but would note, as it did in connection with the order denying stay, that 
the decision to bifurcate a case comes with a set of possible consequences that bear close 
scrutiny before electing to proceed. One might well suppose that the Commission would be 
strongly inclined to entertain a request for a reimbursement should the Supreme Court rule that 
the Commission erred in finding the claim compensable. However, that matter is not before us at 
this juncture, and Claimant is correct that there is no actual controversy before us that we can 
address. Accordingly, the request of Employer/Surety to order reimbursement contingent upon 
something that may or may not happen is denied. 
Attorney Fees 
89. As noted above, this matter was bifurcated at the request of Employer/Surety to 
obtain the Commission's ruling on the threshold issue of the compensability of the subject 
accident. At the request of Employer/Surety, other issues, including those addressed in this 
decision, were reserved for subsequent determination. Employer/Surety hoped to obtain a 
favorable ruling on the issue of compensability, and thus resolve the case without the necessity 
of visiting the remaining issues. Presumably, Employer/Surety was also aware that the issue of 
compensability might be decided in Claimant's favor, thus necessitating hearing on the 
remammg issues. 
90. In its decision of May 17, 2011, the Industrial Commission found the subject 
accident to be compensable under the workers' compensation laws of this state. In addition, the 
Commission found that Claimant was entitled to certain medical and TTD benefits, entitlement 
to which was litigated at the September 28, 2010 hearing. 
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91. The May 17, 2011 decision addressed Claimant's entitlement to a limited class of 
workers' compensation benefits because those were the only benefits that Claimant requested at 
the time of the threshold determination of the issue of compensability. However, the 
Commission's finding of compensability implicitly required that Employer/Surety pay to 
Claimant, or on his behalf, those additional workers' compensation benefits to which Claimant 
was entitled as the result of having suffered a compensable accident/injury. 
92. Employer/Surety appealed the Commission's May 17, 2011 decision to the Idaho 
Supreme Court. The Court dismissed the appeal without comment, but later referred the parties 
to the Court's opinion in Jensen v. Pillsbury Company, 121 Idaho 127, 823 P.2d 161 (1992). In 
that case, the Court held that a decision of the Commission which does not finally dispose of all 
the Claimant's claims is not a final decision subject to appeal pursuant to I.AR. ll(d). 
Following the Court's dismissal of the appeal, Employer/Surety petitioned the Industrial 
Commission for its order staying execution of the May 17, 2011 order pending resolution of the 
issues remaining before the Industrial Commission and the perfection of an appeal of the 
Commission's final decision to the Supreme Court. Employer's concern was that it should not 
be required to pay an award to Claimant when the Supreme Court might overturn the Industrial 
Commission's decision and rule that the subject accident is not a compensable accident/injury 
under the Idaho workers' compensation laws. In this scenario, Employer/Surety could find itself 
unable to recoup the monies that it had been erroneously directed to pay to Claimant. 
93. The Industrial Commission considered these and other arguments, and in an order 
dated December 8, 2011, denied Claimant's motion for stay, noting, inter alia, that any decision 
to bifurcate a case carries with it the do\\<nside illustrated by these facts. However, if parties 
were not expected by abide by a Commission order on a bifurcated case, there would be no 
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reason to bifurcate. The order denying the request for stay specified that the May 17, 2011 
decision is final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated therein pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-
718. The order further directed Claimant to pay to Employer/Surety those benefits that were 
awarded incidental to the Commission's finding on compensability. The order did not specify 
that during the pendency of hearing on the issues addressed in this decision Employer/Surety's 
only obligation was to pay the benefits awarded incidental to the finding of compensability made 
in the May 17, 2011 decision. As noted above, the Commission's final order on the issue of 
compensability brings with it an obligation to pay to Claimant those workers' compensation 
benefits to which he would normally be entitled as a result of having suffered a compensable 
accident/injury. 
94. Claimant sought permission to appeal the Commission's order denying the stay to 
the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Commission supported this request for permissive appeal. In 
an order dated January 30, 2012, the Court denied the motion for permissive appeal and directed 
that the remaining issues in this case be litigated without further delay. 
95. Contemporaneous with the legal maneuvering that took place between the date of 
the May 17, 2011 decision and the Idaho Supreme Court's January 30, 2012 denial of the motion 
for appeal by permission, Claimant peppered Employer/Surety with letters demanding payment 
of various workers' compensation benefits, including benefits that were the subject of the May 
17, 2011 order, as well as additional workers' compensation benefits to which Claimant felt he 
was entitled as a result of having suffered an compensable accident. 
96. It is the conclusion of the Commission that the efforts of Employer/Surety to 
perfect an appeal of the Commission decision to the Idaho Supreme Court, and, failing that, a 
permissive appeal to the Court of the Commission's order denying the motion for stay, were 
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made in good faith, and in connection with complex legal issues on which reasonable minds may 
disagree. Specifically, we conclude that Employer's refusal to pay the award made in the May 
17, 2011 order, or any other benefits to which Claimant might be entitled, was not unreasonable 
to January 30, 2012, the date of the Idaho Supreme C~urt's denial of the motion for appeal by 
permission. 
97. By letter dated January 31, 2012, counsel for Claimant reiterated his demand for 
payment of the benefits awarded in the May 17, 2011 order, plus interest thereon, totaling 
$184,458.38. (See C. 5.17.12 Ex. 17, p. 017015). As reflected in defense counsel's letter of 
February 14, 2012, following the Court's dismissal of the motion for permissive appeal, 
Employer/Surety issued its check to Claimant in the amount of $184, 172.3 8, the difference from 
Claimant's demand to be found in the interest calculation. 
98. By letter dated February I 0, 2012, counsel for Claimant made demand upon 
Employer/Surety for additional workers' compensation benefits, i.e. not benefits which were the 
subject of the May 17, 2011 Industrial Commission order, but other benefits to which Claimant 
was entitled as the result of his compensable accident. These benefits included PPI benefits as 
awarded by Dr. Frizzell, additional medical expenses and travel, lodging, and per diem 
reimbursements for expenses incurred in the course of obtaining medical case. In response to 
these requests, counsel for Employer/Surety provided the following response: 
Your most recent correspondence demands payment for additional 
medical expenses, travel expenses, per diem/lodging expenses and PPI benefits. 
Entitlement to such benefits has not been determined by the Industrial 
Commission and remains in dispute. As discussed during the most recent 
telephone conference with the Commission, these issues will be litigated at the 
hearing scheduled for May 17, 2012. Further, entitlement to additional benefits is 
contingent on the compensability determination made in the May 17, 2011 
decision. The Commission has indicated such decision is final as to the issues 
adjudicated. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has determined that the decision 
is not final for purposes of appeal. A genuine legal dispute continues to exist as 
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to both compensability and payment issues. Although the Court declined to 
address the issues through interlocutory appeal, it has not considered the merits of 
the disputed issues. 
C. 5.17.12 Ex. 17, p. 017022. 
99. Counsel for Claimant persevered, reiterating his demand for payment of 
additional workers' compensation benefits to which he believed his client was entitled. In a 
February 22, 2012 response, counsel for Employer/Surety reiterated her disinclination to make 
any of these payments: 
It is my understanding that the multiple issues to be resolved at the May 
17, 2012 hearing include whether and to what extent Mr. Vawter is entitled to PPI 
benefits and whether there has been an unreasonable denial or delay of benefits. I 
look forward to prompt resolution of these issues and maintain there continues to 
be a legal dispute regarding payment obligations, particularly with regard to 
benefits beyond those granted by the Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011 
decision, for which payment has already been issued. 
C. 5.17.12 Ex. 17, p. 017029. 
100. Finally, in a letter dated April 5, 2012, counsel for Employer/Surety affirmed that 
no payment of additional benefits would be made until those matters were litigated in connection 
with the May 17, 2012 hearing: 
I have also taken another look at the order dismissing my permissive 
appeal and do not find anything to indicate that PPI benefits are due and payable. 
Rather, I see instructions to litigate the remaining issues without further delay. 
Nothing has changed since your previous requests for payment and I refer 
you to my responses as previously stated in my letters identified above, as well as 
the documents filed with the Industrial Commission and Idaho Supreme Court on 
the issue of payment obligations. It is abundantly clear that we disagree as to 
what payments are reasonably due. As you know, issues regarding entitlement to 
additional benefits, including attorney fees for unreasonable denial or delay of 
benefits, are scheduled to be addressed at the hearing of May 17, 2012. 
C. 5.17.12 Ex. 17, p. 017034. 
101. From the foregoing, it is clear that the position of Employer/Surety was that since 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER - 43 
it had paid the benefits that were specifically addressed in the Commission's order of May 17, 
2011, it had no obligation to pay benefits that were not addressed in that order. What 
Employer/Surety has failed to understand, however, is that the Commission's finding that the 
subject accident is compensable carries with it an obligation on the part of Employer/Surety to 
pay to Claimant those workers' compensation benefits to which he is entitled as a result of the 
accident. We find nothing in the correspondence going back and forth between Claimant's 
counsel and Defense counsel which suggests that Employer/Surety at any time disputed the 
claims for additional benefits to which Claimant believed he was entitled. The only basis for 
denial was the aforementioned belief that Employer/Surety had no obligation under the May 17, 
2011 order to pay anything except those benefits which were specifically addressed in that order. 
102. As explained in more detail in our December 8, 2011 order denying Employer's 
motion for stay, it is the expectation of the Industrial Commission that its final order on 
compensability binds the parties to act accordingly during the pendency of this bifurcated matter. 
It is no defense to Claimant's manifold requests to simply say that Claimant's entitlement to the 
benefits at issue will be decided in connection with the May 17, 2012 hearing. Absent a good 
faith dispute over Claimant's entitlement to a particular benefit, Employer/Surety had an 
obligation to timely pay the same once this claim had been found to be compensable under the 
workers' compensation laws of this state. (See Idaho Code§ 72-305). 
103. The res judicata defense is only raised by Employer/Surety to medical and related 
expenses incurred by Claimant prior to the September 28, 2010 hearing. Although we have 
found that doctrine of res judicata does not apply to the additional bills for which claim is made, 
we do not believe that it was unreasonable for Employer/Surety to essay this defense. However, 
with respect to the claims for medical and attendant expenses incurred subsequent to September 
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28, 2010, and the PPI award made by Dr. Frizzell in November 2010, the only defense that has 
been raised by Employer/Surety is that the finding of compensability is not "final" and that, in 
any event, the May 17, 2011 order only required Employer/Surety to pay certain specific bills. 
As developed above, we find Employer/Surety's reliance on these defenses to payment to be 
unreasonable. The Commission's May 17, 2011 order is final and conclusive as to all matters 
adjudicated therein. (See Idaho Code § 72-718). As developed in the Commission's December 
8, 2011 order denying the request for stay, the Commission expects parties to abide by final and 
conclusive orders during the pendency of any bifurcated proceeding. Again, to do otherwise 
would rob bifurcation of its purpose. Idaho Code § 72-804 provides for an award of attorney 
fees against any Employer/Surety who contests a claim for compensation without reasonable 
grounds. Here, we find that subsequent to January 30, 2012, Employer/Surety contested without 
reasonable grounds Claimant's repeated demands for payment of the following benefits: 
a) Medical expenses incurred subsequent to September 28, 2010; 
b) Mileage, per diem, and lodging expenses incurred by Claimant subsequent to 
September 28, 2010; 
c) The PPI award given by Dr. Frizzell following Claimant's date of medical 
stability in November 2010. 
Claimant is therefore entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 72-804 for 
the failure of Employer/Surety to timely pay these benefits. 
Whether Medical Bills Should be Paid at 100% of the Invoiced Amount 
104. Though raised as an issue by Employer/Surety, a challenge to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), was 
not addressed by Employer/Surety in post-hearing briefing. In the original May 17, 2011 order, 
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Claimant presented medical bills in the total invoiced amount of $149,033.68. The Commission 
ordered the payment of the same at 100% of the invoiced amount per Neel, supra. As explained 
by the Industrial Commission in the recent case of Aspiazu v. Homedale Tire Service, LC. No. 
1984-477235 (filed February 18, 2012), we believe that the Court was fully aware that certain 
contractual adjustments made by third party payors may well leave an injured worker responsible 
for less than 100% of the invoiced amount of a medical bill. Nevertheless, the Court's ruling 
specifically applies to all medical bills incurred during a period of denial regardless of whether 
the bills were incurred by an uninsured individual, or an individual with non-occupational group 
insurance. We are bound to apply the Supreme Court's unambiguous direction set forth in Neel, 
supra, and therefore, order the payment of all medical bills incurred by Claimant in connection 
with treatment of his compensable injury to be paid at 100% of the invoiced amount up to the 
date of the Commission's order of May 17, 2011 in which the claim was found to be 
compensable. Thereafter, all medical bills incurred by Claimant in connection with his 




CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that: 
1. Claimant is totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine; 
2. Claimant has preexisting physical impairments as follows: 9% whole person, right 
thumb; 7% whole person, low back; 7% whole person, left shoulder; 10% whole person, right 
shoulder; 
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3. Claimant has accident produced impairment of 12% of the whole person; 
4. Only Claimant's 7% low back impairment meets all elements of ISIF liability, and would 
otherwise result in Carey apportionment as follows: Employer's liability: ((12/19) x 81 %) = 
51.19 + 12 = 63.19%. ISIF liability: ((7119) x 81 %) = 29.8 + 7% = 36.8%. 
a) However, Employer/Surety is estopped from asserting any position on Claimant's 
preexisting physical impairment inconsistent with the 0% PPI rating assessed by Dr. Knoebel in 
1991; 
b) Therefore, the ISIF is not liable for any portion of Claimant's total and permanent 
disability, leaving Employer/Surety wholly liable for the payment of total and permanent 
disability benefits to which Claimant is entitled subsequent to his November 2010 date of 
medical stability; 
5. Employer/Surety is liable for the payment of 100% of the invoiced amount of all medical 
bills referenced herein which were incurred by Claimant in connection with the subject accident 
prior to the Commission's May 17, 2011 decision, with credit for amounts previously paid; 
6. Employer/Surety is liable for the payment of medical bills referenced herein which were 
incurred by Claimant subsequent to the May 17, 2011 decision per the applicable fee schedule, 
with credit for amounts paid to date; 
7. Employer/Surety is liable for the payment of mileage, per diem, and lodging expenses 
identified at C. 5.17 .12 Ex.16; 
8. Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 72-804 for 
Employer/Surety's unreasonable denial of benefits subsequent to January 30, 2012. Claimant 
shall file within (20) twenty days, an affidavit and/or brief in support of his request for attorney 
fees, with appropriate elaboration on Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13 (1984); 
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Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
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LC. No. 2010-000114 
CLAIMANT'S AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
COMES NOW, Claimant, Michael P. VaV\1er, by and through his attorney of Record, 
Rick D. Kallas, and pursuant to the Industrial Commission's 9.28.12 Order and the Idaho 
Supreme Court's decision in Hogaboom v. Economy Jvfattress, 107 Idaho 13, 684 P.2d 990 
(1984), hereby submits the following Affidavit In Support of Award of Attorney's Fees. 
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Rick D. Kallas, being first duly sworn on oath, hereby deposes and states as follows: 
1 . I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho and make the following statements 
based on my own personal knowledge; 
2. The Contingency Fee Agreement Between Claimant and Claimant's Counsel 
The Claimant executed a contingency fee agreement with me on or about 1.19 .10, approximately 
11 days after UPS issued its 1.8.10 complete denial of his 12.18.09 worker's compensation claim 
(See Exhibit A to this Affidavit). The contingency fee agreement entered into by Claimant and 
Claimant's counsel is consistent with Idaho Code §72-508, Idaho Code §72-804 and the attorney 
fee regulations set forth in IDAPA 17, Title 02, Chapter 08, Administrative Rules of the 
Industrial Commission Under the Workers' Compensation Law. Pursuant to that contingency 
fee agreement, the Claimant agreed to pay me 30% of all worker's compensation benefits that 
my efforts operated primarily and substantially to secure on his behalf after the case went to 
Hearing and briefs were submitted to the Industrial Commission. This case went to hearing the 
second time on 5.17.12 Hearing and Claimant's counsel filed a post-hearing Opening Brief on 
7.27.12 and a post-hearing Reply Brief on 8.27.12. Because a hearing was held and briefs were 
submitted, Claimant's counsel is asking the Industrial Commission to Order Employer I Surety to 
pay the full 30% attorney's fee authorized by IDAPA 17.02.08.033.0l(e)(ii) against all medical 
and PPI benefits that Employer I Surety unreasonably denied. Without waiving his right to seek 
attorney's fees on all denied benefits from the inception of this claim on 12.18.09 and based on 
the express language of the Industrial Commission's 9.28.12 decision, the Claimant's attorney 
respectfully requests that the Industrial Commission Order Employer I Surety to pay a full 30% 
attorney's fee against the following benefits: 
A. Exhibit 14 Medical Benefits Incurred Subsequent to 9.28.12 decision 
(Seep. 45 of9.28.12 decision) 
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$2,033.05 x 30% = 
B. Exhibit 15 Medical Benefits Incurred Subsequent to 9.28.12 decision 
$674.00 x 30% = 
C. Exhibit 16 Mileage, Per-Diem and Lodging Expenses 
$2,149.47 x 30% = 
D. Undisputed 12% PPI Rating 
12% X 500 = 60 X 2009 PPI rate of $349.80 = $20,988.00 X 30% = 
Total Attorney's Fee Requested Based on 9.28.12 decision: 






Employer I surety denied this 12.18.09 claim its inception on or about 01.08.10. In order to 
recover the sure and certain relief promised to him by the policy of the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act, the Claimant was forced to hire an attorney and prosecute this denied claim 
through two (2) hearings before the Industrial Commission and two (2) premature interlocutory 
appeals that Employer I Surety attempted to take to the Idaho Supreme Court. Even after the 
Industrial Commission deemed this claim compensable in its original 5 .17 .11 decision, Employer 
I Surety refused to pay the Claimant the past denied medical benefits that he incurred in 
connection with his 12.18.09 denied claim and refused to pay him the undisputed PPI benefits 
that he was entitled to receive under the Workers' Compensation Act. As stated by the Court in 
Hogaboom, "the claimant should not have his benefits lessened by legal expenses incurred as a 
result of the employer's and his surety's unwarranted conduct in refusing or delaying 
compensation of an otherwise compensable claim". Hogaboom, supra, 107 Idaho 17, 684 P.2d 
994 (1984). 
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4. The Anticipated Time and Labor Required to Perform the Legal Services Properly 
Claimant's counsel has been aggressively prosecuting all disputed issues in this completely 
denied claim since the date when the Claimant first retained him on 1.19.10. Since the 
Commission entered its 9.28.12 decision, counsel for employer I surety has informed Claimant 
that they intend to file a Motion For Reconsideration of the Industrial Commission's 9.28.12 
decision and then take their third (3rd) and final appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and ask the 
Court to reverse all adverse rulings set forth in the Industrial Commission's original 5 .17 .11 
Order, all adverse rulings in the Industrial Commission's 12.8.11 Order and all adverse rulings in 
the Industrial Commission's 9.28.12 Order. The total anticipated time to prosecute this denied 
claim from its inception on 12.18.09 to final decision from the Idaho Supreme Court is estimated 
to be approximately six (6) years from date of accident on 12.18.09 to date of final decision by 
the Idaho Supreme Court. The prosecution of this denied claim has been extremely labor 
intensive for Claimant's counsel. There have been at least 3 pre-hearing depositions and 1 post-
hearing deposition taken in this case, 2 hearings before the Industrial Commission and 2 
premature interlocutory appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court by Employer I Surety. (See Exhibit 
B, the Claimant's pleading index which summarizes all of the work that has been performed by 
Claimant's counsel in this case in chronological order). 
5. The Novelty and Difficulty of the Legal Issues Involved in the Matter 
What began as a fairly straight forward case with a relatively simple legal issue (i.e., did the 
Claimant's low back injury arise out his employment?) has been transformed by Employer I 
Surety into a very complex case with multiple legal issues that have already been decided by the 
Industrial Commission in 3 different Orders but which will have to be reconsidered and then 
decided again on appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court after Employer I Surety take their 3rd and 
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final appeal. The Claimant, Employer I Surety and the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund [ISIF] 
have all filed multiple briefs with the Industrial Commission which provide a comprehensive 
explanation of the novelty and difficulty of the legal issues that have surfaced during the 
prosecution of this denied claim. In order to avoid the redundant restatement of the issues 
already litigated and briefed in this claim, the Claimant will not address the novelty and 
difficulty of the legal issues involved in this matter in this Affidavit. However, if the Industrial 
Commission requires further discussion elaborating on the novelty and I or difficulty of the legal 
issues involved in this case (which is beyond the scope of the treatment already given to the 
issues in the parties' briefs) the Claimant would be happy to submit a supplemental affidavit. 
6. The Fees Customarily Charged for Similar Legal Services 
As a workers' compensation Claimant's attorney with 24 years of experience, it is my 
understanding that all Claimant's attorneys in the state of Idaho assert a 30% attorney fee 
charging lien against all denied benefits in cases where a hearing has been held and briefs 
submitted in accordance with the standard set forth in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.0l(e)(ii). The fees 
requested herein are the usual and customary fees charged. 
7. The Possible Total Recovery if Successful 
The efforts of Claimant's counsel have operated primarily and substantially to secure every 
denied medical benefit and every denied income benefit awarded in the Industrial Commission's 
5.17.11 Order, the Industrial Commission's 12.8.11 Order and the Industrial Commission's 
9.28.12 Order. The total possible recovery to Claimant for lifetime medical benefits pursuant to 
Idaho Code §72-432 and lifetime permanent and total disability benefits pursuant to Idaho Code 
§72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409 will be substantial but cannot be quantified with certainty 
given the uncertainty of the Claimant's life expectancy. 
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8. The Time Limitations Imposed by the Client or Circumstances of the Case 
After working for his date of injury employer (UPS) for approximately 27 years, the Claimant 
had a difficult time accepting UPS's wrongful denial of his claim. Throughout every stage of 
this litigation, the Claimant has insisted that I take immediate action to advance the litigation in 
the most expeditious manner possible. Based on his previously urgent financial needs, the 
Claimant has placed very short time limits on the prosecution of every disputed issue in this 
denied claim. 
9. The Nature and Length of the Attorney-Client Relationship 
The Claimant and I have worked together very closely at every stage of this case from the date 
when the Claimant retained me on 1.19 .10 until the present date. This close working relationship 
will continue until we receive a final decision from the Idaho Supreme Court after Employer I 
Surety take their 3rd and final appeal. 
10. The Experience, Skill and Reputation of the Attorney 
I graduated from the University of Idaho college of law and passed the Idaho State Bar in 1988. 
Since that date, I have been representing Claimants in Idaho worker's compensation claims. I 
read every Industrial Commission decision and every Idaho Supreme Court decision that deal 
with Idaho Workers' Compensation law. I regularly attend Continuing Legal Education (CLE) 
courses that address the legal and medical issues involved in the prosecution of Idaho Workers' 
Compensation cases as part of my efforts to remain proficient in the filed of Idaho workers' 
compensation law. I exercise due diligence in my efforts to develop and maintain my skills as a 
Claimant's attorney for the injured workers that I represent in the state of Idaho. 
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11 . The Ability of the Client to Pay for the Legal Services to be Rendered 
After his 12.18.09 industrial accident I low back injury, the Claimant was forced to stop working 
for UPS and was not earning his regular wage. When UPS denied this claim on 1.8.10, the 
Claimant was prevented from collecting total temporary disability (TTD) benefits through the 
workers' compensation system. The only income that the Claimant and his family had to live on 
and pay his bills was the short term I long term disability benefits that he was collecting from his 
disability carrier, Aetna, and those benefits were not sufficient to meet the Claimant's monthly 
obligations. I never asked the Claimant to pay me for my legal services out of his short term I 
long-term disability benefits because I did not want to make the Claimant and his family suffer 
any more financial hardship than the hardship already imposed by UPS's denial of his 12.18.09 
worker's compensation claim. 
12. The Risk ofNo Recovery 
Ernployer I Surety denied this claim on the grounds that Claimant's 12.18.09 low back injury did 
not arise out of his employment. Based on representations made by Defense Counsel for UPS, 
Employer I Surety intend to file their 3rd appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court in order to 
challenge the Industrial Commission's holding on that threshold issue. If the Supreme Court 
reverses the Industrial Commission's 5 .17 .11 decision, the risk of no recovery in this case is 
100% (excluding the benefits previously paid by UPS as the result of the Industrial 
Commission's 5.17.11 Order and 12.8.11 Order). Since Employer /Surety issued their original 
denial on 1.8.10, Employer I Surety have created multiple appealable issues and have made it 
very clear that they intend to appeal each adverse ruling to the Idaho Supreme Court. Based on 
the aggressive defense of this denied claim by Employer I Surety, the Claimant still faces a 
substantial risk of no recovery in this case. Given that risk, the Industrial Commission should 
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award the Claimant the full 30% fee requested herein against all benefits that the Industrial 
Commission found were denied in an unreasonable manner. 
Further your affiant sayeth not. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of October, 2012. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC 
By: 
RlCKD. KALLAS 
Attorney for Claimant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO Before me this 15th day of October, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of October, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the 
Affidavit In Support of Award of Attorney's Fees by the method indicated below and addressed to the 
following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC 
1004 W. Fort St. 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Susan Veltman 
Breen, Veltman & Wilson 
1703 W. Hill Rd. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Vawter I Claimant's Affidavit in Support of Award of Attorney's Fees 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
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EXHIBIT A 
Legal Services Contingency Fee Employment Agreement 
This is an agreement for legal representation in Worker's Compensation claim before the Idaho State 
Industrial Commission between Rick D. Kallas, Attorney at Law (hereinafter referred to as "Attorney"), 
and Micheal Vawter, SSN,-. DOB,-9, Address.-, Donnelly, ID 83615 
(cell), (hereinafter referred to as "Client"). 
Attorney and Client agree as follows: 
1. Attorney will represent client in his/her worker's compensation claim against UPS, (employer) 
and Liberty Insurance Corp. (surety) and its Third Party Administrator, Gallagher Bassett 
Services, Inc. based on client's December 18, 2009 industrial accident I low back injury claim. 
2. Attorney will be paid a fee for services rendered and shall have a "charging lien" against 
client's right to any benefits or compensation, in the amount of all costs, attorney fees, expert 
witness fees or other disbursements made to secure said benefit or compensation, under 
Idaho's Workers' Compensation laws, whether said benefits or compensation are obtained 
through negotiations and settlement or after hearing and Order of the Industrial Commission. 
Attorney does not have to wait until the end of the case to collect his attorney's fee. Attorney 
fees shall be paid to attorney at the same time that client receives benefits as the result of 
attorney's efforts. The disbursement procedure will be as follows: when attorney receives a 
benefit check the check will be deposited into attorney's Trust Account. After the check clears 
the negotiation process and sufficient funds from the bank upon which the check is drawn have 
been confirmed, Attorney will deduct all outstanding costs which have previously been advanced 
(if any), deduct all Attorney's fees that are due and then issue 2 checks from Attorney's Trust 
Account: 1 check to Client for client's "net" payment (i.e., the amount due after the payment of all 
attorneys' fees and costs) and 1 check to Attorney for the correct payment of all attorney's fees 
and costs that are due. 
a. In a case where no hearing on the merits has been held, Rick D. Kallas' attorney's fee 
charging lien shall consist of 25% of "available funds". Available funds do not include 
any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to client's agreement to retain 
attorney. If this claim is settled pursuant to a structured settlement or an annuity which 
requires employer I surety to make periodic payments to Client, Client shall pay attorney 
Rick D. Kallas 25% of the Present Value (P.V.) of the first 10 years of guaranteed future 
payments and 15% after the first 10 years of guaranteed future payments for the 
balance of the term of the guaranteed future payments. This 25% attorney's fee shall be 
paid to Rick D. Kallas regardless of whether Client owes a prior attorney fees pursuant 
to a contract or attorney's fee lien. Client agrees that Client shall be solely responsible 
for the payment of the prior attorney's fees and no portion of those fees shall be paid out 
of the 25% fee that client has agreed to pay Rick D. Kallas pursuant to this contract; 
b. In a case where a hearing has been held and briefs submitted (or waived) under Judicial 
Rules of Practice and Procedure (JRP), Rules X and XI, attorney's charging lien shall 
consist of 30% of available funds. If this claim is settled pursuant to a structured 
settlement or an annuity which requires employer I surety to make periodic payments to 
Client, Client shall pay attorney Rick D. Kallas 30% of the Present Value (P.V.) of the 
first 1 O years of guaranteed future payments and 15% after the first 10 years of 
guaranteed future payments for the balance of the term of the guaranteed future 
payments. This 30% attorney's fee shall be paid to Rick D. Kallas regardless of whether 
Client owes a prior attorney fees pursuant to a contract or attorney's fee lien. Client 
agrees that Client shall be solely responsible for the payment of the prior attorney's fees 
and no portion of those fees shall be paid out of the 30% fee that client has agreed to 
pay Rick D. Kallas pursuant to this contract; 
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c. In a case where either party files an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, 40% of 
available funds. If this claim is settled pursuant to a structured settlement or an annuity 
which requires employer I surety to make periodic payments to Client, Client shall pay 
attorney Rick D. Kallas 40% of the Present Value (P .V.) of the first 10 years of 
guaranteed future payments and 15% after the first 10 years of guaranteed future 
payments for the balance of the term of the guaranteed future payments. This 40% 
attorney's fee shall be paid to Rick D. Kallas regardless of whether Client owes a prior 
attorney fees pursuant to a contract or attorney's fee lien. Client agrees that Client shall 
be solely responsible for the payment of the prior attorney's fees and no portion of those 
fees shall be paid out of the 40% fee that client has agreed to pay Rick D. Kallas 
pursuant to this contract; or 
d. In a case where compensation is paid for total permanent disability, 15% of such 
disability compensation after ten (10) years from the date such total permanent disability 
payments commenced. This 15% fee shall be paid to Rick D. Kallas regardless of 
whether Client owes a prior attorney fees pursuant to a contract or attorney's fee lien. 
Client agrees that client will be solely responsible for the payment of the prior attorney's 
fees and no portion of those fees shall be paid out of the 15% fee that client has agreed 
to pay Rick D. Kallas pursuant to this contract. 
3. If the Industrial Commission does not approve any portion of attorney's fee, client understands 
and agrees that attorney may file a Request for Hearing before the Commission for the purpose 
of presenting evidence and argument on the issue of attorney's fees. 
4. Client is not obligated to compensate attorney for services rendered if nothing is recovered by 
negotiation, settlement or award. 
5. Client is responsible for the payment of all costs and fees incurred to prosecute or settle this 
case on client's behalf and understands that attorney's fee will be calculated on the gross 
settlement or award before deducting costs and fees. After the client retains attorney, client 
authorizes attorney to collect all worker's compensation benefit checks on the client's behalf. 
The benefit checks will be sent directly to attorney's office. In those cases where attorney has 
earned a fee against Client's income benefits or has advanced any litigation costs to prosecute 
client's case, client hereby authorizes attorney to deposit client's worker's compensation benefit 
check direct!y into attorney's Trust Account. To reimburse himself for any costs advanced, 
Attorney is authorized to deduct a maximum of $250.00 or 25% of each benefit check (which 
ever amount is greater) until the costs advanced by attorney have been reimbursed in full. This 
cost reimbursement deduction from each of client's worker's compensation benefit checks shall 
be in addition to any 25% - 40% attorney's fee that attorney is authorized to deduct in 
accordance with Paragraph 2 above. The balance of client's worker's compensation benefit 
check (after reimbursement of costs and the payment of attorney's fees) will be sent to client 
from attorney's Trust Account. After attorney's fees have been paid, client authorizes, but does 
not place a mandatory duty upon attorney, to disburse whatever funds are necessary to satisfy 
outstanding costs and fees reasonably incurred to prosecute client's case. 
6. Client authorizes attorney to pay all outstanding health care expenses, whether owed to doctors, 
hospitals, therapists, or health insurers, related to the subject matter of the case out of the case 
proceeds. Client acknowledges that this authorization is a benefit to the client in order to secure 
the cooperation of health care providers and insurers and client makes this authorization 
irrevocably. Notwithstanding this authorization, client will be liable for all medical bills, not the 
attorney. 
7. Client shall not settle this case without attorney's prior approval, which approval shall not be 
unreasonably withheld. If client does settle this case without attorney's approval, client shall be 
responsible for the payment of all attorney's fees authorized herein. 
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8. Client agrees that attorney has not made any representations concerning the probable outcome 
of client's case and cannot guarantee to obtain a sum sufficient to reimburse client for the costs 
and expenses incurred in the prosecution of this case. If attorney does render opinion about a 
probable outcome, client understands that attorney has merely given a good faith opinion and is 
not making a representation of fact or warranty. 
9. Attorney may withdraw from this case if: 
a. Client insists on presenting a claim or defense that is not warranted under existing law 
and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for the extension, modification or 
reversal of existing law; 
b. Client seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct, demands that attorney act illegally or 
unethically, takes actions which render it unreasonable difficult for attorney to discharge 
his duties under this agreement or otherwise acts in a manner inconsistent with the letter 
or spirit of this agreement; or 
c. Client insists that attorney act in a manner which is incompatible with attorney's good 
judgment or advice. 
10. Attorney may be discharged by client at any time. If attorney is discharged, he shall be 
compensated for services rendered to the date of discharge and shall have the right to file a 
charging lien with the Industrial Commission seeking an award of attorney's fees for services 
rendered at the rate of $250.00 per hour, attorney's usual and customary hourly rate, or in the 
alternative, attorney's charging lien shall consist of 25%, 30% or 40% of the benefits that 
attorney's efforts operated primarily and substantially to secure for the claimant in accordance 
with paragraph 2 (A) - 2 (C) above, whichever amount is greater. 
11. Attorney has the right to retain possession of client's documents until his bill is paid in full. If 
client demands copies of the documents in attorney's file, attorney shall have the right to charge 
client .25 cents per page per copy, which client shall pay prior to said copies being made. 
Disclosure Statement 
12. In worker's compensation matters, attorney's fees normally do not exceed 25% of the benefits 
your attorney obtains for you in a case in which no hearing on the merits has been completed. 
In a case in which a hearing on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not 
exceed 30% of the benefits your attorney obtains for you. If your case is appealed by either 
party to the Idaho Supreme Court, your fee will be 40% as indicated in paragraph 2. (C) above. If 
this claim is settled pursuant to a structured settlement or an annuity which requires employer I 
surety to make periodic payments to Client, Client shall pay attorney Rick D. Kallas 25% or 30% 
or 40% of the Present Value (P .V.) of the first 10 years of guaranteed future payments and 15% 
after the first 10 years of guaranteed future payments for the balance of the term of the 
guaranteed future payments in accordance with paragraphs 2 (A) - 2 (C) above. 
The 25% - 40% fee that you have agreed to pay pursuant to this contract shall be paid to Rick D. 
Kallas regardless of whether Client owes a prior attorney fees pursuant to a contract or 
attorney's fee lien. Client agrees that client will be solely responsible for the payment of the prior 
attorney's fees and no portion of those fees shall be paid out of the 25% - 40% fee that client 
has agreed to pay Rick D. Kallas pursuant to this contract. 
13. Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may agree to a higher 
or lower percentage which would be subject to Commission approval. Further if you and your 
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attorney have a dispute regarding attorney fees, either of you may petition the Commission to 
resolve the dispute. 
14. Both client and attorney have read this entire agreement, including the disclosure statements in 
paragraphs 11 and 12 above, have a copy of this agreement and agree to its terms and 
conditions. This Agreement represents the parties' complete and entire Agreement with respect 
to the claim referenced above. This agreement cannot be altered, modified, varied or changed 
in any way without a written modification agreement which is signed by both parties and 
expressly made a part of this contract. Any oral or verbal term, statement, condition or 
understanding made outside of this written agreement has no legal effect whatsoever and 
cannot alter, vary or modify the terms of this contract. If there is any conflict between the terms 
of this contract and any other written or verbal agreement, statement, term condition or 
understanding, the terms of this contract shall control. 
15. This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, successors, representatives and assigns of 
client and attorney. 
I certify that I have read and understand this agreement. 
Client: Date: _/_-!_9-_/ o __ 
Attorney: 
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Complaint 
Michael Vawter Pleading Index 
LC. No. 2010-000114 
NOS CL Discovery To Dfts 
Answer 
NOS Dft. Discovery to Claimant 
NOS Dft. Resp. CL Dis. To Dft. 
CL NOS J.R.P. 10 H.E. to Dft. 
CL NOS. CL Dis. Resp. to Dft. Dis. Req. 
CL Req. For Cal. 
Def. Resp. to Req. For Cal. & Mot. To Bi-furcate 
CL Resp. Dft. Mot. To Bi-furcate 
I.C. NOTICE OF 6.7.10 TEL. STATUS CONF. 
Dft. Not. Int. To Take. CL Depo on 6.10.10 
I.C. NOTICE OF 7.19.10 TEL. STATUS CONF. 
I.C. NOTICE OF 8.16.10 PRE-HEAR. CONF. 
l.C. NOTICE OF 9.28.10 HEARING 
Dft.Not. of Intent To Take Depo of Mike McGuire 
Dft. LIST OF EXB. 
Dft. Not. Serv. LIST OF EXB. 
CL Amd.J.R.P.10 H.E. for 9.28.10.Hearing 
Cl. NOS Amd.J.RP.10. H.E. for 9.28.10 Hearing 
CL Not. Supp. Disc. Resp. 
CL 2nd Amd.J.R.P. 10. H.E. for 9.28.10 Hearing 
Dft. Amd. H.E. List 
l.C. CERT. OF SERVICE. HEAR. TRX 
ORDER EST. BRIEF.SCH. 
CL Opening Brief 
Dft. Responsive Brief 
CL Reply Brief 
Ref. Powers Proposed Decision 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER 
Claimant's Request For Calendaring 
Dft. Response to CL Req. For Cal. 
ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR CALENDARING 
CL Reply to Def. Resp. to CL Req. For Cal. 
NOTICE OF TEL. 6.6.11 TEL. CONF. 
NOTICE OF 9.7.11 TEL. CONF. & 10.25.11 HEARING 
AMENDED NOTICE OF 9.7.11 TEL. CONF. & 10.25.11 HEARING 
Def. Notice of Functional Capacity Evaluation 
Def. I Appellant's Notice of Appeal 
Dfts. Not. oflntent to file WC Complaint Against ISIF 
Dfts. Req. for Addt'l Issues@ 10.25.11 Hrg. 
Cl's Obj. to Dfts. Mot. to Add Issues@ Hrg. 
ORDER VACATING 10.25.11 HRG. & ESTABLISHING BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
Dfts. Memo Re the Issue of Pymt. Obligations 
Aff. Veltman in Supp. ofDfts. Memo Re the Issue of Pymt. Obligations 
ISIF's Acknowledgement of Not. of Claim 
Cl's Resp. to Dfts. Mot for Stay of 5.17.11 Order to Pay Comp Benefits 
EER/Surety's WC Complaint Against ISIF 
ISIF's Answer to Complaint 
ISIF's NOS oflnterr. & RFPD to EER/Surety 
ISIF's NOS oflnterr. & RFPD to Claimant 
EER/Surety's NOS oflnterr. & RFPD to ISIF 
Cl. NOS Disc. Requests to ISIF 
Cl. NOS Disc. Responses to ISIF 
CL NOS JRP 10 Hrg. Exhibits 
Cl. Req. for Calendaring 
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CL NOS 1" Supp. Resp. to ISIF's RFPD 
EER/Surety NOS Disc. Resp. to ISIF 
ORDER DENYING STAY 
EER/Surety's Mot. for Permission to Appeal Order & Req. for Expedited Hrg. 
EER/Surety's Mot. Req. Expedited Ruling for Stay Upon Permissive Appeal 
ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME 
ISIF'S Resp. to Motions Filed by EER/Surety 
CL Req. for Sch. Of Hrg. Date Based on CL' s 11.29 .11 Req for Calendaring 
CL Resp. in Opp. OfUPS's Mot. for Permission to Appeal 
ORDER GRANTING PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
UPS's Resp. to Cl's Req. for Cal 
ISIF's Resp. to Cl's Req. for Cal 
ISIF's NOS of Disc. Resp. to Claimant 
Cl's 2nct Req. for Sch ofFinal Hrg Based on 11.29.11 Req. for Calendaring 
NOTICE OF 02.10.12 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
ISIF's Not. ofTaking Cl's Depo [03.01.12] 
Cl's Req. to Include Supp. Issue@ 05.17.12 Hrg. 
NOTICE OF 05.17.12 HEARING 
UPS's Req. for Order Governing Hrg. Exhibits 
ORDER REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS 
Cl's NOS of Cl's 9.28.10 Hrg. Exhibits to ISIF 
UPS' NOS of Copy of09.28.10 Hrg. Exhibits to ISIF 
ISIF's Notice ofDepo of UPS EE, Preston Wilkinson 
Cl's NOS of Cl's Supp. Disc Resp to UPS and ISIF 
Cl's Not. ofl '1 Amended JRP 10 Hrg Exhibits for 5.17.12 Hearing 
Cl's First Amended JRP 10 Exhibits for 5.17.12 Hearing 
UPS' Not. of Dr. Frizzell' s 06.04.12 Post-Hrg Depo. 
UPS' NOS of Supp. Answers to Cl's Interrogatories 
UPS' NOS of Supp. Answers to ISIF's Interr/RFPD 
UPS' NOS of List of Rule X Exhibits 
UPS' List of 5.17.12 Exhibits 
ISIF's Rule 10 Disclosure 
Cl's NOS of Supp. JRP 10 HE No. 6 for 5.17.12 Hearing 
Cl's Supp. JRP 10 Exhibits for 5.17.12 Hearing 
UPS Notice ofFiling Post-Hearing Deposition 
ORDER ESTABLISHING BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
Cl's Opening Brief for 05.17.12 Hearing 
UPS' Post-Hearing Brief 
ISIF's Post-Hearing Brief 
Cl's Reply Brief for 05.17.12 Hearing 
UPS' Notice of Substitution of Counsel 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCULSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER 
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Rick D. Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
Idaho State Bar No. 3872 
Attorney for Claimant 
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and 
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP., 
Surety, 
and 
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LC. No. 2010-000114 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR 
CORRECTION OF ERRATA IN 9.28.12 
DECISION 
COMES NOW, Claimant, Michael P. Vawter, by and through his attorney of Record, Rick D. Kallas, 
and, pursuant to Idaho Code §72-718 and the Industrial Commission's 9.28.12 Order, hereby submits the 
following Motion For Correction of Errata. 
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1 . Motion For Correction of Errata. 
Page 3, line 7, indicates that Claimant appealed the May 17, 2011 decision to the Idaho Supreme Court 
when Employer I Surety filed the appeal; 
2. Motion For Correction of Errata. 
Page 5, line 17, indicates that ISIF acknowledges that the Claimant "may be" totally and permanently 
disabled when ISIF actually conceded in their Post Hearing Brief "that the claimant has met his burden 
of establishing that he is totally and permanently disabled" (See pp. 14-15 ofISIF' s Post-Hearing Brief); 
3. Motion For Correction of Errata. 
Page 12,, 21, line, 6, indicates that Claimant's left shoulder injury occurred on 9.19.90 when the actual 
date of injury was 9.19.00; 
4. Motion For Correction of Errata. 
Page 26,, 58, box# 2 indicates that the Claimant's left shoulder injury occurred on 9.19.90 when the 
actual date of injury was 9.19.00; 
5. Motion For Correction of Errata. 
Page 29, ,63, line 9 indicates that Claimant injured his left shoulder in 1990 when his actual date of 
injury was 9.19.00; 
6. Motion For Correction of Errata. 
Page 38, the issue stated in bold type should be restated to indicate that it was Employer I Surety who 
requested the advance declaratory ruling; i.e., Is Employer I Surety Entitled to Ruling on 
Reimbursement in Advance of Supreme Court Review of this Decision?; 
7. Motion For Correction of Errata 
Page 40, , 93, indicates that the Commission denied the Claimant's Motion For Stay when it was 
Employer I Surety who filed the Motion to Stay the Industrial Commission's 5 .17 .11 Order; 
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8. Motion For Correction of Errata 
Page 41, i 92, line 3, indicates that the order directed Claimant to pay to Employer I Surety when it 
should state that the Order directed Employer I Surety to pay to Claimant; 
9. Motion For Correction of Errata 
Page 41, i 94, indicates that Claimant sought permission to appeal when it should state that Employer I 
Surety sought permission to appeal the Commission's Order Denying Stay; and, 
10. Motion For Correction of Errata 
Page 44,, 102, in the parentheses at the end of the paragraph, the Commission makes reference to Idaho 
Code §72-305 when the reference was probably intended to be to Idaho Code §72-304 - Prompt 
Compensation Payments Required. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of October, 2012. 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC 
Attorney for Claimant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of October, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the Claimant's 
Motion For Correction of Errata by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC 
1004 W. Fort St. 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Susan Veltman 
Gardner & Breen 
1410 W. Washington 
Boise, ID 83 702 
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[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 




SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB NO. 7850) 
BREEN VELTMAN WILSON, PLLC 
1703 W. Hill Rd. 
Boise, ID 83702 
PH (208) 387-2667 
FAX (208) 387-2677 
veltman@bvwcomplaw.com 
Attorney for Defendants, United Parcel Service, Inc. and Liberty Insurance Corp. 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL P. VAWTER, 
Claimant, 
v. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP., 
Surety, 
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL 
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DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
COME NOW Defendants, United Parcel Service, Inc., and Liberty Insurance Corporation, 
and file this motion pursuant to JRP 3(F). Defendants request the Industrial Commission 
reconsider its order filed in this matter on September 28, 2012. Defendants seek to preserve 
appellate rights with regard to all issues litigated in this matter pursuant to IAR 11 ( d), because all 
issues flow from the Commission's previous determination that Claimant sustained a 
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compensable injury. Defendants particularly request reconsideration of the issues set forth in 
their brief filed in support of this motion. 
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of October, 2012. 
Susan R. Veltman 
BREEN VELTMAN WILSON 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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LC. No.: 2010-000114 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
OF SEPTEMBER 28, 2012 DECISION 
Defendants file this Brief in Support of their Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to JRP 
3(F) and Idaho Code § 72-718, respectfully showing as follows: 
The Commission's application of the doctrine of quasi estoppel was in error. 
Quasi estoppel was not identified as an issue in the March 7, 2012, Notice of Hearing, nor 
was it addressed at the hearing itself when the parties discussed the issues to be litigated. Although 
Claimant discussed the doctrine in his post-hearing brief, he did not affirmatively raise the issue as a 
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defense prior to hearing. Similarly, ISIF did not argue for quasi estoppel in its brief, nor did it 
affirmatively plead the issue as a defense prior to hearing. See Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 
137 Idaho 352, 357, 48 P.3d 1241, 1246 (2002) (stating the doctrine of quasi estoppel is an 
affirmative defense and the party asserting it must prove each of the elements by a preponderance of 
the evidence). The Commission therefore erred when it applied the doctrine because it was not set 
forth as an issue for hearing or affirmatively pleaded as a defense. Defendants did not have proper 
notice of the issue and were not afforded the opportunity to put on evidence regarding the matter. 
See Sharon 0 'Dell v. Cedar's Steak & Lobster, 2007 IIC 0755 and Henderson v. Alliant 
Techsystems, Inc., 2007 IIC 0852, where the Commission declined to consider issues in its decision 
that were not properly identified prior to or at the time of hearing. Accordingly, the Commission's 
consideration of quasi estoppel and related findings on the matter were erroneous. 
Even assuming the doctrine had been properly plead and identified as an issue for hearing, 
Claimant and ISIF failed to meet their burden of proving each of the elements by a preponderance of 
the evidence. In its brief, ISIF did not advocate for any form of estoppel, let alone outline the 
necessary elements for quasi estoppel in particular. Although Claimant asserted that quasi estoppel 
should apply and identified the elements as set forth in Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 138 P.3d 
198 (2003), he did not discuss how the elements were met in this case. Specifically, Claimant did 
not show how Defendants have taken a different position in this matter or identify what Defendants' 
original position was (which is important because the 1990 claim was not litigated). Nor did he 
explain (a) how Defendants gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to him or (b) how he was 
induced to change his position, or ( c) that it would be unconscionable to permit Defendants to 
maintain an inconsistent position from one they have already derived a benefit from or acquiesced in. 
Most importantly, Claimant did not address the fact that Defendant Liberty Insurance Corporation 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, P. 2 
was not the surety at the time of Claimant's 1990 claim. Neither did ISIF. As noted on page 11 of 
the Commission's decision, UPS had a different surety at the time of Claimant's 1990 low back 
injury. Although directly acknowledging the sureties were different, the Commission failed to 
explain how estoppel would apply to Liberty Insurance Corporation when it was not involved in the 
prior matter. 
Despite the omission, even assuming the doctrine was applicable, there is no support for the 
proposition that Defendants' current position with respect to Claimant's 1990 low back injury is 
inconsistent with a previously taken position. There was no previous position. Based on IIC records, 
Employer's surety for the 1990 injury appears to have based Claimant's entitlement to permanent 
impairment on the then unrefuted opinion of Richard Knoebel, M.D. In the limited excerpt of Dr. 
Knoebel's 1991 report that was included in the IIC records, he opined Claimant had no activity 
preclusion related to his 1990 injury and did not qualify for assignment of permanent impairment. 
(Def. Ex. 10, p. 27). Dr. Knoebel's assessment regarding work capacity is the only one on file, and 
there is nothing unreasonable about Claimant, UPS, and its then surety, Liberty Northwest Insurance, 
to rely on it at that time. The Industrial Commission recently evaluated the credibility of Dr. 
Knoebel' s IME opinions regarding causation and impairment in an industrial back injury. In doing 
so, the Commission found his opinions in that particular case to be well supported and adopted his 
opinions over those of the treating physicians. See Priest v. Valley Regional Transit, 2012 IIC 0033. 
With regard to Claimant's 1991 impairment assessment by Dr. Knoebel, Claimant certainly could 
have obtained a different assessment or disputed the opinion, but did not. 
To preclude Defendants from now asserting Claimant should have had permanent impairment 
and restrictions, after almost a 20-year history documenting his subsequent back problems, is 
erroneous and prejudicial. Indeed, it is common in a litigated case for parties to argue for retroactive 
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restrictions and impairment ratings, and it is not unusual for the Commission to impose them 
retroactively when determining the extent of disability. See Cuevas v. Nederend Dairy, 2010 IIC 
0093 (stating "[T]he question of whether or not some portion of Claimant's disability should be 
apportioned to a pre-existing impairment is not dependent on whether or not there is a physician 
imposed limitation/restriction which predates the subject accident, even though existence or absence 
of such a physician imposed restriction is, assuredly relevant to such an analysis."). The precedent 
created by the Commission's decision in this case would limit the ability of parties to maintain 
positions based on more complete facts than when an initial determination was made. 
The Commission recently declined to apply the doctrine of quasi estoppel in the case of 
Federko v. Sun Valley Co., 2011IIC0034. There, the defendants initially accepted the claimant's 
claim and paid benefits, but later denied it on the basis he failed to provide timely notice of his 
industrial accident. The Commission agreed, and found the claimant's claim was barred by Idaho 
Code § 72-701. On reconsideration, the claimant argued the defendants should be estopped from 
asserting the notice defense under the doctrine of quasi estoppel because they took inconsistent 
positions when they accepted the claim and subsequently denied it. He argued it would be 
unconscionable to permit defendants to mainta.in the notice defense. The Commission rejected this 
argument, stating the defendants never took the position that notice was timely. As noted above, it 
also stated that although defendants first accepted the claim and later denied it, this is common and 
permissible in the workers' compensation system. 
Underlying the Commission's September 28, 2012, decision is the implication that UPS and 
its then surety knew in 1991 that Claimant should have had restrictions, but "advocated" Dr. 
Knoebel' s assessment in order to avoid paying impairment benefits. There is no evidence to support 
this, and as stated above, Claimant was fully capable of disputing the opinion, requesting a second 
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opinion, and filing a request for hearing, but he did not. Dr. Knoebel' s opinion can hardly be 
construed as a benefit to UPS and its surety any more than it can be to Claimant, who without 
restrictions was able to return to work and earn full salary for more than 18 years. It is not 
unconscionable for Defendants to now assert Claimant should have had permanent impairment and 
restrictions following his 1990 injury in light of his subsequent problems, particularly when the 
Commission reached the same conclusion ("Independent evidence in the record tends to support Dr. 
Frizzell's ultimate conclusion that apportionment of both impairment and limitations is 
appropriate."). (Decision, p. 15). Similarly, on page 29, the Commission discussed the 
appropriateness of Dr. Frizzell' s retroactive limitations/restrictions stating "The sensibility of this 
recommendation is well borne out by Claimant's subsequent history." It is no more unconscionable 
to allow Defendants to advocate for consideration of retroactive impairment and restrictions 
following Claimant's 1990 injury than it is for Claimant to accept $30,780.64 in permanent partial 
impairment benefits for his right thumb and bilateral shoulders and now assert he "did not have any 
functional limitations" related to those conditions. (CL Brief, p. 20). 
Moreover, it is not unconscionable for Defendants to share the burden of paying disability 
benefits with ISIF when only part of Claimant's disability was found to have been caused by his 
2009 injury. This is the reason why the ISIF was created. The Supreme Court has recognized that 
the ISIF was created "to encourage the hiring of the handicapped and, as a corollary, to relieve 
employers of the unfair burden of paying total permanent disability compensation when only part of 
the disability was due to the industrial accident." See Gugelman v Pressure Treated Timber Co., 102 
Idaho 356, 360, 630 P.2d 148, 152 (1981). In this case, the Commission found that Claimant's 
preexisting low back condition met the elements of ISIF liability. To then discharge ISIF from its 
responsibility contravenes the purpose of the fund and the principles behind its creation. 
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The Commission's failure to apply the doctrine of res judicata to medical 
benefits was in error. 
The issue of Claimant's entitlement to medical benefits was adjudicated at the 2010 hearing, 
and medical benefits in the amount of$149,033.68 were ordered by the Commission in its May 17, 
2011, decision. There was no request that the record be held open so that the amount of medical bills 
could be supplemented or that the Commission retain jurisdiction on the issue of medical benefits. 
Disputes arose as to the extent to which the 2011 decision was final for purposes of appeal and 
payment obligations. In its December 8, 2011 Order Denying Stay, the Commission stated: 
We are cognizant of the rule set forth in Jensen. However, according to Idaho Code 
§ 72-718, A Commission decision, in the absence of fraud, is final and conclusive as 
to all matters adjudicated on the date the decision is filed, provided that no party 
moves for reconsideration. Here, no party has moved for reconsideration, and no 
party has alleged fraud. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, the May 
17, 2011 decision is final as to the matters of whether Claimant suffered an injury 
arising out of employment, whether Claimant is entitled to TTD benefits, whether 
Claimant is entitled to medical benefits, and whether Claimant is entitled to attorney 
fees. These issues will not be revisited by the Commission in future decisions, absent 
instruction by the Court following an appeal. Though the Commission has 
continuing jurisdiction over the remaining issues in this case, the May 17 decision 
was not intended to be, nor should it be read as preliminary. It is final. 
(12/8/2011 Order Denying Stay, p. 5). The precise issue litigated at the 2010 hearing regarding 
medical benefits was "Whether Claimant is entitled to medical benefits and the extent thereof." 
(5/17/2011 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order). 
The legal doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to agency proceedings, 
including those of the Industrial Commission. Welch v. Del Monte Corp., 128 Idaho 513, 516, 915 
P.2d 1371, 1374 (1996). This includes Industrial Commission findings regarding entitlement to 
medical benefits. Magee v. Thompson Creek Mining Co., 268 P.3d464, 469, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 25, 
16-17(2012). Res judicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue preclusion 
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(collateral estoppel). Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Collateral 
estoppel bars the re litigation of issues actually adjudicated in prior litigation between the very same 
parties. Rodriguez v. Department of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 29 P.3d 401 (2001). Five factors 
must be evident in order for collateral estoppel to bar the relitigation of an issue determined in a prior 
proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation 
was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was 
actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior 
litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to 
the litigation. Id. 
The Commission determined that resjudicata would not apply in this case (the 9/28/2012 
decision refers to res judicata in the broad sense and the precise issue is whether collateral estoppel 
applies as the previous orders in this case clearly indicate that the 2010 hearing addressed bifurcated 
issues and not every issue asserted in this claim). In doing so, the Commission incorrectly ignored 
that the issue actually litigated at the 2010 hearing included the extent to which Claimant is entitled 
to medical benefits. Its 9/28/2012 determination that any medical bills discovered by Claimant after 
the hearing, regardless of the date of the medical service, would constitute "a distinct claim for 
benefits" ignores the previous determination and is contrary to the language cited above from the 
Commission's 12/8/2011 Order Denying Stay. (9/28/2012 Decision, p. 37). In determining what 
issues were actually litigated at the 2010 hearing, the phrasing of the actual issue litigated should 
control, rather than determining what issues were litigated based on which bills Claimant opted to 
obtain and offer into evidence. 
Certainly, Claimant had a fair and full opportunity to litigate his entitlement to medical 
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benefits for medical care he received prior to the 2010 hearing, which constitutes the bulk of the 
"new" medical benefits in dispute. With regard to medical services received after the hearing, 
Claimant had the opportunity to plead for future medical benefits in accordance with Idaho Code § 
72-432, which is commonly how medical awards are phrased. Alternatively, Claimant could have 
requested that medical benefits adjudicated at the 2010 hearing be limited to past benefits ratherthan 
pursuit of the open-ended issue he litigated, which was broad enough to include future medical 
benefits. 
In the event that a new claim for benefits arises whenever a claimant discovers a medical bill, 
in spite of a previous final decision as to the extent to which medical benefits are owed, there is no 
way for parties to obtain a final decision as required by the Idaho Supreme Court in order to perfect 
an appeal as a matter of right. Indeed, any claimant who has not prevailed on the issue of entitlement 
to medical benefits merely needs to find a medical bill that was not admitted into evidence at the 
initial hearing in order to re-initiate the litigation process, without establishing a change in condition 
or manifest injustice. The doctrine of collateral estoppel should preclude such re-litigation and allow 
defendants to rely a previous final decision as to what medical benefits are owed. 
The Commission's award of attorney fees was in error. 
The Commission determined that Defendants' refusal to pay medical expenses incurred 
subsequent to September 28, 201 O; mileage, per diem and lodging expenses incurred subsequent to 
September 28, 201 O; and the PPI award given by Dr. Frizzell, became unreasonable after January 30, 
2012. The unpaid amounts total $4,258.04 in medical, $741.65 in medical travel expenses, and 
$33,231.00 based on the 19% PPI rating assigned by Dr. Frizzell. The grand total of these benefits is 
$38,230.69. 
As cited above, the Commission's 12/8/2011 order specifically indicated that issues including 
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entitlement to medical benefits and attorney fees would "not be revisited by the Commission in 
future decisions, absent instruction by the Court following an appeal." The Court declined to accept 
Defendants' appeal and indicated that remaining issues should be litigated without delay. Based on 
the collateral estoppel issue described above (that the extent to which Claimant was entitled to 
medical benefits was previously litigated, including entitlement to future medical benefits) and 
pursuant to representations from the Commission's 12/8/2011 order, it was reasonable for 
Defendants to decline to pay medical benefits. 
With regard to PPI benefits, the issue of apportionment was clearly in dispute, which would 
impact the extent to which Claimant was entitled to PPI benefits. Based on Claimant's assertion of 
total permanent disability, it was unknown whether any amount of PPI benefits would be payable. In 
fact, pursuant to the Commission's 9/28/2012 decision, no PPI benefits are due. Certainly, it was not 
unreasonable for Defendants to fail to anticipate that they would be precluded from asserting 
apportionment based on the doctrine of quasi estoppel, an affirmative defense that had not been 
raised. Accordingly, Defendants' refusal to voluntarily initiate PPI benefits was reasonable. 
Factual and typographical errors. 
The following errors are not likely outcome determinative, but misstate the history of the 
claim: 
1. On page 3, the 7th line reflects that Claimant appealed the May 17, 2011 
decision to the Idaho Supreme Court and it should be Employer/Surety. 
2. On page 41, paragraph 94 reflects that Claimant sought permission to appeal 
the Commission's order denying stay and it should be Employer/Surety. 
3. On page 45, paragraph 104 reflects that an issue was raised by 
Employer/Surety to challenge the Neel decision regarding payment of medical 
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benefits, but failed to address the issue in its post-hearing brief. This issue was 
not raised by Employer/Surety; it was included at the request of Claimant. 
(Claimant's Request to Include Supplemental Issues for Resolution at 5.17.2012 
Hearing filed 2/12/2012). Employer/Surety assert there are enough novel legal 
issues raised by the facts of this claim, without a challenge to the Neel case. 
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of October, 2012. 
Susan R. Veltman 
BREEN VELTMAN WILSON 
Attorney for Def end ants 
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RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW Defendant, State ofldaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF"), by and 
through their counsel of record, Paul J. Augustine, of Augustine Law Offices, PLLC hereby oppose 
Employer/Surety's Motion for Reconsideration on the grounds identified below. 
\ 
First, although the doctrine of quasi-estoppel was not specifically pled by any of the parties 
as an affirmative defense, the Defendants cannot argue that they were prejudiced because it was their 
burden (by virtue of filing a complaint against the ISIP) of establishing inter alia, the extent of 
DEFENDANT INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL !INDEMNITY FUND'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
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claimant's pre-existing permanent physical impairment as part of the prama facie case. It was clear 
that Defendants knew their own doctor (Dr. Knoebel) rated claimant's impairment of his low back 
due to his injury 1990 at 0% of the whole person and released him to return to work unrestricted. In 
an effort to establish liability against the ISIF once they realized claimant was likely totally and 
permanently disabled, the Defendants obtained a second opinion nearly twenty years later from Dr. 
Frizzell in which he retroactively rated claimant's pre-existing impairment in direct contradiction of 
Dr. Knoebel' s opinion and his own opinions. 
In its answer, ISIF raised several affirmative defenses implicating the doctrine of quasi-
estoppel, including that the claimant did not suffer any permanent physical impairment prior to his 
last industrial injury, that his impairments did not constitute subjective hindrances to his employment 
and that his impairments did not combine with his last injury to render him totally and permanently 
disabled. Therefore, Defendants assertion that the specific issue of quasi-estoppel was not raised by 
the pleadings is inconsistent with the defenses raised by ISIF as well as the position taken by 
Defendants in their prosecution of this matter against ISIF. 
Although the ISIF agrees with the Commission's ultimate conclusion that the ISIF is not 
liable for claiman'ts total disability, the Commission should have simply followed and applied the 
facts of this case to the issues raised by the Defendants' complaint against the ISIF. These facts 
establish that the claimant suffered a 1990 low back injury, he was released by Defendants' IME 
doctor to return to full duty with no restrictions and no impairment, he returned to work in a heavy, 
physically demanding job for nearly nineteen years thereafter, he only missed three weeks of work 
during that nineteen years due to low back pain, and no physician prior to his low back injury of 
2009 restricted claimant's ability to perform his job nor imposed any impairment rating on him for 
low back pain. It was not until Defendants had the benefit of claimant's nineteen years of full duty 
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service and after his 2009 low back injury (which Defendants denied and forced the claimant to 
establish that he suffered a compensable accident) that the Defendants then obtained an opinion from 
Dr. Frizzell that the claimant had a pre-existing ratable impairment for his low back condition. As 
the Commission noted, Dr. Frizzell opined on several occasions that the claimant's injury and 
resultant disability was due solely to his last accident. Clearly Defendants realized that without a 
change in Dr. Frizzell' s opinion they were staring down the barrel of a total perm claim and crafted 
an argument that the claimant had a pre-existing impairment to his low back despite the fact that they 
derived a benefit of not having to pay the claimant any impairment for his 1990 injury and allowing 
him to work without restrictions for nineteen years. 
Instead of accepting Dr. Frizzell' s changed opinion, the Commission should have been more 
skeptical and not accepted this changed opinion in light of the fact that he could not explain how he 
reached this opinion and could not explain how the claimant's pre-existing condition combined with 
his 2009 accident to cause his current injury. If the Commission accepted Dr. Knoebel's rating of the 
claimant's 1990 low back injury and the evidence of record that the claimant only missed three 
weeks of work performing heavy, physically demanding labor for the next nineteen years prior to his 
2009 low back injury, it still would have found that ISIF is not liable for the claimant's total and 
permanent disability. Instead, it applied the doctrine of quasi-estoppel to this case. 
The application of quasi-estoppel is clearly supported by the facts this case and by the 
pleadings of record. After his 2009 injury, Defendants clearly adopted a position inconsistent with 
the original ratings received by the claimant for his pre-existing low back injury. Defendants were 
forced to take this necessitating inconsistent position in order to support its complaint against ISIF. 
In so doing, however, it would be unconscionable for the Commission to allow Defendants to change 
their position, thus the application of quasi-estoppel doctrine. ISIF has maintained through these 
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proceedings that based upon Dr. Knoebel' s full release with a 0% impairment rating that claimant's 
1990 low back injury did not constitute a subjective hindrance nor could it combine with his most 
recent industrial accident to form the basis ofISIF's liability. It is clearly unconscionable to allow 
Defendants to escape the payment of benefits resulting from claimant's 1990 low back injury and 
benefit from claimant's nineteen years of full duty labor and, following his 2009 accident, to change 
their position and obtain a contrary opinion from Dr. Frizzell who apparently was persuaded by 
Defendants to change his initial opinion and find that the claimant had some impairment attributable 
to his 1990 injury. Clearly Defendants gained an advantage from Dr. Knoebel's 1991 0% 
impairment rating and full release and now seek to gain an advantage against the ISIF by arguing that 
Dr. Knoebel' s impairment and full release was somehow not applicable and Dr. Frizzell' s retroactive 
impairment rating now carries the day. Just as the Commission should not allow this unconscionable 
change of position under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, the Commission should also consider that 
the Defendants' could not, without this change of position, carry its burden of establishing a parma 
facie case against the ISIF. 
Since the issue of quasi-estoppel and the position change invoked by Defendants was clearly 
at issue by virtue ofISIF's affirmative defenses to the Defendants' complaint and the facts support 
the Commission's finding, ISIF respectfully requests that the Commission deny Defendants' Motion 
for Reconsideration. 
DATED this 1'\ !"-day of October, 2012. 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By~~~~-++-~~~~~~~~ 
Paul J. Augus i e - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for dustrial Special Indemnity Fund 
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